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FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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Reflections on the Quarter

President Nixon's Third State of the World Message

ON February 9, 1972, a week before beginning his epochal trip to Peking, President Nixon issued his third annual State of the World Message to Congress, entitled *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace*. This document, like its predecessors, is designed to inform the Congress and the public of the underlying rationale and hopes of U.S. foreign policy. It is thus simultaneously a statement of U.S. philosophy, a chronicle of accomplishments and an assessment of prospects.

The Nixon Administration has founded its foreign policy on a conception of a new American role in world affairs: In a world of increasing multipolarity, the United States can restrict its commitments as other powers assume a greater share of the burden of their security. This concept derived from an analysis of American public morale, the growth of Soviet nuclear power, the impressive development of economic power in Western Europe and Japan, and the entry of the People's Republic of China into the world political community. Three principles — strength, partnership, negotiation —are supposed to govern the new policy. Sufficient strength to assure the continuation of global strategic deterrence, greater assistance from our allies in maintaining regional stability, and the conduct of negotiations with our adversaries are the main parts of the program.

In his 1972 statement, President Nixon proclaimed that "signal progress" had been made in putting his philosophy into practice. Signal progress in strategic power, however, has been registered by the Soviet Union. According to the Administration's figures, during the past three years the number of Soviet land-based missiles has increased from 1,190 to 1,520 and Soviet sea-based missiles from 240 to 500. U.S. missiles in these categories remained 1,054 and 656, respectively. Despite improvements made to U.S. missiles, such as MIRV and Poseidon, and advanced work on an ABM, Soviet strategic advances have caused concern. The President has therefore requested an increase in the U.S. defense budget for the new fiscal year, with special emphasis on research for ULMS, a new underwater missile system designed to preserve the invulnerability of the U.S. sea-based deterrent.

In the area of partnership, the message stresses the monetary agreement of December 1971, the British entry into the Common Market, the meetings held with various European leaders during the past year, and the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. But the monetary crisis and the new China policy are acknowledged to have caused considerable

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strain among the allies, especially Japan. The President admits that relationships with our friends "appeared somewhat out of phase with innovations taken . . . with our adversaries." Nonetheless, he remains confident of basic allied harmony.

Finally, the proudest achievements presented by the report are in negotiations with adversaries. Talks on strategic arms control with the Soviet Union are making progress; tensions in Central Europe have declined; increased trade with the Soviet Union is a distinct possibility; and, above all, the Presidential visit to Peking promises to usher in a new era in American-Asian relations. But President Nixon is cautious; the picture is mixed. The Soviet Union and the United States continue to have deep differences in the Middle East and in South Asia, as revealed during the Indo-Pakistani war. Negotiations with North Viet Nam remain at dead center. Many differences with the Chinese People's Republic persist in the aftermath of President Nixon's visit.

The importance attached to the Presidential world message as a statement of U.S. policy was clearly revealed in the press conference held in Shanghai on February 27, after release of the U.S.-China communiqué. In the communiqué, the United States "affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes."

At the press conference, Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was asked why the United States did not affirm its treaty commitment to Taiwan in the communiqué. In reply, he referred to a portion of the President's State of the World Message: "Our bilateral security treaties with Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea remain the touchstones of regional stability." (p. 87.)

The President's message, however, also states that "Adjustments in our own military deployments in Asia have come only after thoroughgoing reviews with our partners." (p. 87.) The Republic of China on Taiwan contended that the goal of the ultimate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan was made without prior consultation as required in the Mutual Security Treaty of 1954 between Taipei and Washington. This issue clearly presents a dilemma as the United States endeavors to attempt to open up new avenues with adversaries without destroying the confidence of its allies.

The President's 1972 message differs in tone from its predecessors. While he sounds many optimistic notes, he seems to realize that the "structure of peace" still lacks the foundation stone of full cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Further, as the United States-People's Republic communiqué suggests, profound differences exist between these two powers as to the future of Asia.

Since China categorically eschews the role of superpower, the

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forthcoming negotiations with Moscow may be of more intrinsic importance than those with Peking. The fundamental problem besetting the Nixon Doctrine is: Will American moderation, compelled largely by domestic crisis, be matched by Soviet moderation, compelled largely by fear of confrontation? If President Nixon's agenda for his Moscow visit is indicative, he does not intend to let the issue of Soviet intentions rest another year, for arms control and the Middle East are high on the list. As the sections of the report on strategic arms, the Middle East and South Asia reveal, the President is wary of Soviet motives. This sentiment will surely be appreciated by Peking.

President Nixon concludes that the control of enmity is an insufficient permanent goal for a foreign policy. A more inspirational theme must be sounded: for a durable peace, distinguished by a world order in which all have a stake and in which "habits of moderation and compromise can be nurtured." These are fine but vague sentiments. It is the translation of these purposes into general Congressional and popular support for particular programs which remains the Administration's abiding weakness. The narrow Congressional votes on critical defense programs, the defeat of the initial foreign aid bill, and the sentiment for troop withdrawals from Europe all demonstrate that this dimension of foreign policy has not been a resounding success.

The third Presidential message thus records diverse attempts to erect a lasting structure of peace. The major element, Soviet cooperation, is still elusive. The United States has negotiated tenaciously for three years on many issues, seeking sometimes desperately (as in the Middle East) to establish lasting Soviet commitments to cooperation. In the meanwhile the Soviets have increased their strength enormously. Our partnerships have hardly prospered under the strain of the monetary crisis, negotiations with the Soviet Union and the new China policy. And the President is still attempting to establish the domestic consensus he correctly believes is essential to the success of his foreign policies.

NATO and MBFR

IN recent months momentum has been alternately building and ebbing behind proposals for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe. During much of 1971 economic and political pressures in the United States, a desire for détente among important elements of European opinion, and apparently positive signals from Moscow pointed to the possibility of MBFR talks beginning in the near future. By February 1972, however, the U.S. government appeared to have lost considerable interest in the proposed negotiations, which had never enjoyed great support in the foreign ministries of Western Europe. The Soviet Union and its Pact allies, moreover, flatly rejected a bloc-to-bloc forum for the talks.

MBFR talks were initially proposed by NATO in the Reykjavik

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Declaration of June 1968. The NATO ministers enunciated several principles for troop reductions including reciprocity, balance, the maintenance of security at reduced cost, and reliable verification. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 made the proposal a dead letter for eighteen months until U.S. Congressional pressure built up for unilateral American cutbacks. In May 1970 the NATO ministers reaffirmed their interest in MBFR talks, and in June the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers proposed the reduction of "foreign armed forces stationed on the territories of the European states." At the Twenty-fourth CPSU Party Congress in March 1971, Brezhnev made it clear that "foreign" armed forces referred to Soviet as well as American forces; and in January 1972 the Warsaw Pact, in a communiqué from Prague, agreed to consider cutbacks in both foreign and indigenous forces, thus satisfying a key West European demand.

Whether MBFR talks would bode well for the security interests of the United States, Western Europe or even the Soviet Union is doubtful. A major U.S. motivation in pressing for MBFR is to quiet domestic critics who seek to reduce U.S. participation in the defense of Europe and thus force the Europeans to bear a greater part of the burden of their own security. MBFR has had support in the United States because it appeared, at first, to offer the opportunity of negotiating force reductions on a proportional basis with the Soviet Union, without jeopardizing European security.

The American commitment to defend Western Europe is made tangible by the presence of substantial numbers of U.S. troops. It retains credibility despite a growing inclination to doubt that the United States would use its strategic nuclear power to defend Western Europe in a period of Soviet-American nuclear parity, which compels the United States to risk the destruction of its own territory in order to defend its NATO allies. European apprehension about MBFR is based on several factors, especially on fear that such an agreement, by cutting U.S. force levels, would weaken the linkage between American strategic power and the deterrence of conflict in Europe.

Aside from strategic considerations, the crucial question is whether mutual and balanced force reductions would weaken NATO theater defenses more than Warsaw Pact defenses. Pact forces currently outnumber those of NATO by almost half a million men, and Soviet forces alone have a numerical advantage over NATO armies in Northern and Central Europe, historically the invasion route to the west. Balanced force reductions would cut troop strengths by equal percentages and increase existing asymmetries by paring essential NATO units; the Warsaw Pact forces could adjust more easily to reductions in their larger military establishment. In general, reductions tend to give an advantage to offensive capabilities, because an attacking force could be concentrated while reduced defensive forces would have to spread themselves

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along a given line unless they have adequate warning of an impending attack. But this Pact advantage might be offset by the questionable reliability and motivation of East European armies in an offensive role.

Other asymmetries would have to be taken into account in any MBFR negotiations. Geographically, any reduction in U.S. troop strength would remove those forces more than 3,000 miles from the Continent. In the event of hostilities, they would have to be transported and supplied across the Atlantic along exposed air and sea lanes. Moreover, their airlift back to Europe in the midst of a crisis would probably be deemed provocative and, in wartime, would depend on access to vulnerable airbases and staging areas. By contrast, Soviet troops would be pulled back 400 miles with easy access by ground to their former positions.

This asymmetry has a psychological aspect as well. U.S. force reductions could lead to an American psychological disengagement from problems of European security at a time when the Soviet Union has made great advances in its military capabilities.

Another less publicized asymmetry existing *within* NATO poses a difficult political problem. The American armies in Europe are, for the most part, qualitatively superior in training and equipment to their West European counterparts. If, as a result of MBFR, American forces were drawn down, the impact would be more serious than if a similar number of NATO European troops were reduced. To forestall this possibility, the West European governments have sought to keep American force cuts to a minimum in proportion to their own, but it is precisely American reductions that U.S. Congressional critics have been demanding. Therefore, MBFR negotiations could contribute to further division between the United States and Western Europe. Undoubtedly because of an awareness of this difficulty, the NATO member-states have undertaken detailed joint studies of MBFR within the alliance.

France, like our other chief allies, entertains serious misgivings concerning MBFR talks. The French position on MBFR has changed markedly since President Pompidou took office. Under de Gaulle the impression was fostered that the French government was not reluctant to encourage American conventional disengagement from the Continent. But Pompidou, aware that West German hegemony might follow U.S. withdrawal from European affairs, has favored the maintenance of maximum U.S. troop strength in Germany. French policy appears to oppose not only unilateral force reductions but mutual ones as well. Paris also balks at MBFR negotiations conducted within the framework of bloc-to-bloc diplomacy, a forum in which the superpowers would dominate discussions. Opposition to such diplomacy, a longstanding French attitude in European security issues, has led France to prefer a conference on European security as the setting for MBFR talks. Again, this view conflicts with

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U.S. policy, which considers a conference embracing nations belonging to neither alliance to be inappropriate for discussing an issue that directly concerns the NATO member-states.

The British government, fearing that troop cuts would create a military balance favoring the Soviet Union, has warned of the serious and complex problems involved in negotiations, while not publicly opposing the talks.

The official German attitude is no more enthusiastic, for any diminution in NATO's capability to respond conventionally to a Soviet attack would reduce the options available to NATO in response to a Warsaw Pact invasion. Moreover, the *Ostpolitik* has been predicated on the leverage American support for West Germany gives Bonn in dealing with the USSR. Premature troop reductions would weaken the position of the Brandt Government in negotiations with Moscow and at the same time would encourage Bonn to believe that an accommodation should be reached with the Soviet Union as Europe's predominant power. In this respect, the *Ostpolitik* could have an impact on U.S. policy. It may discourage the Nixon Administration from opening MBFR negotiations, since it provides ammunition to Senate critics who favor unilateral U.S. cutbacks: these Senators may argue that, because of *Ostpolitik,* the need for U.S. troops in Europe to defend Germany against a nonexistent Soviet threat is diminished.

Elsewhere in the alliance, the Turks are fearful of any agreement that would reduce pressure on the Soviet Union along NATO's Central Front, since it would free Moscow to concentrate larger forces on the Turkish border. In fact, only in Norway and Denmark is there any enthusiasm for the prospect of U.S.-Soviet force reductions.

Official American reservations about MBFR are based on several factors. First, because of the above-mentioned imbalances, verification problems, political difficulties, and a possibly awkward negotiating forum in which a dozen or more nations might be represented, MBFR talks might drag on for an even longer period than the almost three years consumed to date by the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Second, these talks would be far more complex because of the problems of asymmetry, the variety of weapons systems involved and the varying security needs of the nations affected by MBFR.

Third, after exhaustive study Western defense planners have concluded that MBFR would undoubtedly weaken NATO in relation to the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets have not accepted "balanced" cutbacks; rather, they have proposed that reductions not be "to the detriment of the countries taking part" in the talks. The Warsaw Pact communiqué following the Prague meeting on January 25-26 failed to put forward a formula for "balanced" troop reductions which would deviate from the one-to-one ratio. This omission was greeted with relief by many U.S. officials who, because of the great complexity of MBFR, would not be

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displeased by Soviet unwillingness to enter into negotiations.

The Soviet attitude has depended in part on the forum in which the proposed talks would take place. In the spring of 1971, both Brezhnev and Kosygin expressed interest in negotiations. On May 14, 1971, five days before the U.S. Senate was scheduled to vote on the Mansfield Amendment, Soviet party leader Brezhnev delivered a speech in Tbilisi urging the West to start negotiations on mutual but not necessarily balanced troop reductions. Four days later, on the eve of the Senate vote, Kosygin reiterated Brezhnev's position. The Soviet leaders thus undermined the efforts of Mansfield Amendment supporters by providing the Administration with the argument that *unilateral* U.S. force reductions would be a mistake of "historic proportions," making meaningful talks on *mutual* force reductions impossible. Whether Brezhnev and Kosygin had deliberately or inadvertently assisted the defeat of the Mansfield Amendment, some observers concluded that Moscow might be seriously interested in some kind of negotiations.

By the end of 1971, however, it appeared that the Soviets had ruled out bloc-to-bloc talks. A key indicator was their refusal to receive former NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio, appointed in early October as a special emissary to Moscow for preliminary MBFR discussions. Several factors may explain their reluctance to see Brosio. Opposed to bloc-to-bloc talks, they may wish to find an alternate forum, such as a conference on European security, in which their potential for exploiting divisions among Western states would be maximized. Such a forum, however, would hold some disadvantages for the Soviet Union. In the event of growing self-assertiveness by Yugoslavia, Rumania or other East European countries while the negotiations were in progress—probably over several years—the Soviets would be faced with the unpleasant choice of either permitting such momentum to develop in the hope of proving their "reasonableness" to West European countries, or taking military action, as they did in 1968, at the risk of torpedoing the conference.

Soviet indifference to the Brosio mission may also stem from a desire to use MBFR talks as a means of enhancing the international stature of the German Democratic Republic. A NATO-Warsaw Pact framework for the talks would provide minimal East German representation, whereas a European security conference would give East Germany the chance to participate more freely and gain added prestige.

Finally, the Soviet Union may have rejected bloc-to-bloc negotiations as a means of undermining prospects for the talks while appearing to favor them in principle. If the motive is to block negotiations, it may be speculated that the Soviets have come to place a higher priority on maintaining their own forces (and stability) in Eastern Europe than on cutbacks in U.S. forces in the West. For while some NATO officials estimate that the Soviets could withdraw up to 30

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per cent of their forces from Eastern Europe without losing the capability to intervene effectively in the event of another "Prague Spring," it is by no means certain that the Kremlin makes the same calculation. The Pact communiqué of January 26, admitting the possibility of cutbacks in "national" armies as well as "foreign" ones, sought to reassure West European governments that East European forces could be reduced; but it was consistent also with the Soviet Union's interest in maintaining a preponderance of its own forces in the East vis-à-vis its Pact allies. Any analysis of Soviet policy and motives on MBFR is speculative and must allow for the interplay of bureaucratic disagreement within the top military and political leadership (such as has existed with respect to SALT).

If MBFR negotiations eventually take place, it will be because the United States sees no alternative to unilateral U.S. force reductions and because Moscow decides to use MBFR to exploit divisions within NATO and ultimately reduce the American presence, even at the risk that Soviet troop reductions might induce instability in Eastern Europe. Force reductions might also permit the Soviet Union to realize financial savings and redeploy troops to its border with China.

Should MBFR negotiations lead to Soviet and American force reductions of between 10 and 30 per cent, the impact might extend beyond considerations already adduced. Our European allies are not likely to respond by increasing their own defense capabilities to make up for lessened American power. Rather, U.S. reductions could have a snowball effect, encouraging European governments to cut back their NATO force contributions. This not only would further expose Europe to Soviet military-diplomatic pressure, but would compel abandonment of NATO's flexible response strategy.

Furthermore, MBFR talks could reinforce one of the negative consequences of a SALT accord that did not limit Soviet offensive systems. Such an agreement would erode confidence in the willingness of the United States to come to Europe's defense at the risk of exposing American cities to a massive Soviet nuclear strike. Paralleling this, MBFR could undermine the credibility of the U.S. commitment to escalate to strategic nuclear weapons in defense of a diminished American military presence in Europe. In such an atmosphere of uncertainty the Soviet leadership might be tempted in Europe, as Khrushchev was in Cuba, to seek unilateral strategic advantage. In short, whether the scenario is military—at the conventional or nuclear levels—or political, the ultimate cost of saving a few hundred million dollars by troop withdrawals might jeopardize vital American security interests in Europe.

The Changing Balance in South Asia

THE events of December 1971 in the Indian subcontinent brought forth a new state, dramatically rearranged the local balance of power, and led to a new high in

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major power involvement in the region.

The creation of an independent Bangladesh was perhaps inevitable. The union of East and West Pakistan on the sole basis of common religion had been incongruous from the start. East Bengali grievances were long-standing, requiring only the development of political conditions to bring them to a head. So long as an authoritarian government was able to maintain its firm grip, the union of the two parts preserved a surface stability. But the initiation of democratic political processes in 1970 started a series of events that military repression proved unable to quell. The overwhelming mandate the East Bengalis gave the Awami League of Sheik Mujibur Rahman in the 1970 elections indicated the depth of feeling on the East Pakistan issue. In subsequent negotiations on the accession of the newly elected government Yahya Khan, with a large assist from Ali Bhutto, decided against generous concessions which would have been the only way to preserve some form of union. The military occupation of the Eastern wing that followed was foredoomed by India's long-harbored desire to score a major victory over its subcontinental neighbor.

The Indo-Pakistani war must be viewed against the background of shifting power relationships—the decline of the American position in the subcontinent and the growth of Soviet and Chinese ties with the respective parties to the crisis. The reactions of the two principal nations of South Asia to the announcement of President Nixon's visit to China reflected the trends of their relations with the United States and Peking and highlighted the shifts in alignment.

Pakistan, at that time already heavily engaged in the suppression of East Bengal, saw the Sino-American rapprochement as a means to relieve the contradiction in its own foreign policy. Long supported by the United States and a member of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan had moved toward China largely as a consequence of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani clashes of 1965. The obvious unwillingness of the United States to give them meaningful assistance against India—in Pakistan's view the sole enemy—forced the Pakistanis to move closer to the only other large power capable and perhaps willing to do so. Yet good relations with two powers hostile to each other is a somewhat precarious position and, therefore, Pakistan was more than willing to aid the United States in arranging Dr. Kissinger's first journey to Peking.

India, on the other hand, has maintained an ambivalent stance toward Peking. When the peaceful coexistence spirit of Bandung was undermined by the Chinese invasion in 1962, Indo-American relations reached a high point of accord. In the wake of the 1965 war with Pakistan, however, India has moved ever closer to the Soviets while trying, at least prior to 1971, to reconstruct relations with China —with slight success. China received virtually all it required from India at no cost to itself: the bor-

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der question had been resolved militarily in China's favor; India consistently supported UN membership for the Chinese People's Republic and withheld recognition from Taiwan; Chinese sovereignty in Tibet was tacitly accepted, and the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugee groups in India were not permitted to engage in activities which might harm the gestures of friendship. In contrast, China provided military aid to the Naxalites, Nagas and Mizos; Chinese press attacks continued, and Peking's support for Pakistan has been maintained.

When President Nixon's visit to China was announced on July 15, the Indo-Pakistani clash was rapidly escalating. The Pakistan army's crackdown in the East had begun four months earlier and the inpouring of refugees into India had become an acute problem. In Delhi's view, any increased harmony among Pakistan, China and the United States represented a serious threat. The Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1971 thus was formalized at an opportune time, although its foundations had been laid well in advance of the Nixon announcement. As the crisis developed the Soviet alliance proved its worth: Moscow sent massive military assistance to India immediately prior to the two-week war and made liberal use of the veto in the UN Security Council. Whether the immobility of Chinese military forces on India's northern border was a result of Soviet pressure, the winter season or Chinese reluctance is an open question.

In the aftermath of the two-week war, an interim balance sheet may be drawn. India has emerged as the dominant regional power, possessed of not unsubstantial military capability. One cannot but admire the adroitness of Indian diplomacy. For Delhi, the influx of refugees and the presence of large Pakistani military forces in the East presented too great a threat to ignore, and the difficulties encountered by Pakistan in suppressing rebellion in the East presented an excellent opportunity to accomplish its decisive defeat. After Yahya Khan's initial move against East Bengal in March, it took eight months for events to unfold in India's favor: the training of the Mukti Bahini and their probing of Pakistani defenses; the conclusion of the Soviet alliance; the redeployment of Indian military forces; the advent of the winter season; the growth of world sentiment against Pakistani atrocities. All pieces were in place by late November, whereupon the Indian military moved with dispatch. The results were easily predictable.

Pakistan emerges as a nation shorn of a long-standing liability, with a new government whose posture is as yet unclear, and with a desire for revenge that may well color the diplomacy of the subcontinent for many years. It will lack the capability for response, however, and its disablement may invite renewed Indian challenges over the half of Kashmir under Pakistani control and over still-disputed portions of the Punjab. On Pakistan's other flank, relations with Afghanistan have been close to the point of conflict on several occasions over the Khyber Pass

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frontier area of Pushtunistan or Pakhtoonistan. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which Afghanistan and India will press claims against the weakened Pakistan state with the backing of the Soviet Union.

Since gaining power, President Bhutto has been busily consolidating his position at the expense of the discredited Yahya Khan. He has visited Peking while calling for a new security treaty with the United States, announced Pakistan's withdrawal from the Commonwealth after Britain granted diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh, and initiated various economic policies, the outcome of which remains uncertain.

Bangladesh faces formidable problems. Whether Sheik Mujibur Rahman will be successful in achieving his stated goal of a parliamentary government is questionable. Obviously any government will find it difficult to assuage pent-up political demands, not to speak of the gigantic economic problems of overpopulation and natural and man-made disaster. Mujibur's personal popularity may be expected to hold sway for some time but the probable inability of any government to solve the problems of the nation may make for long-term chaos.

The Indians may find extricating themselves from East Bengal more difficult than their military conquest. At some point the degree of influence India seeks to exert over the new nation may prove too conspicuous for the East Bengalis. The Indians for their part may face increasing separatist movements among their own numerous minorities, notably in the trouble-plagued state of West Bengal. This, however, must be balanced against Mrs. Gandhi's electoral triumph of March 1971 and the exuberant Indian nationalism engendered by military victory.

The United Nations once again proved itself incapable of exercising control over a major international crisis. The Security Council was effectively hamstrung by the Soviet vetoes. The General Assembly, a primary focus of American policy during the conflict, proved unable to enforce the overwhelming mandate it gave for a cease-fire; the Indian government ignored the 104-to-11 vote of December 7 until India's conquest of the East was complete. The principle forbidding aggression across national frontiers was thus once more successfully violated, adding another failure to the UN record.

Of the major powers, the Soviet Union emerged from the conflict with vastly increased prestige and a considerable claim to whatever position it wants in India, in spite of Mrs. Gandhi's pledge of continued nonalignment. The Soviets prevailed against both the United States and China, which found common ground in support of Pakistan. That Moscow exposed the Sino-American mutuality of interests as a "paper tiger" will influence the strategic equation around the rim of the Indian Ocean for years to come. The new Soviet position in India may be translated into more extensive naval privileges and may provide an important link in the expanding Soviet presence

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in the region. Moscow is also establishing the basis for a position in Bangladesh, though the outcome here must await the course of the new nation's politics and the Kremlin's decision on the worth of Bangladesh as a dependent client. The Soviet containment of China took a giant step forward and Sino-Soviet relations worsened as a consequence.

On the other side of the ledger, support for India was not popular in the Arab world, though this will not prove a major liability since Pakistani ties with the Middle Eastern states are not particularly strong. There is also some question about how much economic assistance the Soviets will provide to India and to Bangladesh. It is doubtful that the Soviet Union would be willing or able to match the American aid to India.

China took the defeat of its Pakistani client rather calmly. Chinese action was limited to verbal support in the UN and moderate official communiqués from Peking. Chinese statements on alleged border violations by India have been mild and there is no apparent move underway to revive the 1962 conflict.

Peking had faced a major policy dilemma when the Pakistani crisis flared in March—whether to maintain friendly ties with Rawalpindi or to support the "national liberation" movement in Bengal. In some respects its decision in favor of the Pakistan government may be viewed as a victory of traditional diplomacy over ideology. The manner in which the Chinese attempt to salvage the present situation remains to be seen. It is doubtful whether China will wish to tolerate a Soviet-Indian axis, but Peking's diplomatic and military options are not especially attractive. Pakistan is no longer a valuable ally to be played against India. Military pressure on India would be potentially a dangerous move in view of the more than forty Soviet divisions on China's northern border. Political maneuvering in Bangladesh is a distinct though difficult possibility, as is increased support for insurgent groups within India.

U.S. foreign policy was thrown into considerable disarray by the two-week war. Intensive American attempts at mediation among the three parties failed largely as a consequence of Indian intransigence. Efforts to arrange a speedy ceasefire, both through the United Nations and bilaterally, were ineffective. The United States was in the position of reluctant ally to a government bent on an unwise policy of violence and brutality—an ally whose support, in the end, was widely perceived as inadequate, confused, or misconceived. The pronouncements from Washington, the dispatch of the naval task force, and the intimations of second thoughts about the President's forthcoming Moscow visit did not deter the Indian advance into East Pakistan. Actually, U.S. actions were not designed to do so, since American policymakers quickly recognized the hopelessness of the West Pakistani position. Dr. Kissinger was already using the term Bangladesh rather than East Pakistan shortly after the Indian invasion, whereas *New York Times* dis-

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patches were still datelined East Pakistan.

American policy may have helped to deter any designs India had for a major attack on West Pakistan after the elimination of resistance in the East. Although there is no categorical proof that Mrs. Gandhi and her Soviet backers had such designs, a reduced and splintered West Pakistan probably would have appealed to certain factions within the Indian government. It is noteworthy that Bhutto has attributed the absence of an attack against West Pakistan to U.S. statements and deployments made during the crisis. Whatever the effect of U.S. policy, the retention of a viable West Pakistan state remains a fundamental American goal.

There was little the United States could have done to alter the course of events on the subcontinent, given the intentions of the Indians and Soviets and the blunders of the Pakistan government. American influence in Delhi had been minimal for a long period and influence in Rawalpindi had in some degree been mortgaged by Pakistan's assistance in arranging for the Kissinger visit to Peking. Though India may still need American aid, the United States will be hard put to constrain Soviet influence there.

It will be difficult for Washington to derive any practical benefit from its position as the largest donor to refugee relief in the subcontinent, yet the magnitude of American aid is worth noting. The U.S. government announced its readiness to provide $500 million in cash or commodities, of which a total of $91 million was committed through the United Nations for the support of nearly ten million refugees in India, and $158 million was set aside for famine and refugee relief in East Pakistan, supplied through the United Nations and bilaterally. In addition, during fiscal year 1971, the United States supplied $540 million in development assistance to India, an amount which accounted for two-thirds of all international development funds for that country.

The President's Peking visit survived the conflict, even though part of the rationale for it, namely, the restraint of growing Soviet power, had already been undermined by the outcome of the India-Pakistan war. China's role as a counterbalance to the USSR has more potential than current usefulness. In the meanwhile, a more confident India, content with her new dominance of the subcontinent, may seek to restore channels to Washington so as to avoid the perils of a too intimate friendship with Moscow.

New Trends in Canadian-U.S. Relations

CANADA is cautiously developing some new relationships with the United States. The impetus for these new directions in Canadian foreign policy is an increasing concern that extensive economic involvement with the United States makes Ottawa excessively dependent on Washington.

Canada is the United States'

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best customer, but is much more dependent on world trade and one market than is the American economy. In 1971, Canada's exports to the United States reached $12.2 billion, amounting to 68 per cent of all Canadian exports; exports from the United States to its northern neighbor exceeded $11 billion, constituting nearly 75 per cent of total Canadian imports but only 25 per cent of total U.S. exports. American investment, approximating $23 billion, also plays a vital role in the Canadian economy. Some Canadian industries are almost completely controlled by American subsidiaries, while about half of Canada's total manufacturing plant is owned by American multinational corporations.

In the past few years, Canada has taken a number of steps to diversify its trade patterns and cultivate new political relationships. For example, Ottawa established diplomatic relations with Peking in 1970, voted for the Albanian resolution to seat Communist China in the United Nations in 1971, and signed a record $200 million wheat deal with the Chinese for 1972. Prime Minister Trudeau's visits to foreign heads of state in 1970 and 1971 provide yet another indication of Canada's determination to establish a distinctive identity on the world scene. In 1970 Trudeau visited New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and Japan. In 1971 he went to Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States, and attended the official Commonwealth Conference at Singapore. The Canadian view holds that a foreign policy maintaining important economic and political links with numerous countries can make Canada a more confident ally less vulnerable to American political influence.

Some of these Canadian initiatives, particularly closer relations with China, diverged rather sharply from U.S. policy at the time they were taken. In order to prevent damage to U.S.-Canadian relations, Ottawa emphasized that its policies were intended to contribute to peace and order and were responsive to domestic needs. Canada took pains to stress that the United States would remain its best friend and largest trading partner. The 10 per cent import surcharge imposed by the United States on August 15, 1971 suggested, however, that a reconciliation of American and Canadian interests in the future may be quite difficult. The Trudeau administration pressed hard but unsuccessfully for exemption from the U.S. surtax on the grounds that neither Canada's floating dollar nor any Canadian discrimination had damaged U.S. exports. The incident confirmed the suspicion of many Canadians that American interests would be defended vigorously, even if important Canadian interests were harmed in the process.

Termination of the U.S. surcharge on December 20, 1971 prevented a confrontation between the two countries. The episode, however, increased Canadian feelings of dependence on the American economy and renewed a determination to achieve greater local con-

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trol of the Canadian economy. The government has moved ahead in its efforts to formulate guidelines for U.S. investment. The tax reform bill approved by Parliament on December 17, 1971 contained several measures to control foreign investment and slow down American takeovers of Canadian business. The Trudeau administration intends to take additional steps. A recommendation in 1971 by the Gray Commission for a screening agency to increase Canadian control over U.S. investments and to "pick and choose" those investments most beneficial to Canada has been accepted in principle by the Cabinet. A comprehensive statement about government policy toward U.S. investment has been promised by the spring of 1972. In Quebec, U.S. investors are facing increased demands to use French in their day-to-day operations.

Because the two North American states must deal with many issues from different perspectives, quite a few problems between them remain unresolved, though none has reached the intensity of the trade and investment issues. For instance, bargaining positions have hardened on both sides regarding the way in which the 1965 U.S.-Canadian automobile agreement is to be revised. The 1965 pact permits new cars to cross the border duty-free, though some "safeguards" were included to protect the emerging Canadian automobile industry. The United States seeks the removal of the auto pact's "safeguards," while Ottawa fears that a completely integrated North American car industry would entail loss of control of important economic decisions.

Natural resources policy is another pressing issue. Are fuel resources to be shared through a continental energy policy or will Canadian economic nationalism prevent further integration of North American raw materials industries?

A recurrent problem is caused by the pervasive American cultural influence. French Canadians are becoming as interested as English Canadians in examining ways of creating a distinctive Canadian culture.

Security policy, too, is a source of disagreement. Canada is vital to U.S. security and vice versa, yet Canada's long-term role in continental defense has not been clarified. Canada cooperates with the United States in continental defense through NORAD, but national sovereignty is stressed increasingly in the case of the Canadian Arctic and Ottawa seeks to assume complete control of all military activities in Canada.

On the more positive side, President Nixon will visit Ottawa in April 1972. After Prime Minister Trudeau's December 6, 1971 trip to Washington, he expressed appreciation for President Nixon's respect for Canada's political and economic identity. Moreover, the historical perspective confirms an optimistic assessment of U.S.-Canadian relations. For the first decade after World War II, Canada played the role of one of the world's most important middle powers. Her influence often pro-

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vided vital support for U.S. efforts to build a viable postwar order. With the restoration of Western Europe and the rise of Japan, Canada had neither the weight nor the desire to continue that role. But she remains a close friend and important ally.

As Canada searches for a new international role, it is acknowledged that her destiny is inescapably linked to the United States. The United States, too, is increasingly recognizing the importance of its largest trading partner. The demonstrable capacity of both countries to live tolerantly and cooperatively with each other, despite immense disparities, will continue to provide impressive evidence to the world that national borders can unite rather than divide peoples.

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THE SUPERPOWERS AND MULTIPOLARITY: FROM PAX AMERICANA TO PAX SOVIETICA?

by John R. Swanson

THE apparent loosening of the bipolar international system into a multipolar one at first suggests that both superpowers will lose international influence to newly emerging major actors. A closer examination of this transition, however, indicates that the diffusion of power represented in the process may come at the expense of one of today's superpowers and create potential advantages for the other. While the hypothetical beneficiary could be either the United States or the Soviet Union, there is a strong possibility that it will be the Soviet Union.

The major obstacle to considering this eventuality is the temptation to apply to a future multipolar system the classical "balance of power" model, signifying a fluid process of coalition-building and breakup in which any combination or recombination of actors is possible. One flaw inherent in imposing this abstract model on the complex system which is likely to emerge is the fact that the new multipolarity will grow out of the present, and not be suddenly substituted for bipolarity. The "new" major actors will not achieve superpower status quickly, let alone simultaneously. Rather, they will gain their rank gradually and individually from a long series of marginal changes in the total field of world politics.

It is logical to assume that the United States and the Soviet Union will attempt to influence the transition, and that their efforts will affect the nature and workings of the future system. Differences in their interests, capabilities, prestige and images, and in the relationships of these factors to the interests and capabilities of the prospective major participants in the system will thus be crucial to the evolution of the new multipolarity.

Military security alliances, a major feature of the balance of power model, could also be absent. Either the continuation of present armament trends or denuclearization will reduce their significance. In the former case, the most probable outcome would be a multipolar deterrence situation, analogous to Morton Kaplan's "unit veto system," in which each actor has the capacity

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to destroy or at least to deter all of its likely opponents.[1] Multiple-actor deterrence would neutralize nuclear power as the deciding factor — as would nuclear disarmament. It would also lessen the incentive for military alliances among the major powers and perhaps even provide disincentives, for example, the fear of provoking an opponent or set of opponents by moving toward an alignment.

Nonnuclear power factors would determine the actual balance, but these are unlikely to be equally distributed or to have an equal impact on all of the participants. (Differences in population are one example of this.) Indeed, the familiar bipolar system was a stalemate only on the nuclear level, for in total power the United States has enjoyed a substantial advantage over the Soviet Union. Nonmilitary aspects of power will also work against the fluidity envisioned in the balance of power model.

Multipolarity and Intersecting Cleavages

The elements of statehood and state power are far more complex now than at the beginning of the century, and much more closely interwoven, both domestically and internationally. States are no longer the closed or closable systems of the classical balance of power period. Instead, each major actor today (or, properly, the elites of each state), and even more those of the future, is or will be a nexus in an intricate network of relationships and processes. This follows logically from our present system of *interpenetrated* states, and could be reduced only by a headlong reversal of the industrial and technological revolutions.

The future multipolar system will be characterized by intersecting lines of cleavage, growing interpenetration of the states involved, and differential alignments by any one state on different ranges of issues. It will be a world in which marginal changes and marginal differences are more likely than dramatic or revolutionary upheavals, for the simple fact that the costs of the latter and the factors exercising a braking impact upon them are higher.

These features of the future system are already somewhat in evidence. The Sino-Soviet conflict and American difficulties in relation to Western Europe and Japan are signs that the military and ideological cleavages of the Cold War are being cross-cut by tensions between the superpowers and their allies or bloc partners, past and present. Other contemporary features that will retain

[1]Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 50-52.

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their importance and further complicate cleavage patterns are differences between the developed and underdeveloped countries, trends toward regional integration and opposition to extraregional influence, nationalism and subnational tensions, cross-national political, social and economic fissures and power clusters. Superimposed on all of this is the growth of international communication and awareness which has led some, such as Marshall McLuhan, to depict a "global village,"[2] though the kind of worldwide social, cultural and political integration that term connotes is still far from realization.

Awareness of the potency of cleavages cutting across ideological groupings and enthusiasm for the diminution of Cold War tensions do not, however, mean that ideological divisions have already been or are about to be replaced by other factors. While there are many indications that ideology is declining as the primary determinant in international politics, ideological interests and motives have not completely disappeared. The present "left-right" ideological spectrum will continue to have a significant role in world affairs, and some trends might actually reinforce it (for example, American economic difficulties would tend to reinforce communist notions of inherent contradictions in the capitalist system). Nevertheless, these ideological factors will be operating in a more complex political field, simultaneously with other lines of cleavage, each setting limits on the effects of the others.

Competition between communists and capitalists, or between a broader socialist aggregation and capitalism, will reduce the potential fluidity of a multipolar system and put brakes on changes based on friction between the superpowers and their allies. Neither a capitalist nor a communist state is likely to pursue a political alignment that jeopardizes its own values or social system. Thus, as the two blocs continue to loosen in the power dimension, presently subordinated members will gain relatively more autonomy from the superpowers, while retaining the ideological affinities that have bound them together. This means the softening of ideological tensions rather than their elimination.

The Superpowers Compared

In the system outlined — one of intertwined, contradictory and cross-cutting political tendencies, with lines of cleavage and

[2]Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). The "global village" concept is discussed throughout the book.

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coalescence subject to shifting priorities — the beneficiary will be the superpower that is better able to retard the decay of its own position, to maneuver flexibly, and to pursue a relatively coherent set of objectives amid a wide and complex field of issues and tensions. Assuming rationality on the part of decision-makers of both states, a number of factors make the Soviet Union a likelier candidate for beneficiary status than the United States.

One such factor is the wider latitude Soviet centralization gives to decision-makers in the conduct of foreign policy. This will remain the case whether the Soviet elite retains its power undiminished or whether there is a trend toward democratization and decentralization. A more humane, decentralized Soviet system would be the result of a gradual transition rather than precipitate change, so that greater decision-making autonomy than that enjoyed by American foreign policymakers seems certain well into the future. Central economic planning, the state trade monopoly, a high degree of integrated and directive social organization, and relatively centralized power should be assumed in assessing Soviet capabilities.

In sharp contrast stands the recent and rather massive loss of faith by Americans in the good judgment of their leaders when the latter have had wide latitude in foreign affairs. The current questioning of foreign involvements has strengthened traditional American norms of public debate and opposition to leadership autonomy in military and nonmilitary foreign policy. U.S. leaders, even at the height of public confidence, have had to devote considerably greater effort to retaining the buffers against public pressure than have Soviet leaders, who operate in a political culture of low public involvement. This set of constraints on American decision-making bids fair to be reinforced in the wake of Viet Nam.

The distinction is not absolute, given the low probability of a complete shift to isolationism in the United States and evidence that the Soviet leadership faces growing political constraints at home. It is, however, an important one that will bear on the maneuverability of the two states in the international arena. It means that Soviet success hinges more completely than American on leadership sophistication and awareness of real world conditions.

Past evidence of the significance of this factor was the Soviet response to Western military containment policies. As early as 1949 — in the era of the supposedly rigid Stalin — the Soviet

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Union began a flanking maneuver designed to put the onus on the West for militarization and the danger of nuclear war. While the West remained locked into military alliances well into the 1950's, the Soviets laid the groundwork for an alignment with neutralists, nationalists and pacifists alienated by the Western posture.[3] Today's Soviet leadership is far more sophisticated than the Stalin regime and far more attuned to the complexities of the international scene.

The total collapse of the Soviet system is unlikely, as is the precipitate diffusion of leadership power. It is therefore reasonable to postulate a much higher level of leadership flexibility vis-à-vis public opinion for Soviet decision-makers than for American leaders. The possibility that ideologically-based interests, albeit declining, may remain a vital element in Soviet policy also gives the Soviet Union a degree of coherence in foreign activity lacking on the part of the United States, which reflects a more diffuse and often contradictory value system.

Related to this is the change in outlook of the two superpowers to involvement in world affairs. While interdependence with the rest of the world makes isolationism virtually impossible, it is almost a truism that the United States will reduce its world role as chief defender of the status quo against communism. Public disillusionment, the decay of anti-communism and the crusading mentality, the high costs and risks of overextension, domestic social and economic problems, and the simple realization that the United States is not omnipotent, all point in this direction. If this does not foreshadow a sudden withdrawal to a "fortress America," it does mean greater willingness to let events run their course and reluctance to become directly involved in crisis situations. States previously dependent on the United States will be increasingly on their own. This same factor allows the Soviet Union more maneuvering room, for the reduction of American involvement, however marginal, reduces the costs of Soviet activity.

On the other hand, it is naive to regard the USSR as a status quo power. Soviet leaders today are obviously aware of the complexities of political and social processes and less optimistic than they were in the past about the rapidity of international change. They realize that the Soviet Union lacks the intellectual, social, economic, political and military capability to be involved in every process of change taking place in the world, whether directly as a

[3]Marshall D. Shulman discusses this thesis in *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963; New York: Atheneum, 1965).

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state or indirectly through a tightly controlled communist movement. But this does not herald a complete reversal of the Soviet posture. The high level of international activity, the military buildup, including the introduction of naval forces into the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, and continued interest in relations with other communist parties suggest the opposite of a status quo orientation.

Given the exaggerated character of past Soviet efforts to promote revolution, the "fall-back" position available to the leadership is not disillusionment but the adoption of a more relaxed, gradualist attitude. Even the abandonment of ideology would not suggest Soviet contentment with the status quo, but rather an effort to promote the interests of the Soviet state in the international arena.

The idea that the ideology necessitates a highly militant, revolutionary, totalistic commitment is a misconception. Marxism-Leninism regards the world revolutionary process as *self-generating* and the role of communist parties and states as one of encouraging, supporting and accelerating processes that will occur without their involvement, although on a longer time span. Since the days of Lenin, it has been ideologically legitimate to retreat to a more marginal role when the relationship between world conditions and communist capabilities has not been conducive to rapid advances. Nothing in Soviet theory demands constant all-out exertion to promote revolution under all circumstances and at all costs. There is also little in Soviet theory to require the direct involvement of the Soviet state in every process of change; the notion that Moscow had to control the actions of every communist party can be considered a Stalinist aberration.

The leadership can thus legitimately adopt a policy of marginal, supportive influence on trends, a long-term, gradualist approach to change more in line with Soviet capabilities. One should not confuse its caution with pessimism or retrenchment, for caution has been a hallmark of Soviet foreign policy.[4] A cautious, low-profile, unrevolutionary posture may, in fact, be more conducive to the long-term achievement of ideological ends than the active hostility or ubiquitous string-pulling of the past. Such an approach generates far less counterpressure, and is thus considerably less costly. As Soviet capabilities grow, Moscow's ability to exert marginal

[4]For a study of caution versus risk-taking in Soviet foreign policy see Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 310-349.

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influence on trends will also grow, especially if the United States is simultaneously involved in a process of marginal disengagement.

The Soviet international role *is* growing, despite the taming of revolutionary militancy. This growth is firmly based on the tangible elements of power and facilitated by increasing sophistication in the arts of conventional diplomacy, assets no less conducive to the fulfillment of ideological objectives than of traditional state interests. In the future the Soviet power base is likely to become even stronger relative to the United States. The U.S. economy will confront increasing marginal constraints because of its far higher level of development and commitment of resources. Its growth potential is bound to decline as it approaches closer to the limits of its resource base and foreign-expansion potential. American dependence on the world economy is growing at the same time that the domestic price structure and foreign competition reduce the U.S. advantage. Multipolarity, as it evolves, will increase the external economic pressure from Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan and China.[5]

Soviet developmental potential is considerably greater, if for no other reason than its lower base with respect to potentially available resources and the relatively low level of Soviet involvement in the world economy. There is also more "slack" in the Soviet system for improved efficiency and productivity. Even if one allows for adversities in economic planning, problems resulting from overcentralization and managerial difficulties, Soviet growth potential is high, and the Soviet competitive position seems almost certain to improve substantially during the next twenty or thirty years.

"Guns or butter" and "machinery or butter" problems will become less stark as the economy grows. It is quite possible that the USSR can expand both its consumer sector and its foreign capability. Growth of foreign trade, to which the Soviets now seem to be permanently committed, will permit economies of scale to facilitate this, while the state trade monopoly and central planning continue to act as buffers against excessive external pressure or dilution of the socialist system. Ability to generate more consumer goods will reinforce the viability of the socialist economy,

[5]U.S. officials are already referring to the intensification of foreign competition. See, for example, President Nixon's appeal for price and wage restraints on July 6, 1971, in which he cited competition from "four economic superpowers," Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China and Japan, reported in *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, July 7, 1971. Among other aspects of economic constraints claiming publicity during the past year have been electric power shortages, problems of oil supplies, the balance of payments and inflation.

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making it more legitimate in the eyes of its own and foreign publics. Worker productivity is likely to increase when it is more visibly related to tangible rewards. The reduction of consumer tensions will also serve to reinforce the relatively free hand Soviet decision-makers already have in foreign policy.

The United States is far closer to a point of saturation in consumer goods, and how much growth is possible in that sector is an open question. The dilemma is that either saturation (for example, the production by the end of the century of one new automobile for every man, woman and child in the country) or a popular de-emphasis of consumption values would have a severe impact on an economy heavily indebted to and dependent upon future growth, and with decreasing prospects for expanding its foreign markets. Almost any alternative course of events suggests mounting economic stresses for the United States, decreasing margins of flexibility, and possible real decline. Meanwhile American policymakers will find themselves hamstrung by these tightening margins.

The American value system is itself undergoing change. Along with a decline in success and prosperity values, modern communications and the internationalized education of new generations in the United States have reduced the primacy of national goals and elevated a peculiar blending of universalism with a highly individualized search for significance. The potential for mobilizing American society behind national goals has been seriously reduced, and the instrumentalities available to American leaders are fewer than in the past. Social mobilization is becoming more and more dependent upon the "rightness" of leadership decisions.

The Soviet leadership does not face this problem, at least to the same degree. Centralized control over information and socialization give the regime more control over attitudinal inputs, and erosion of this power is likely to be gradual. While the constancy of Soviet propaganda often results in apathy and cynicism, the available supplemental instruments of social mobilization are ample: a high commitment to social services, the capacity for increases in consumer goods, the potential for introducing more intellectual and artistic freedom, all would act to strengthen rather than detract from the commitment of the Soviet public to national objectives.

The vision of a United States turned more inward than outward, bent on individualistic pursuits and acclaiming universal

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above national values, less flexible in its capacity to control and dispense resources for foreign policy purposes, and disillusioned with a global foreign policy, seems to be a realistic forecast.

Also realistic is the prospect of a Soviet Union whose leaders have a relatively free hand in conducting foreign policy, whose people are increasingly attuned to rewards given nationally in the form of success and prosperity values, more flexible in its ability to dispense resources for foreign policy, and fully capable of an expanded international role.

Superpowers Old and Superpowers New

Trends such as these will have a substantial effect upon, as well as be affected by, the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity. The external images of the present superpowers — how others perceive them to relate to their interests — are undergoing differential (or convergent) evolution. Because prestige is power, any deterioration of the American image represents a reduction of the American constituency abroad, while more positive changes in the Soviet image enhance Soviet prestige and, accordingly, Soviet power.

Having seen the United States in action, and witnessing the realities of American social and economic problems, many of which are "exported," other peoples and their leaders are less prone to a utopian image of the United States and see instead a power considerably more human, self-interested and fallible, one whose strength is as much a potential threat to their interests as a boon. There have been fewer illusions about the Soviet Union, and consequently little disillusionment. Every advance in Soviet technology and prosperity, every gain for Soviet power, every pacific gesture reduces a decidedly negative image in the eyes of a world inclined to criticize the United States for pursuing its own self-interest and to applaud Soviet pursuit of self-interest as a sign of moderation.

Moreover, these changes in image are taking place at a time when the political left has gained in international legitimacy and the United States is perceived as the superpower holding down the "conservative" end of the ideological spectrum. Socialist alternatives are more legitimate, or at least more tolerated, in Western Europe and Japan than in the United States, and there are potentially powerful leftist aggregates in those countries, so that these areas are ideologically "between" the present superpowers. The potential superpower at the opposite pole,

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however, is not the Soviet Union but China. On ideologically-related issues the Soviet Union is closer to the "middle of the road" internationally. The change in values necessary to permit the United States to retake the center would require a virtual revolution. Thus, to the extent that ideology limits the realignment of states in the emerging multipolar system, the Soviet Union will be in the advantageous "swing" position relative to the other major participants. Greater Soviet capability to maneuver on nonideological issues (e.g., economic relationships) would further enhance that status.

Western Europe and Japan are two areas likely to become major power centers. Their rise necessarily implies greater independence from the United States and, accordingly, a movement toward a neutral stance between the present superpowers. Since this represents a weakening of American power, the Soviet Union has a clear interest, in the short run, in assisting that trend. The logical Soviet policy is to play down Cold War issues related to Europe and Japan, to emphasize European-American and Japanese-American tensions, and to present the USSR as a cooperative neighbor, a supporter, and an alternate economic partner.

The outlines of such a policy are already evident. In his report to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, Brezhnev cited the growth of "contradictions" among the "imperialist" power centers, explicitly mentioning the United States, Western Europe and Japan, and called for improved relations with them while putting the onus for existing tensions on the United States.[6] This could be dismissed as rhetoric and ideological window dressing were it not for ample evidence of such "contradictions" and some rather clear Soviet gestures for the reduction of East-West tensions in Europe. Indications of Soviet interest in a German settlement (facilitated by the *Ostpolitik* of the Brandt Government), the forceful reiteration of proposals for a European security conference, the suggested mutual liquidation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, disarmament proposals, and a forward movement at SALT all point in this direction. The development of Soviet economic relations with Europe and Japan, while of longer standing, also has the same effect.

It is possible that this "peace and trade" offensive in Europe and toward Japan reflects a conscious "strategy" of cultivating

[6]"Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress Presented by L. I. Brezhnev on March 30, 1971," *New Times*, April 14, 1971, pp. 33-34.

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American allies against American "excesses" and adjusting to depolarization. The basis for such a strategy is the commonality of Soviet interests in reducing American influence with the self-interest of Europeans and Japanese in enhancing their own independence. For Europe and Japan, accommodation with the Soviet Union and de-emphasis of ideological differences would strengthen their hands against American power. Their ability to exert some pressure on the United States to reform its foreign economic practices and to alleviate the exportation of domestic economic problems has grown significantly of late; Soviet support or the leverage of Soviet trade alternatives would fortify such efforts.

It is not necessary to postulate a reversal of the American and Soviet roles in these areas. A trend toward merely equivalent American and Soviet relations with Western Europe and Japan would facilitate the evolution toward multipolarity and at the same time represent a substantial enhancement of Soviet influence.

Moscow's ability to play this game has ironically been strengthened by polycentrism, which has eroded the conspiratorial image of communism and Soviet policy. Anti-communism is declining toward substantive values of political and social philosophy, while communist adoption of the parliamentary approach and Soviet espousal of a "peaceful transition to socialism" facilitate coalescence of the political left for the pursuit of common socialist goals. Courtship of other socialists is a Soviet tactic followed by the European and Japanese communists.[7] Its success would permit the growth of "leftist" influence on domestic and foreign policies in Europe and Japan, spelling even more difficulty for the United States. The fact that many socialists and communists have a broad range of essential agreement with the Soviet Union on international issues means that such a development would also create a more advantageous situation for the USSR. Since Europe is only partially integrated and will not be a unit for some time, the Soviets can do their courting and communist parties can work within separate political entities and, perhaps, influence the integration process itself. While presently improbable, it is not entirely farfetched to suggest a remote *socialist* Common Market.

Eastern Europe now seems to be relatively safe for Soviet interests, although the relationships in that area will continue to

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

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become more complex. The most critical period may well be over. Since the communist regimes are well established, the Western powers and the East European peoples will have to accommodate themselves to their reality. The Berlin Wall and the suppression of Czechoslovak liberalization in 1968 have eliminated other alternatives. The Czechoslovak case is, moreover, unlikely to be repeated. A primary ingredient in that situation — as in the Hungarian and Polish episodes of 1956 — is missing now: the abrupt demise of a conservative Stalinist regime and the concomitant sudden release of pent-up dissatisfactions. Like its predecessors, Czechoslovakia stands as an object lesson on Soviet willingness to act when the boundaries to permissible deviation have been crossed.

It is essential to note, however, that the boundaries of deviation have been widened considerably since the 1950's, to some extent at Soviet initiative. Moscow has been engaged in a lengthy, and not always willing, process of adjusting its relationships with Eastern Europe to permit bloc members a considerable degree of latitude in domestic experimentation and foreign ties. Continuation of this process cannot but alleviate tensions, thus reinforcing the legitimacy of the Soviet role and of the East European regimes.

The self-interest of the East European communist leaders in maintaining the fraternal system makes such "leash-lengthening" safer. However "liberal" they may be vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and despite existing differences of opinion with Moscow, they have more in common with the Soviets than with the West. The major difficulty has been the virtual absence from communist thought of any notion of possible conflict among communist parties and, accordingly, the lack of means for resolving it.[8] Perhaps a decade of debate has produced a greater tolerance for differences of opinion and an atmosphere more conducive to their reconciliation. Certainly public controversies among communist countries seem to be less momentous than in the recent past. The fact that Ceausescu, now the leading critic of Soviet policies within the Warsaw Pact, called for reconciliation during his visit to Peking,[9] and that Rumania has resumed participation in Warsaw Pact functions, for instance, would appear to equal in significance the argumentation in the East European and Soviet press over Ceausescu's China visit.[10]

[8]See the discussion of the problem of conflict resolution in Triska and Finley, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-154.
[9]*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 9, 1971.
[10]*Ibid.*, July 10, 1971.

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If Moscow can safely permit contacts between Eastern and Western Europe (as implied in Brezhnev's reference to possible normalization of relations between West Germany and the "socialist" states[11]), this will bring two ranges of potential benefit to the Soviet position. (1) Enlarging the number of alternative trading partners available to Western Europe would strengthen the counterweights against American influence. (2) It would also serve economic progress in Eastern Europe, in turn contributing to the satisfaction of consumer demands and further legitimating the East European systems at home and in Western eyes. Continuance of state planning and economic integration of the East with the Soviet Union would serve as checks against adverse developments.

In this connection, Eastern Europe is likely either to remain a system of separate states or to become increasingly integrated with the USSR, unlike Western Europe, which is integrating apart from the superpowers. The possible integration of East European states with Western Europe is foreclosed, or at least severely restricted, on ideological grounds. For these reasons American losses in Western Europe and Japan are not likely to be counterbalanced by Soviet losses of influence in Eastern Europe.

The major potential "defector" from the communist system, and also a probable future superpower, is China. Continued competition from China will face the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future, unless Chinese policy changes dramatically. Barring a war between them, which is less likely than reciprocal deterrence because of the awareness on both sides of its awesome costs, there are limits to the Chinese threat, related both to China's position on the ideological spectrum and her considerably lower power status.

China's ideological posture has been the farthest to the left among the potential superpowers. From that position she has challenged Soviet leadership of the communist movement, although Maoist radicalism has been mostly unsuccessful and has no prospective support among communist parties that agree with Soviet policies or are to the right of the Soviet Union itself. The relative decline of revolutionary activism everywhere in the past year and a half has deprived Peking of its claim to strategic

[11]"Central Committee Report . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 33. Brezhnev's exact statement was: "We are prepared to cover our part of the way towards normalisation and improvement of relations between the F.R.G. and *the socialist part of Europe*, provided, of course, the other side acts in accordance with the letter and spirit of the treaty." (Emphasis added.)

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leadership. The Cultural Revolution and the virtual dissolution of the Communist Party reinforced China's isolation within the communist system, in which even her former Asian allies have mended fences with Moscow.

The other persuasive argument Peking could advance among communists, the issue of Soviet domination, has lost relevance since the Soviet Union shows little evidence now of a claim to formal "headship" over them. The Soviet party remains *primus inter pares*, but on the basis of its historical role, communist tradition, experience, and the status of the USSR as the only communist superpower. Peking's efforts to denigrate that role have thus had to move outside the range of ideological argumentation —Chou En-lai's attempts to enlist Rumania and Yugoslavia in an anti-superpower bloc are the most recent example.[12] The effect here, however, is to undermine China's own ideological legitimacy and to play into the hands of Soviet critics of this Chinese ploy.[13] The benefits to other communist states in being neutral between the Soviet Union and China are substantial. It is highly unlikely that Peking can effect a breach in their ties with Moscow, while the USSR has apparently reconciled itself to the reduction of direct control over them.

China also sought in the past to compete with the Soviet Union for influence in the developing countries, but as the Soviets have recognized, sweeping revolutionary change does not seem in immediate prospect in the Third World.[14] China's avowed strategy is thus a liability. Her available resources for competing effectively in the process of longer-term evolution are inferior to those of the USSR, so that her impact is likely to be marginal as related to Soviet interests. Her clumsy effort to generate antipathy toward Moscow on the basis of racism, moreover, failed to gain a significant following and could not but have raised doubts among communists regarding Mao's status as a *communist* elder statesman. In any case, the pursuit of influence in the developing countries is not a short cut to major power status, since these countries are highly diverse, dependent on support from one or more superpowers, and politically a more peripheral factor than they appeared to be in the recent past.

An adventurous Chinese foreign policy of participating in or actively encouraging military activity in Asia would present no

[12] *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 9, 1971.
[13] See, for example, *New Times*, April 28, 1971, pp. 4-6.
[14] This argument is made in several articles in W. Raymond Duncan, editor, *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries* (Waltham, Mass: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970).

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severe dilemma for the Soviet Union because of its risks for all of the superpowers. On the one hand, Chinese success would come largely at the expense of the West, and, should Moscow deem a "forward strategy" to be feasible, the Soviets retain the option of moving in that direction, depending upon costs in relation to Europe and Japan. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has no direct responsibility for a Chinese failure, and would have the option of aligning itself with Japan, Western Europe, and conceivably even the United States against Chinese "extremism." Just as Moscow can participate in a "grand coalition" against the United States, it can also participate in a similar coalition against China, if either moves toward a more extreme posture. If a shift to the "right" would isolate the United States, a risky and adventurous shift to the "left" would do the same to China.

The only other area in which China could compete for influence would be in relations with the capitalist powers, the United States, Western Europe and Japan. The minimum requisite for effective competition here, however, is for China to moderate substantially. Such moderation can only mean reducing the ideological stakes of the Sino-Soviet conflict and adopting what Peking has regarded as a "revisionist" course. It would probably be welcomed in Moscow: Brezhnev's report to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress held out an unmistakable olive branch not only to China, but to Albania as well.[15]

Even with this, China will not be able to rival the Soviet Union in diplomacy or in economic relations for a long time to come. Other countries are unlikely to bind themselves so closely to her that they become dependencies, and the benefits relations with China could confer on them are the same as those they can obtain from the USSR: markets and sources of supply. As a counterweight to American influence in Western Europe and Japan, the Soviet Union has considerably more to offer; for these areas the advantage of having two superpowers as trading partners would make trade with China, while attractive, less essential. On the other hand, should growth in China's relations with Europe and Japan come at American expense, this would be in the short-term Soviet interest.

The Chinese threat to Soviet interests is thus more likely to be verbal and symbolic than real. China appears, in her animosity toward Moscow, to have been in search of issues with which to

[15] "Central Committee Report . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 27.

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"club" her former ally. As she grows in power, she will be a more effective competitor on the same field and under the same rules as the Soviet game, but this is far in the future. A search for short cuts holds faint prospect for success. As she develops and if she moderates, however, the Soviet Union could more easily reconcile itself to a Chinese role in the socialist evolution of the world and, perhaps, even to a partnership.

Toward a Pax Sovietica?

The mere equalization of American and Soviet power and influence would mean enormous changes in the character of international politics and spell the end of the *Pax Americana* which underlay nuclear bipolarity. It would mean a great increase in Soviet influence, largely at American expense. The fact that two of the likely future superpowers, Western Europe and Japan, are present U.S. allies, and the probability that the USSR can keep its influence in Eastern Europe substantially intact while being able to withstand Chinese competition suggest at least an equalizing of the American and Soviet power positions vis-à-vis the future superpowers.

During the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity an astute Soviet leadership, sophisticated at maneuvering in international politics, can anchor itself into a position of relative advantage in the new system. Such an outcome rests on a more pacific, less revolutionary, and more flexible Soviet posture — in essence, on much that has been reflected in American aspirations for peace and international order. It is ironic that American efforts to secure moderation in Soviet foreign policy may bring with them costs for American interests and advantages to the Soviet Union. The most significant question for American foreign policy during the remainder of the twentieth century may well be the ability of the United States to live with the consequences of peace in a multipolar *Pax Sovietica.*

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TRIPOLARITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

by Ronald J. Yalem

THIS essay will attempt to describe and analyze the principal characteristics of an international system composed of three main actors and the kinds of interactions likely to occur among the three powers. A tripolar model will be constructed as a supplement to Morton Kaplan's six well known models of international systems.[1] The effort is being undertaken in the belief that the present bipolar system is in the process of yielding to a tripolar structure composed of the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China, and that it has accordingly become necessary to understand the structural dynamics of such a system and the implications of its operations.

What follows is largely a tentative and exploratory investigation since a major intellectual difficulty is the absence of theoretical or empirical research on international tripolarity. As a matter of fact, history reveals no examples of a tripolar system.

The following assumptions set forth the ideas on which the present essay is based:

(1) Tripolarity is defined as the coexistence of three relatively equal states in terms of military power — especially nuclear weapons capacity — in which the possibility exists that nuclear weapons could be used by any one state against any other.

(2) While Communist China presently possesses neither the quantity of nuclear weapons nor the long-range delivery capabilities of the Soviet Union or the United States, intelligence estimates and projections for future Chinese capabilities predict a significant reduction of this gap within the next decade. Consequently, China's ability to acquire proximate equality with the primary nuclear superpowers warrants its inclusion as a potential superpower in an incipient tripolar system.

(3) The role of ideological differences between superpowers in a tripolar system is considered to be of negligible significance to the system's operation. Decision-making by superpowers will be

[1]Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957).

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primarily determined by calculations of power and self-interest rather than by ideology.

(4) No universal international organization exists with the capacity to control the evolving structural relations of a tripolar system, nor is one likely to arise in the future. Regional organizations will continue to function in subordination to the global balance of power.

(5) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty will be effective in halting nuclear diffusion. As a result, the possibility that new centers of power will arise to challenge an evolving tripolarity is unlikely. Japan and a possible West European polity are not considered here as potential nuclear superpowers. France and Great Britain are excluded from the discussion because they lack and are unlikely to develop intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems and because of the improbability that they would direct their nuclear capabilities against the United States.

The possibility of an international system dominated by three states has been considered by a few scholars. Arthur Burns, for example, considers that Chinese nuclear capacity affects the international relationships of the traditional bipolar rivals because of Peking's world revolutionary aspirations. As he puts it, "China, though not yet, perhaps, a superpower, plays such a part in current superpower relationships that we are obliged to see them as now tripartite."[2] He goes on to argue that the international system of the 1960's constituted a distinctive tripolar world order supplemented by lesser centers of power in Western Europe and the developing areas of Latin America, Asia and Africa.[3] Donald Puchala has written that "for years Western analysts have been alluding to Chinese potential for superpower status. That potential is slowly beginning to be realized. Possible tripolarity is clearly the implication of Chinese power ascendance."[4]

If it is arguable that tripolarity arose during the 1960's, considering the determinative role of the Soviet Union and the United States in the international system and the fact that China did not explode its first nuclear weapon until 1967, there may be less controversy about the probable emergence of a tripolar system in the 1970's. China has not only acquired a growing nuclear weapons capacity, but is in the process of developing

[2]Arthur Burns, "Military-Technological Models and World Order," *International Journal*, Autumn 1969, p. 797.
[3]*Ibid.*, p. 799.
[4]Donald Puchala, *International Politics Today* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971), p. 254.

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intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems. The same thing cannot be said for the other two nuclear powers, France and Great Britain, whose nuclear weapons are "last-resort capacities, conferring some small advantages but not constantly exploitable in their day-to-day external politics."[5]

The impact of Chinese nuclear weapons and delivery systems will affect the present system of bilateral nuclear deterrence by creating a situation in which "both the United States and the USSR will, for the first time, confront the possibility that a clash with one nuclear-armed opponent will leave them at the end of the exchange still facing another potential opponent thus armed."[6] This suggests that the present system of deterrence will have to be modified to take into account the existence of an additional nuclear superpower. Arms control schemes will also have to be revised to allow for increases in Chinese military power involving an estimation of "from fifteen to thirty land-based ICBM's by 1975."[7] Harry Gelber plausibly urges a new trilateral system of deterrence: "to bring China into the international debate on politics and strategy, including ways of communicating intentions reliably to opponents, is a matter of considerable urgency."[8]

With regard to ascribed status — a term used to denote a state's diplomatic position in the international system on the basis of the number of diplomatic missions it receives — a gradual reduction of the inconsistency between China's low ascribed status and high achieved power status may also be expected.[9] As American policy toward Communist China shifts from containment and isolation toward acceptance and cooperation, other states will be disposed to increase their diplomatic and other ties with the Peking government. Peking's representation at the United Nations and acquisition of permanent membership on the Security Council are bound to accelerate this trend and bolster the legitimacy of China's claim to superpower status.

The model which follows attempts to depict the major features of tripolarity involving interactions among the three principal actors and between them and the various regional subsystems of the international system. Inclusion of the subsystems is based on the assumption that they exert influence upon the main actors as well

[5]Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 796.
[6]Harry G. Gelber, "The Impact of Chinese ICBM's on Strategic Deterrence," ORBIS, Summer 1969, pp. 409-410.
[7]*Ibid.*, p. 410.
[8]*Ibid.*, p. 434.
[9]These terms are discussed in Michael D. Wallace, "Power, Status, and International War," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 1, 1971, pp. 25-26.

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as being the object of penetration by the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China.[10] These reciprocal relationships will likely continue in a tripolar system.

General Characteristics of the Tripolar System

We will first discuss tripolarity without considering the effect of nuclear weapons. Later the role of these weapons will be analyzed in terms of the deterrence problems they generate. The most obvious characteristic of a tripolar international system is a built-in tendency for two actors to coalesce against the third — for example, China and the United States versus the USSR, China and the USSR versus the United States, or the USSR and the United States versus China. This tendency is apt to be activated when bilateral interaction between any two states manifests more cooperation than hostility. There is thus the possibility of a greater incidence of conflict in a tripolar system: the number of bilateral interactions is tripled in comparison with the single interaction pattern in a bipolar system, and three additional patterns of conflict are possible as a result of bilateral coalitions directed against third states. The problem of stabilizing such a system therefore requires the concerted efforts of each state to prevent the emergence of a bipolar alignment against itself so that a pure tripolar system may be maintained.

Where a bipolar alignment exists for any time, there will be pressures on the third state by the other two involving the possible elimination of the third state and transformation of the system to bipolarity. Paradoxically, a bipolar alignment that may be cooperative in pressuring the third state becomes one of hostility as the tripolar system changes into bipolarity. With the elimination of the third major power, the cooperative bipolar alignment decomposes and the two predominant actors become adversaries because of the natural opposition implicit in bipolarity.

For stability to be maintained in a tripolar system, each state must operate independently of the other two and resist the temptation to form bipolar alignments. Each state must restrict the scope and intensity of its bilateral relationships to those necessary for the maintenance of a rough tripolar equilibrium. But without any "balancer" power to offset the inherent tendency

[10]The importance of regional subsystems in the international system is effectively presented by Oran Young, "Political Discontinuities in the International System," *World Politics*, April 1968. See also Ronald J. Yalem, *Regional Subsystems and World Politics* (Tucson: Institute of Government Research, University of Arizona, August 1970).

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of two of the principals to combine against the third, or a strong supranational actor to regulate tripolarity, the system is likely to be susceptible to continual instability.

This systemic liability may be somewhat counterbalanced by the participation of Communist China as the third superpower. So long as a potential superpower is denied such participation, and especially when it has revolutionary aspirations, it constitutes a source of conflict and instability for the world community. While inclusion would not necessarily deflect China from its revolutionary goals, the dynamics of tripolarity would in all likelihood serve to moderate the pursuit of them.

Assuming the eventuation of a tripolar system in the next decade, it is necessary to calculate not only the character of superpower relationships but also the interactions between these states and the important regional subsystems within the international system. The most probable relationship would involve a Chinese hegemonial role within the subsystem of Southeast Asia, continuing Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe, and American domination of Latin America. So long as the subsystems are dominated by the superpowers, they will probably not be able to affect the power relations or equilibrium among the principal states. However, significant systemic instability would arise in the event that any superpower attempted to exert influence in the subsystems of the other two, generating a possible bipolar coalition against it. This means that one of the fundamental rules for preserving tripolar stability would require each superpower to refrain from intervening in subsystems not recognized as its own. Where such a rule is violated, the superpowers adversely affected must combine in coalition to put down the challenge. This need not result in a permanent bipolar alignment but rather would be an *ad hoc* response designed to force the third state to withdraw.

A further source of instability could develop if regional subsystems attempt to achieve greater autonomy and eventual superpower status. The addition of fourth and fifth superpowers would result in another system transformation. The most likely possibilities appear to be Japan in the East Asian subsystem and a unified Western Europe operating as an autonomous regional actor. For the next decade, however, the emergence of fourth and fifth nuclear superpowers seems remote.

Relationships between an incipient tripolar system and the regional subsystems of Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America may be hypothesized where conditions of pure tripolarity

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obtain and for a modified or unstable tripolarity. If China, the Soviet Union and the United States can coexist on the basis of tacit rules of pure tripolarity — that is, by confining their hegemonial actions to their own spheres of influence — the relationship among them will not only be stable at the world level but is also likely to have a stabilizing effect on the regional subsystemic level. On the other hand, where two actors conspire in a coalition against the third at the world level, this instability will be reflected at the regional subsystemic level as well. For example, we would expect that an American-Soviet coalition against China would aim to curtail or limit Chinese influence within the Southeast Asian subsystem. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have backed opposing factions in the Viet Nam war, both have been united in their determination to limit Chinese communist influence over North Viet Nam lest it be used to expand Chinese power in Asia. Similarly, an American-Chinese coalition would pose at least a latent threat to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Finally, a Chinese-Soviet coalition against the United States might result in intensified communist activity within the Latin American subsystem.

Of course there is always the remote possibility that one or more superpowers might intervene in a rival subsystem even though relationships at the world level were stable. If a superpower believed that its relative world influence was deteriorating, it might attempt such intervention, which would obviously affect the stability of power relations.

Deterrence in a Tripolar System

In addition to the instabilities of tripolarity flowing from the tendency of two states to combine against the third and from superpower interference in the subsystems of rival states, there would be an increase in uncertainty regarding nuclear deterrence. So long as the Soviet Union and the United States were the only significant nuclear powers, they could calculate the military and strategic aspects of their bilateral relationship with relative certainty, knowing that the inferior power capabilities of other states would not complicate their assessments. With the emergence of Communist China as a third superpower a measure of uncertainty is added. Deterrence relationships in a tripolar system make it necessary for each state to devise a strategy to deter *two* other states.

In the bipolar context it has been argued that international

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stability depends on the stability of deterrence.[11] If this is true, a relatively stable trilateral deterrence that could operate as well as the deterrence obtaining under bipolarity holds the key to international stability in a tripolar system.

When the principal actors in a tripolar system each possess nuclear weapons, a major function of deterrence may be the prevention of an attack by one state against another, and especially the deterrence of an attack by two states against one. It has been asserted that in a nuclear tripolar system there would be less likelihood of two states combining against a third than in a tripolar system based on conventional weapons strength.[12] Presumably, in the latter system the retaliatory capacity of the attacked state would not be sufficient to deter a surprise attack; in the former system the threat of nuclear retaliation would be a more effective deterrent.

There is justification for this view, but only if we assume that the retaliatory capabilities of each nuclear power are strong enough to inflict unacceptable damage. At present the Soviet Union and the United States lack a full first-strike capacity against each other but probably possess such a capability toward Communist China, so that, strictly from the military angle, an attack by the USSR and the United States against China would most likely be effective. Only when China develops a more significant second-strike capacity will a surprise attack by the other two states become too costly. In all other possible situations of nuclear attack involving the three states — where the USSR or the United States would be target of the combined strength of two states — the present superpowers' second-strike capacity is sufficient to serve as deterrence. It would appear therefore that eventually a tripolar system will be one in which a combined nuclear weapons strike against any one state will be infeasible. At the same time, nullification of such attacks does not rule out the possibility of two against one coalitions where force is not involved, as in political conflict not approaching the dimensions of a nuclear exchange.

When the requirements for an effective system of trilateral deterrence are considered, the strategic advantages in a bipolar system become obvious:

> When each primary power becomes certain that it cannot at present successfully go to war with the other superpower and that it will not be

[11]Ciro E. Zoppo, "Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity, and International Stability," *World Politics*, July 1966, p. 580.

[12]Steven L. Spiegel, "Bimodality and International Order: The Paradox of Parity," *Public Policy*, Winter 1970, pp. 403-404.

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able to do so for the foreseeable future, stability is very likely to persist. Because this condition of stalemate is simpler to achieve the fewer the dominant powers, a bipower system contributes to successful deterrence.[13]

Yet an increase of only one major nuclear power should not be significantly destabilizing, especially if one agrees with Hedley Bull that a strategic nuclear stalemate or relationship of mutual deterrence will likely emerge in the next decade between China and the United States and China and the Soviet Union to complement the present stalemate between the USSR and the United States.[14]

Despite the fact that Communist China is as yet grossly inferior to the other two superpowers in nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, there is increasing recognition that this gap is temporary and will be sharply reduced in the future, raising the strong possibility of a stalemate. If a three-way stalemate does develop, the threat to international stability posed by the emergence of a new nuclear superpower may be overcome. The result could be a balance of mutual deterrence established on a complex of three bilateral deterrent systems instead of only the one bilateral system between the Soviet Union and the United States. In order to reach and sustain a military balance among the three major powers, however, political relations must also be stabilized:

> . . . the arms balance must, after all, remain subordinate to the accepted long-term aim of reconciliation. A nuclear balance may provide a safeguard on the way, but cannot be a substitute for that eventual political solution. Arms are good servants, but poor masters.[15]

Conflict Management in a Tripolar System

Kenneth Waltz has observed that "no political structure, whether domestic or international, can guarantee stability. The question that one must ask is not whether a given distribution of power is stable but how stable different distributions of power are likely to be."[16] We have already indicated that a bipolar system tends to be more stable than a tripolar system, principally because with fewer main actors there is greater simplicity and certainty of relationships, both military and political. But the differential in

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 398.
[14] Hedley Bull, "The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1971, p. 673.
[15] Gelber, *op. cit.*, p. 434.
[16] Kenneth Waltz, "International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power," in James N. Rosenau, editor, *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (Second edition, New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 312-313.

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stability between such systems has never been probed. If international stability is a function of the frequency and intensity of conflict, the stability of a tripolar system may hinge on the capacity of the major actors to establish effective processes of conflict management to supplement a stable system of trilateral deterrence. Writing in 1967, Waltz asserted, "what management there now is in international relations must be provided, singly and occasionally together, by the duopolists at the top."[17] Today, in considering management at the top, we have to take into account the rise of China to potential if not actual superpower status.

It is realistic to exclude the United Nations from a role in conflict management even on the assumption that Communist China's entrance into the organization will have a gradual meliorative effect on Peking's foreign policies. During the bipolar era the UN has been manipulated by the superpowers for their own national interests rather than developed into a body to which they would be willing to grant greater authority in the critical area of threats to the peace. The Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the American intervention in Viet Nam strikingly reveal the impotence of the United Nations as a constraint on great-power behavior. So we must look to the three superpowers to furnish the initiative for conflict management. What forms and procedures would be involved and how could they be employed to reduce the greater instability of a tripolar system? This is a crucial question to which we can offer only tentative answers.

The most obvious approach to conflict management in a tripolar system concerns the extension to Communist China of the present arms control agreements developed by the Soviet Union and the United States. This assumes, of course, that such arrangements as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Partial Test Ban Treaty, hot line, Outer Space Treaty, and limitations on offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems will be effective in reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, and that Peking will accept them, perhaps after being recognized as a third superpower. Bringing Communist China into these and other future arms control agreements may be the strongest argument for a tripolar system. This is not to predict that participation would necessarily guarantee China's cooperation. Arms control may have only marginal attractiveness for a secondary nuclear power anxious to expand its technological competence for the purpose of reducing

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 313.

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its nuclear inferiorities.[18] But if China eventually decides to cooperate in arms control arrangements, partly as a result of its inclusion in the international system as a new superpower and partly as a result of national interest, some of the instability associated with tripolarity may be mitigated in a shared consensus on the necessity for conflict management in the nuclear age. This should be of highest priority for the stabilization of the future international military environment.

Further, the mutual restraint on the use of nuclear weapons thus far demonstrated by the two leading nuclear powers might be widened to embrace China. It would involve the unilateral acceptance by China of certain formal or informal rules of international behavior. Despite the weakness of international law as a constraint on the use of force by states, some informal restraints that have emerged out of the fear of nuclear war — particularly abstention from the use of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of escalation measures in interbloc conflicts — may be as significant as the UN Charter rules on the limitation of force.[19]

Stanley Hoffmann has argued against the translation of empirical norms of restraint into legal prohibitions because it would "put the statesmen into a position in which they do not like to be; even though, in a crisis, legal restraints prove to be fragile indeed, the statesmen do not enjoy being pushed to the point where they may have to demonstrate this fragility."[20] More flexible are tacitly agreed norms that can be revised to fit changing conditions and do not establish formal legal obligations that statesmen may be prone to violate. Yet arms control agreement in the form of legal obligations may be a more positive approach than implicit constraints on behavior, in this writer's opinion. A certain insecurity prevails with tacit restraints on behavior; they may be misinterpreted or violated when they prove to be inconvenient for the pursuit of state objectives. The Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba in 1962 in contravention of the tacit rule of noninterference in superpower spheres of influence is a classic example. Legal formalization would reduce this uncertainty though not necessarily ensure compliance.

Formal or informal rules to restrain intervention in the internal

[18]David Edwards, *Arms Control in International Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 148.

[19]Stanley Hoffmann, "International Law and the Control of Force," in Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann, editors, *The Relevance of International Law* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1968), p. 34.

[20]*Ibid.*, p. 41.

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conflicts of the middle and smaller states should also be developed, as well as rules to restrain intervention where smaller states are involved in external conflict with each other. A frequent source of conflict in the bipolar system arose because domestic instability in the new states precipitated the competitive external intervention of the superpowers. Soviet and American interventions on opposite sides of the Viet Nam war and the Middle East conflict have not enhanced the stability of their relationships. Unless new rules for nonintervention are established in the tripolar system, whatever stability may be achieved through arms control and deterrence policies will be undermined by the possibility of direct or indirect confrontations over states that lie outside the superpowers' respective spheres of influence.

Conclusions

From the perspective of international stability the shift from nuclear bipolarity to nuclear tripolarity has some manifest disadvantages. It will increase uncertainty with regard to the vital functions of deterrence and arms control which have helped to stabilize the bipolar international system. The emergence of a new tripolar system would also promote the tendency for two states to combine against the third and thereby exacerbate conflict. There are certain compensating features, however. The American *démarche* to China, which helped to open the door to United Nations membership and may result in diplomatic recognition, implies that there is greater danger in attempting to perpetuate bipolarity than in improving relations with the Peking government. Inclusion of Communist China as a coequal member of a new tripolar system would be a realistic recognition that world order and world stability require the cooperation of the major world powers to avert international crises and war.

The present gap between China's high achieved status as a military power and its low ascribed status in terms of diplomatic recognition may be dysfunctional for the entire international system insofar as it serves to perpetuate Chinese hostility toward the rest of the world. China's belligerence is in part due to the refusal of the international community to accord it legitimate recognition as a primary power. While its participation in a tripolar system creates new uncertainties and may not immediately moderate Peking's hostility, it is possible that a gradual mellowing may occur. In the long range there could be a greater gain than loss of system stability.

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At the nation-state or subsystemic level, the implications of a shift from bipolarity to tripolarity are likely to be significant. Despite the propensity among the principals for two powers to form a bilateral coalition against the third, the greater fluidity of alignments operative in a tripolar system may make such coalitions only temporary because the pattern of relationships among the superpowers will lack the stabilizing features of the Cold War era of bipolarity. In his recent analysis of triangular power relationships, Hedley Bull argues that the pattern that develops "is unlikely to produce the stable alliances and antagonisms of the cold-war period, the sources of which lay in conditions — the polarization of power and the ideological schism — which have long been in decay and may soon disappear altogether."[21]

Within the context of three-sided relationships Bull asserts that the third state may gain as a result of the conflict between the other two.[22] This assumption has some validity even now. The Sino-Soviet conflict has provided at least part of the basis for a Sino-American rapprochement through which the United States has an opportunity to normalize relations with China. Correspondingly, China has need of U.S. support as political and military leverage against the Soviet Union. So long as Sino-Soviet relations were tranquil, the United States was the object of a common and concerted hostility.

Yet the advantages that may accrue from this aspect of tripolarity may only be marginal. American gain may be short-lived if Moscow perceives reconciliation between Washington and Peking as a threat to its own interests. While Soviet-American détente made it possible for the United States to undertake overtures toward China, Sino-American rapprochement may not be consistent with détente, at least in the short run. Should the USSR perceive the need for countervailing action to offset the threat of a Sino-American coalition against it, it might be stimulated to repair its breach with China. If this were to occur, the United States would have lost and not gained. It would once again face the combined hostility of two powerful states as in the early period of bipolarity.

The preceding discussion points to the imperative of caution on the part of each state in a tripolar relationship. Each state should abstain from exploiting any conflict between the other two that might be temporarily advantageous but potentially destabilizing,

[21]Bull, *op. cit.*, p. 670.
[22]*Ibid.*, p. 669.

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and at the same time avoid extensive bilateral cooperation in order to minimize the possibility of the third power's alienation.

The fragility of relationships in a tripolar system also underscores the need for institutional or informal procedures of conflict management to avert misunderstanding and increased tension. In its own interest, the United States should assume the leadership in seeking to establish mechanisms that all three states may avail themselves of for this purpose. While such mechanisms might not eliminate or reduce a fundamental rivalry among the three powers, they could be instrumental in extending to Communist China conflict management procedures that have worked well in Soviet-American relationships. If this could be accomplished within the next few years, we could have some confidence that the transition from nuclear bipolarity to nuclear tripolarity could be facilitated without destabilizing the international system as a whole.

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UN PEACEKEEPING AND DOMESTIC INSTABILITY

by David P. Forsythe

MEN have been debating the adequacy of the nation-state system of world politics at least from the time of Rousseau to the present day.[1] The debate has grown in scope and intensity under the impact of the current trend toward increasing interdependence among nations. Nothing indicates better the present clash between old patterns of thought and new ideas based on changed facts than situations of domestic instability — situations in which violence or imminent threat of violence is contained within one territorial unit.

The nation-state is supposed to be inviolable and impenetrable. Its territorial integrity is to be rigidly preserved and observed. The domestic jurisdiction of the national government is said to take precedence over all matters "essentially" within that territory. The main intent of the traditional international law of civil war was to urge restraint and nonintervention by third parties.

Yet current world politics indicates both the prevalent desire of governments to intervene in situations of domestic instability and the availability of instruments of diplomatic, economic and military penetration. We have reached the point of inherent interdependence and automatic intervention: to know of civil strife, and to have the capability to intervene, and not to intervene, constitutes *de facto* intervention in behalf of the stronger faction.[2] The numerical increase in cases of domestic instability in this century, especially in the Third World, and the common dangers inherent in those situations, primarily from superstate exploitation and competition, accentuate the gap between supposed rules of

[1]See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) for an analysis of Rousseau's reasoning that changing the nation-state system was both necessary for peace and also impossible. For a history of thinking about alternatives to the nation-state system, see F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), Part I.

[2]See Harry Eckstein, editor, *Internal War, Problems and Approaches* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), particularly the essays by the editor and Karl Deutsch. For a comprehensive bibliography regarding "local disorder," see Linda B. Miller, *World Order and Local Disorder* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

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order and actual behavior.[3] James Reston noted the discrepancy clearly:

> The dominant nuclear powers seem to be acting on the assumption that once they are cautious and cooperative in avoiding a world war and a world depression, they can divide and fight out all other secondary battles as they please. There is discipline and authority on all really dangerous confrontations that might lead to nuclear war and threaten the security of the great powers, but freedom to carry on the power struggle in other nations, at the expense of other peoples.[4]

Some observers believe the dangers from superstate competition in civil strife to be so great that "mankind solicits the destiny of the dinosaur if it responds to these urgencies with complacent trust in present patterns of thought and conduct."[5] Others, likewise aware of interdependence and mutual dangers, point out (at least as private citizens) that

> The revival and re-enforcement of the United Nations no doubt seems, and at the moment may be, Utopian. . . . The passing of powers from old to new, from parochial to ecumenical, from states separating peoples to institutions uniting them, will not be accomplished quickly or easily. Still, it seems high time to begin.[6]

This article will examine current attitudes toward domestic instability and attempt to ascertain whether new attitudinal patterns are forming regarding the utility of the United Nations in mitigating the dangers from "local" conflicts. The focus of the study concerns UN peacekeeping: the containment or termination of violence.[7] While no operations have been launched since the Cyprus Force, a number of new factors have come into being with respect to peacekeeping. The superpowers continue to exchange views at the UN. Instability erupts, as in Nigeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan and elsewhere, causing governments and the Secretary-General to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of peacekeeping measures. The legacy of the UN Congo operation

[3]Evan Luard, *Conflict and Peace* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), presents data on civil wars and related phenomena that clearly substantiate this point; see Chapter 6 and *passim*.

[4]"The Big Powers are Challenged," *The Atlanta Constitution*, February 24, 1970, p. 4-A.

[5]Richard A. Falk, *Legal Order in a Violent World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 115.

[6]Charles Yost, *The Insecurity of Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 258.

[7]The focus chosen should not be taken to imply that peacekeeping is a more important function than any other UN undertaking. For a persuasive argument that international cooperation is more likely to come from UN socio-economic service activities, see Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares* (New York: Random House, 1964), Chapter 19. If Claude's argument is correct, peacekeeping — rather than being a cause of cooperation — may be fruitfully studied as a guide to the extent of an attitude of cooperation brought about by other factors.

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continues, as does the UN involvement in Cyprus, compounded by the ramifications of the withdrawal of UNEF from the Middle East.

The basic inquiry of this essay thus concerns whether out of this maze of events and policy statements there is emerging a clearer conception of the role of the UN in situations of domestic instability. As such it is a study of attitudes rather than of specific structures and functions that might be employed.[8]

The Non-Law of Civil War

At least theoretically, international legal norms should reflect governmental expectations about desired behavior in situations of domestic instability and provide a foundation for United Nations involvement. Governmental attitudes toward the general subject of domestic instability, however, are sufficiently confused, conflicting and ambiguous as to provide little clear expectation of what is a desired response for third parties — national or international. The traditional legal principle requires nonintervention by third parties in matters that the UN Charter terms "essentially within the jurisdiction of any state. . . ." On the other hand, even when no attempt is made to label a situation a threat to the peace and thus override the domestic jurisdiction barrier through Security Council decisions, the doctrine of "just war" is unilaterally dragged out of the dusty closet to buttress intervention. Communist regimes claim the right to intervene in just wars of "national liberation," Third World regimes claim the right to participate in just wars of anti-colonialism, and Western regimes, by action if not dogma, claim the right to engage in just wars of anti-communism.[9]

Without going into legal detail regarding the tripartite status of civil war under traditional law, and without argument for specific changes needed in that law, it can be said in brief that at the moment — and for the foreseeable future — legal norms pertaining to domestic instability will follow political exigencies. Neither Eastern, Western nor Southern states have enough confidence in the ambitions of the other two groups to apply a restrictive policy to themselves; at the same time each is ready to argue a restrictive policy for the others if such seems immediately profitable. This

[8]See my article, "United Nations Intervention in Conflict Situations Revisited: A Framework for Analysis," *International Organization,* Winter 1969, pp. 115-139, for a suggested conceptualization of structures and functions available to the organization.

[9]Falk, *op. cit.,* p. 145 and *passim.*

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posture is well demonstrated by Soviet behavior at the Twenty-first General Assembly in 1966. While in general espousing the right of intervention in national liberation movements (such as Viet Nam), and while articulating what later became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserts the right of Soviet intervention in socialist states (as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia), the USSR introduced in the Assembly, and vigorously supported, a draft resolution on the total ban of all forms of intervention in both domestic and external affairs. A/RES/2225 (XXI), passed by a vote of 114-0-2, had the following main provisions: it urged the "immediate cessation of intervention, in any form whatever"; condemned "all forms of intervention in the domestic or external affairs of states"; and called upon states to refrain from intervention "for the purpose of changing by violence the existing system in another state or interfering in civil strife in another state."[10]

The debates show clearly that the Soviet Union was less interested in ushering in the rule of nonintervention than in having the Assembly talk about the United States' "illegal" actions in Viet Nam. The Latin American states, however, wanted to discuss the Soviet Union's representatives who had met in Havana in 1966 with colleagues from communist groups and parties in more than eighty other countries and formed "the First Solidarity Conference" to promote violent revolution throughout Central and South America via subversive intervention.

Because of such short-term propaganda efforts, Assembly debates have done little to clarify the behavior expected in situations of "civil strife." Political needs of the moment triumph over the more basic need to establish generally accepted norms of conduct for mutual benefit. The Assembly's Special Committee on Principles of International Law and Committee on Defining Aggression have been consistently bogged down because of self-serving national arguments that promise no end to the propaganda battles.[11] The International Law Commission, composed of individuals rather than governments, has not taken up the subject of the law of domestic instability and is not likely to do so, preferring to stay in the safer waters of the "law of treaties." There has been

[10]See further *UN Monthly Chronicle*, January 1967, pp. 46-51.

[11]For a review of non-events in these supposedly law-clarifying organs, see "Issues Before the 24th General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, September 1969, pp. 175-179, 181-184. Cf. the trenchant editorial comment by John Hazard, "Why Try Again to Define Aggression?," *American Journal of International Law*, July 1968, pp. 701-710.

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some discussion of an ILC review of the entire field of international law. Granting that the intellectual level of such a discussion would be higher than in governmentally-composed groups, there is little ground at the moment for believing distinguished legal personalities could induce governments to ratify a convention that restricted their freedom to choose options in situations of domestic instability.

The result is that "norm indeterminacy"[12] prevails regarding the behavior expected of third parties in such situations, particularly on the part of governments looking to practice rather than to current assertions by legal scholars. As for the United Nations, "norm indeterminacy" means that the organization is legally not guaranteed a role, or necessarily denied a role. The common legal condition is present: legal claim is met by legal counterclaim in each case of conflict. And the synthesis of clashing claims that eventually prevails depends less on their legal merits than on the power marshaled in their support.

Contrary to some assumptions, the problem of domestic jurisdiction versus collective interest has been resolved in a pattern favoring general expansion of the UN's role in civil strife, for the "majority of member-states has consistently rejected readings of Article 2:7 [domestic jurisdiction] that would limit the Organization's capacity to realize its major purpose — the maintenance of international peace and security."[13] That this expansionary trend should exist is in part a reflection of the true nature of the domestic jurisdiction concept. Myres McDougal has put this point well:

> The concept of domestic jurisdiction in international law has never been impermeable. Actions occurring within the territorial bounds of one state with palpable deprivatory effects upon others have always been subject to claim and decision on the international plane. There has scarcely ever been a case of major proportions in which the principle of domestic jurisdiction has not been invoked; where trans-national effects have been precipitated, the principle has rarely barred effective accommodations in accord with inclusive interest. Hence, domestic jurisdiction means little more than a general community concession of primary, but not exclusive, competence over matters arising and intimately concerned with aspects of the internal public order of states. Where such acts precipitate major inclusive deprivations, jurisdiction is internationalized and inclusive concern and measures become permissible.[14]

[12]Falk, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
[13]Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
[14]"Rhodesia and the United Nations," *American Journal of International Law*, January 1968, p. 15.

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Yet it must be stressed that increasing awareness of the international ramifications of intranational events does not guarantee international involvement. The law that gives "primary . . . competence," to use McDougal's phrase, can be made into an exclusive claim with sufficient supportive power. It bears stressing that such claims are epitomized but not monopolized by the Soviet Union.

The role of the UN in any given case of domestic instability continues to depend less on the indeterminate and not-likely-to-be-clarified-soon international law of civil war, and more on which national actor seeks what interest with what power at hand.

Superstate Attitudes

Several attitudes can be noted in appraising the likelihood of the development of a clear peacekeeping role for the UN in cases of domestic instability, even if the general legal context of such situations remains amorphous. The most important of these are superstate attitudes toward the UN and its peacekeeping function.

The legacy of the UN Congo operation in 1960-1964 and the subsequent Article 19 crisis still hangs heavy over both the United States and the USSR. The Soviets lost the struggle for control of the field operation, since ONUC frustrated the objectives of pro-Soviet radicals such as Prime Minister Lumumba. But the Americans lost the struggle to control the Assembly and compel all member-governments to pay assessments for the operation. However one evaluates the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East 1957-1967,[15] and regardless of the limited but real success of the UN Force in Cyprus since 1964, it is the Congo case that has left the most lasting impression on the superstates. Both are aware of what a UN peacekeeping force can become under certain conditions — i.e., an enforcement agent, as in the Congo. There, UN forces, under a dynamic Secretary-General with a vague mandate, initiated coercion by combining the right of freedom of movement and the right to fire in self-defense in order to create and enforce a particular type of domestic "law and order" rather than to police a cease-fire. Both superstates now seem wary of Congo-like involvements under international aegis, either because of a concern for the field operation or in apprehension of the politico-economic "fall-out" after the operation.

[15]It is to be noted that whatever negative residue remains from UNEF's withdrawal, Thant's decisions at least preserved the integrity of future peacekeeping *vis-à-vis* a host government.

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Since the Congo case they and other governments have been searching for a consensus on the functioning of UN peacekeeping in the UN Committee of 33, or more officially the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations. Created by the Assembly in 1965, the Committee of 33 showed the effects of the controversial Congo involvement for the next few years: there was little consensus except insofar as the thirty-three agreed to disagree. In 1968 a smaller Working Group was created, comprised of the Big Four and four others.[16] Because of this procedural switch, or the less controversial Cyprus operation, or the passing of time, limited consensus crystallized out of this UN body by 1970 and the points of disagreement between the Soviets and Americans were clarified.

The United States now officially pronounces peacekeeping as one of the major functions of the United Nations.[17] Beyond this general point, it supports a relatively larger role for the Secretary-General as field manager of any form of peacekeeping operation and thus differs with the Soviet Union on this important issue. While both the Soviets and Americans are now asserting the primacy of the Security Council in authorizing peacekeeping missions, with the Americans also arguing for residual authority in the General Assembly, only the United States — not the Soviet Union — wants to give operational decisions to the Secretary-General. According to Charles Yost, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, the first essential for effective UN peacekeeping

> is an understanding of the roles of the principal organs of the UN, in particular an acceptable and workable balance of responsibilities between the Security Council and the Secretary-General. For years an underlying agreement has existed, much more agreement than appeared on the surface of debate, on the Council's primary role and the need to make the Council a more effective and responsive vehicle for dealing with emergencies and utilizing the UN's peacekeeping capacity. The Council's primacy is compatible with the residual authority of the General Assembly to recommend peacekeeping measures in cases when the Security Council is unable to act.
>
> The Special Committee is now focusing on operations authorized or established by the Security Council. My delegation believes that the

[16]Canada, Czechoslovakia, Mexico and the UAR.

[17]In 1969, the State Department spoke of peacekeeping as one of the two general functions of the UN, with economic development second, and technological concerns mentioned in passing. (Samuel De Palma, "What the United Nations Means to America Now," *Department of State Bulletin*, November 3, 1969, p. 374.) In 1970, the Department spoke of four basic U.S. interests in the UN system: peacekeeping, strengthening the International Court of Justice, achieving procedural reform, and disseminating technology. Secretary Rogers, "Making the U.N. a More Effective Instrument to Meet Changing World Needs," *ibid.*, August 24, 1970, pp. 220-224.

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Security Council should determine the key provisions of the mandate and exercise broad political supervision. Others advocate extending the authority of the Security Council to encompass operational decisions: the size and composition of the force, naming the commander, determining financing. The key point on which discussions should focus is where to draw the line of operational re-operational necessities. In the United States' view the Security Council has a legitimate interest in assuring political responsiveness, but effective management requires that the executive authority of the Secretary-General not be impaired.[18]

It is important that the United States wishes to preserve this "apart from" status for the head of the organization in peacekeeping functions. Such a policy consolidates past practice and helps to establish a firm precedent for future prerogatives of the Secretary-General that might signal a systemic change toward greater centralization of international authority. The Secretary-General represents whatever independent status the UN has as an actor in world politics, and the first three Secretary-Generals have exercised more influence in the capacity of administrators than as overtly political actors under Article 99.[19]

Creation of a supranational authority, for peacekeeping or any other function, is decidedly not the U.S. intention. American criticism of the Soviets for trying to control "every aspect"[20] of peacekeeping through the Council, and support of the administrative integrity of the Secretary-General "for sound operational practices to ensure efficient and effective management,"[21] reflect only a pragmatic U.S. concern for operational efficacy in a peacekeeping mission once launched, along with a desire to curtail extension of Soviet negative power through expansion of the veto's application.[22]

The U.S. inclination to see the Secretary-General as a partially independent actor, although circumscribed by great-power directives from the Council, is based on several factors. The United States has never been "burned" by a UN operation as the Soviets

[18]"Key Requirements for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations," *ibid.*, January 5, 1970, p. 16. This statement was made originally in the Committee of 33. It is strikingly similar — as a statement of U.S. policy — to what Ernst Haas says that policy should be in his *Tangle of Hopes* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969), pp. 272-277, especially p. 275.

[19]See particularly Leon Gordenker, *The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). Article 99 reads: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

[20]De Palma, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

[21]Yost, "Key Requirements . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[22]See President Nixon's comments to U Thant, reported in *Department of State Bulletin*, August 10, 1970, p. 165.

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were in the Congo, although it has certainly been displeased with some actions of some Secretary-Generals (e.g., U Thant's statements on aspects of the war in Viet Nam). Then too, as a status quo nation, it may view UN peacekeeping as a measure to pacify a status quo situation and therefore be willing to grant some authority and power to the Secretary-General for this purpose. With the exception of the Congo operation which the United States may be renouncing as precedent, UN peacekeeping in the Middle East, Cyprus, Kashmir and elsewhere has been designed basically to police something that exists — a boundary or cease-fire line — rather than to create something new. In this sense the function is conservative or status quo oriented, which might explain part of the U.S. attachment for it.

American policy regarding the Secretary-General's role, even if it reflects a less parochial attitude than that of the Soviets, does not denote a deep dissatisfaction with the ordering of authority in world politics or a significant movement away from traditional (effectively unregulated) national competition. The United States still opposes a standing peacekeeping force, preferring the "earmarking" of contingents within national armies for UN use.[23]

Recent policy statements by State Department officials indicating a desire to preserve the UN's operational capacity for peacekeeping are buttressed by domestic politics within the United States. Campaign statements in the 1968 Presidential election indicate a search by leading figures of both major parties for an alternative to the U.S. role of world policeman.[24] This slight retrenchment toward neo-isolationism and a "low profile" should enhance UN peacekeeping in the view of the current Administration, even if a related dilemma confronts the United States in this posture. It is arguable, to say the least, whether the UN can keep the peace by means of the active support of the United States in that process.[25] For the organization to be able to

[23]Yost, "Key Requirements . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 16. On this issue Washington said that it was "open to persuasion that other methods are better and practical."

[24]See Inis Claude, "The United Nations, the United States, and the Maintenance of Peace," *International Organization,* Summer 1969, pp. 621-636. Cf. the growing literature urging caution in unilateral action by the United States, recently represented by Graham Allison, *et al.*, "Limits to Intervention," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1970, pp. 245-261.

[25]Claude, "The United Nations . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 633, concludes that "unless the United States takes the lead in promoting the solution of problems relating to the authorization, management, and financing of peacekeeping, those problems will remain unsolved and will spoil the future of this new and promising function of the United Nations."

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serve as a substitute for U.S. involvement rather than as a channel for extensive involvement, Washington would have to acquiesce in an operation run by the Secretary-General with the support of "middle-power peacekeepers" such as Canada, the Scandinavian nations, India, Yugoslavia, and perhaps — but not likely — the United Kingdom. Obviously the image of a UN force serving as a substitute for American involvement is a bit more complex than first meets the eye. Yet for all the dilemmas, and for all the trouble Washington would meet in building a consensus at the UN — and in assuring that its security interests would not be jeopardized — UN peacekeeping is likely to remain moderately attractive to the United States. This attitude has been strengthened by the unhappy experience in Viet Nam.[26]

That the Soviet Union has not flatly opposed the entire concept of peacekeeping but has instead reached general agreement with the United States on authorization, establishment and composition of observer groups[27] is perhaps surprising when one looks at the superpowers' won-lost record with respect to UN peacekeeping. In major "games" of domestic instability the Soviets are 0-2; in regional instability games they are only 0-0-1. They clearly lost the Congo game to the moderates. In Cyprus, curtailment of the violence that was threatening to cause war between Greece and Turkey and disrupt the southern flank of NATO must be counted as a loss for the USSR. In the Middle East, where the USSR has apparently perceived an interest in fomenting instability in order to keep the Arab governments stirred up against Israel and thereby against the United States as Israel's major backer, UNEF stabilized the Egyptian-Israeli boundary for ten years — another loss. Only in Kashmir did the Soviets see a short-run interest in support of UN peacekeeping, since continued friction between India and Pakistan could have led to Pakistan's increased dependence on Chinese military aid. But by the same facts the United States also "won," hence a tie. The Soviets have few short-term gains to show from UN peacekeeping, except the most important gain: the avoidance of a direct confrontation with the other superstate because of the interposition of UN buffer forces, alias the plate glass window. It is well perceived in the Soviet Union that at times it is safer to compete with the United States *about* UN peacekeeping than to compete with the United States *without* UN peacekeeping.

[26]Cf. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Prospects for Peacekeeping," *International Organization,* Summer 1970, pp. 548-565.
[27]*UN Monthly Chronicle,* January 1970, pp. 103-106.

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Important differences between the Soviets and Americans remain. The depth of the Soviets' opposition to a relatively independent Secretary-General is indicated by their objection to the Secretariat's even having a hand in preparing reports distributed to the Committee of 33. They relented only to the extent that the Secretariat could prepare reports on past peacekeeping experience if no recommendations were made in those reports to the Committee.[28] Despite Soviet participation in international organizations during the last twenty-five years and the hopes that entanglement in the "web" of global organizations would open up the Soviet Union to less parochial views, Soviet views have remained remarkably consistent with those held in the early 1940's. According to Dean Acheson, in 1943 with regard to UNRRA

> Litvinov uncovered the classic Soviet positions toward international institutions. Nothing might be done within any country without that country's consent and except through its agencies; decisions . . . must be unanimous; . . . actions of the Director General must be subject to constant review and approval or rejection of the Executive Committee (comprised of the Great Powers), which might also dismiss him. . . .[29]

This restrained view of the utility of the United Nations stems in large part from the Soviets' position of persistent minority within the organization, which has not changed much even with the decline of U.S. influence in the General Assembly.[30] The basic desire is still to make the Soviet veto operable at any stage of a UN program of action. The fact that all the discussion and disagreement in the Committee during the past five years has been over the subject of observer missions as used in Lebanon and Yemen, *inter alia*, and not over paramilitary contingents, indicates further that even peacekeeping forms entailing lesser involvements on the part of the organization and member-governments would be closely scrutinized by the veto-possessing governments if the Soviets had their way.

The desired primacy — indeed, totality — of authority by the veto-possessing power is reflected in Soviet attitudes toward the financing of peacekeeping operations. In the context of the Cyprus situation the Soviets continue to stress the voluntary nature of contributions to the UNFICYP, thus preserving their own freedom of choice and freedom from expense, while ac-

[28]"Issues Before the 24th General Assembly," *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[29]*Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 69.
[30]Consult the data compiled and analyzed by E. T. Rowe, "Changing Patterns in the Voting Success of Member States in the United Nations General Assembly 1945-1966," *International Organization*, Spring 1969, pp. 231-253.

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quiescing in the operation as long as it is desired by the parties involved.[31] Though voting in the Council for its creation, they subsequently considered the Cyprus Force unnecessary[32] and refused to pay for it, presumably since the Council chose not to follow Soviet policy on the matter. The question of financing remains devoid of agreement in the Committee of 33. The United States has raised the possibility of a permanent peace fund that would be available in addition to an *ad hoc* allocation of payments for any given peacekeeping operation, arguing that the present voluntary system of financing "is inequitable and undependable and puts a drag on the effective conduct of peacekeeping operations."[33] Yet it can be questioned whether the Soviets would accept a standing peace fund any more than a standing peace force; there is some question as to whether they are happy with a standing Secretary-General.

Despite all the reservations by the Soviets with regard to UN peacekeeping — grounded in the action taken against their interests in Korea and the Congo — some further, if limited, agreement may arise out of the Committee of 33, the mandate of which has been extended once more. Soviet foreign policy globally has been found to be ambiguous and perhaps in transition for a number of reasons.[34] Moreover, Soviet policy at the UN has seemed basically opportunistic even if set within a fairly consistent defensive and restrictive strategy. Far-reaching resolutions endorsing a broad competence for the organization on decolonization and the Middle East have been supported when it seemed advantageous in the short run for the USSR to do so. The USSR position on peacekeeping has been polarized from the U.S. position more in doctrine than in fact. With the Soviets perhaps moving toward the U.S. position which accepts the Secretary-General as manager of peacekeeping operations,[35] and with the United States perhaps moving toward the Soviet position regarding the unilateral right of acquiescence and nonpayment, there may be a larger area of agreement between the superstates — though areas of disagreement would certainly remain in theoretical discussions. The basic foundation for superstate agreement remains unshaken:

[31] *UN Monthly Chronicle*, July 1969, Section I, pp. 8-9.
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] Yost, "Key Requirements . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 16.
[34] See especially Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Conflict and/or Collaboration?," *International Organization*, Summer 1969, pp. 589-620.
[35] De Palma believes some change to be in process in this regard; see his statement, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

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their shared interest in avoiding direct confrontation. The danger of confrontation in any given crisis, such as in the Arab-Israeli conflict, could therefore propel the superstates toward agreement whatever their differences of principle.[36]

The Third World and the Secretary-General

On the basis of discussions in the Committee of 33, past peacekeeping experience and other factors, there is reason to label the current international political system a loose-bipolar, or bipolar polycentric, system. Superstate attitudes, important as they are, are not the only variables at play in the shaping of UN peacekeeping. The attitudes of Third World governments and the Secretary-General must also be considered, as will become evident in a review of three case studies.

Two general trends can be noted by way of introduction to discussions about peacekeeping in the Nigerian, Lebanese and Jordanian civil wars. First, there is growing evidence that the Third World governments have lost interest in peacekeeping in preference to issues of decolonization and economic development.[37] In situations of domestic instability, UN peacekeeping may be rejected by these governments because the local power balance is in their favor; thus they are reluctant to introduce a UN force into the situation that might tend to consolidate the separate position of the rebelling faction. Moreover, peacekeeping may not be perceived as necessary if neither of the superstates backs the rebels strongly. Finally, if a faction in the civil war has already invited the military intervention of a superstate, UN peacekeeping may not be a viable alternative to governments.

The second general trend can be stated simply: Thant was not Hammarskjold. The third Secretary-General saw himself as a moderator, not an initiator.[38] While no neo-Drummond,[39] he can

[36]The position of other important actors, such as France, is omitted here. One reason is space. Another is that post-de Gaulle French policy is perhaps more ambiguous than Soviet policy. A third reason is that much the same analysis applies to France as to the USSR. For example, although both actors give the UN slight utility value, both would find it politically costly to try to block UN peacekeeping that was desired by actual or potential friends in the Third World. For background see James Joseph Combs, "France and UN Peacekeeping," *International Organization,* Spring 1967, pp. 306-325.

[37]Leon Gordenker, "The 'New Nationalism' and International Organization," *International Studies Quarterly,* March 1969, pp. 31-45; and David A. Kay, *The New Nations in the United Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

[38]As Thant said to President Nixon, "I still feel that the term 'moderator' is a very appropriate description of the type of job I am supposed to perform." *Department of State Bulletin,* August 10, 1970, p. 171.

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be regarded as a relative non-activist in comparison with his two predecessors. In his awareness of the negative residue from the Congo operation and of Soviet hostility toward his role in general, he deferred to governmental policies that bar UN peacekeeping. Whether any other Secretary-General would have done differently in the same context is a moot question. A combination of self-restraint and political realism caused Thant to forgo the use of Article 99 and to content himself with speaking on the need for improvements in the present non-system of *ad hoc* peacekeeping.

The interaction of these two general trends, against the background of superstate attitudes, is well demonstrated by the Nigerian domestic instability during 1966-1969. The Federal government in Lagos articulated the claim of domestic jurisdiction over the situation quickly and consistently. It made the claim prevail not because of lack of international ramifications from the struggle. The secession of Biafra had an impact on all African nations plagued by tribal dissensions and frictions — i.e., most of Black Africa. Moreover, any number of third parties were directly involved in one way or another: Egyptians were in the Federal air force, British and Soviet military aid went to Lagos, French military aid to Biafra. Even less did Lagos sustain its claim because of its own power, especially military power, as its inefficient operations evidence. The claim of domestic jurisdiction became the controlling norm in the Nigerian civil war because of the political weakness of the competing claim. Biafra found no major backers outside of limited French *de facto* support and *de jure* recognition from four African states.

The instability produced an organized collective interest only insofar as the Organization of African Unity was allowed to try to mediate the conflict — on terms favoring the Federal government. The OAU-sponsored negotiations were to be conducted within a commitment to preserving Nigeria's *ante-bellum* unity. Calls for a UN peacekeeping force à la the Congo were rejected by Lagos since a cease-fire policed by a UN force would tend to consolidate Biafra's separate position besides drawing international attention to its claim of independence. As far as the United Nations was con-

[36]The widely accepted view of Sir Eric Drummond, first Secretary-General of the League, as a non-activist is used here with some qualification because of analysis by one of his colleagues in the League Secretariat. According to Under-Secretary-General Pablo de Azcarate, Drummond was more or less passive in public but quite active behind the scenes. Azcarate's provocative view has been published in *La Tribune de Geneve,* June 20, 1969, p. xiv, in a feature article comparing Drummond with Albert Thomas. I am indebted to Senor Azcarate for continuing the dialogue on this subject despite the problems of correspondence.

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cerned, the argument of domestic jurisdiction prevailed, as complemented by OAU actions. No doubt a fact facilitating UN exclusion was that the United States and the Soviet Union were both on the Federal side of the fence.

Thant came under intensive criticism for not involving the organization in the Nigerian struggle. It was argued that the UN should undertake peacekeeping to stop the fighting, or at minimum undertake some service role to mitigate starvation in Biafra. In either case, there was private — i.e., citizenry — agitation for Thant to resort to Article 99 and call the attention of the Council to the situation. Thant, however, recognized a number of facts impeding such recourse. Since the Federal government had claimed domestic jurisdiction and had received the OAU's endorsement as the only legitimate government of Nigeria, on the basis of one-sided votes for two consecutive years, the legal foundation for UN involvement was circumscribed.[40] There was little likelihood that Lagos would ask for a peacekeeping force, and obviously Thant would have little support from Black African states in trying to persuade it to change its policy. Then too, OAU mediatory efforts, however spasmodically pursued, had to some extent pre-empted the field of organized international involvement, though probably not irrevocably. Most importantly, a potential supporting coalition of governments in favor of UN involvement failed to emerge. At one point Thant indicated his belief that were he to invoke Article 99, or were a government to try to mobilize Security Council action, the Council would not be disposed to inscribing the Nigerian conflict on its agenda.[41]

As the conflict wore on, it became increasingly evident that even service roles, presumably a lesser form of involvement, were not free from controversy, thus causing peacekeeping to appear more remote as a feasible course of action.[42] Efforts to provide relief by the International Red Cross and the Vatican, *inter alia*, were subject to political overtones — namely, the relief's effect on

[40]See *UN Monthly Chronicle*, May 1969, pp. 78-79, for a press conference in which the Secretary-General articulated his views in some detail. Cf. his earlier, similar view that he was "guided primarily, if not exclusively" by OAU resolutions; *ibid.*, October 1968, p. 103.

[41]*Ibid.*, May 1969.

[42]For a general discussion of UN service roles, see Oran R. Young, *The Intermediaries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 68-79. For a slightly different conceptualization and an analysis of a UN service operation, see my "UNRWA, the Palestine Refugees, and World Politics, 1949-1969," *International Organization*, Winter 1971.

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the Biafran commitment to secession.[43] Governments recognized this if private citizens did not. The United States, professing humanitarian concern for conditions of starvation in Biafra and eschewing the "politics of aid," managed to curtail official humanitarian impulses until the end of secession. The prevailing view was that easement of personal tragedy would have to wait for the imposition of national unity by Lagos, however slow and tortuous.

Peacekeeping, seen in the light of attitudes toward peace-servicing, was not a viable alternative for the Secretary-General. It was not only anathema to Lagos but was looked upon by most governments as a barrier to the eventual reunification of Nigeria — something that would freeze in the conflict and leave the nation divided as in Cyprus. Only Biafra argued for a cease-fire, and since there was little probability of a U.S.-USSR confrontation, most governments preferred to await the expected Federal triumph.[44]

Then there was the case of the limited civil war in Lebanon in the fall of 1969. Whereas the Nigerian federal government always believed it was militarily superior to Biafra and had overwhelming foreign endorsement for its point of view, the Lebanese government's ability to control the actions of the Palestinian commandos was generally in doubt, and the commandos had overt support from the stronger Syrian army. Presumably Beirut was even more in need of third-party assistance than Lagos. Yet there was no recourse to the UN, despite UN peacekeeping in Lebanon in 1958 which had helped to preserve the government apparently to the mutual satisfaction of the three major factions of that nation, Christians, Sunni Moslems and Shi'i Moslems.

In 1969 the danger to Lebanese stability was decidedly real. The use of Lebanese territory for raids into Israel by the commandos provoked the opposition of Lebanese Christians not inclined to take up a Moslem holy war against the Israelis and fearful of Israeli reprisal, but Palestinian actions gained the fervent support of Lebanese Moslems already encompassed in the

[43]Officials in Lagos at one point were reported to have referred to the International Red Cross, active in service roles, as an "intolerable nuisance and obstacle to peace," *New York Times,* June 16, 1969, p. 6. An earlier offer by Thant to have the UN help Lagos work out logistical problems in providing relief aid met with no response from the Federal government. *Ibid.,* July 17, 1968, p. 7.

[44]Thant did finally establish a token UN presence in Nigeria in the form of a representative of the Secretary-General who made some reports back to New York; and Thant himself made a tour of Nigeria after the collapse of the Biafran movement.

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emotional vortex of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The controversy was especially disruptive since Lebanon is approximately evenly divided between Christians and Moslems, and the government is always a coalition based on the three major religious factions. Any bitterly controversial policy decision can thus cause the immediate breakup of the coalition government, and in this case the depth of the issue led to armed conflicts within the society as well.

It can be argued that a UN peacekeeping force along the Lebanese-Israeli boundary, like UNEF on the Egyptian-Israeli boundary, would have permitted the Lebanese government to avoid the responsibility for curtailing commando raids with their danger of Israeli reprisal. Such a force would also have permitted Lebanon to claim to other Arab governments and its own citizens that it would like to fight the Israelis but the UN was holding it back, and it had been forced to submit to international pressure on the issue. A UN force could have been extended along the Lebanese-Syrian boundary, where the Syrians were providing direct support for the Palestinians moving down the "Arafat trail" in Lebanon toward Israel, and where there were reports in 1969 that regular Syrian army troops were crossing into Lebanon to keep Lebanese authorities from cracking down on the commandos. There may have been more support within Lebanon for a UN force in this area than along the Israeli boundary, since to many Lebanese Syrian aims vis-à-vis Lebanon are suspect. A two-pronged UN force would have averted the extreme danger — in a region prone to radical politics and persistent violence — that continued instability might lead to either a Syrian or an Israeli preemptive move to take over the entire nation.

Whatever the arguments outlined here, Lebanon finally elected to seek mediation from President Nasser of the United Arab Republic rather than ask for assistance from the UN. Perhaps the reasoning was that Nasser would have more influence with the commando elite than anyone else. Perhaps there was a desire not to internationalize the issue officially and thereby give Syria the opportunity to espouse the Palestinian case further. In any event, in the Lebanese instability as in the Nigerian, no UN member, nor the Secretary-General, moved to introduce a UN peacekeeping operation into the situation.

Even more illustrative was the similar instability in Jordan in 1970. Again the root cause was the Palestinian movement and its attempts to use Jordan as a base of operations against Israel. By 1970 the PLO and various splinter groups such as the Popular

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Front for the Liberation of Palestine were directly challenging the authority and power of the Hussein government, which was based on the loyalty of non-Palestinian elements in the nation. Hussein's acceptance of a cease-fire with Israel and the start of indirect negotiations brought the tensions to a showdown point in September 1970, and, as in Lebanon a year earlier, the outcome was generally regarded as uncertain.

Neither the Hussein government, nor any other government, nor the Secretary-General moved to involve the UN and to introduce peacekeeping. While large-scale violence raged, including tank battles between loyalists and Syrian supporters of the Palestinians, Israel mobilized its forces and the United States threatened to intervene to counteract Syrian intervention. Nevertheless, the danger of escalation failed to induce an organized response through the UN framework. As Hussein's forces gradually demonstrated their superiority, most parties were content to let the course of battle determine events. Had the fighting run the other way, perhaps there would have been some collective interest. But the Palestinians had few supporters other than the Syrians; the Soviets had ample reason to quietly watch them lose, for the Palestinian guerrillas had been counterproductive to the Soviets' efforts to achieve Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory by diplomacy.[45]

Hussein finally agreed to a cease-fire negotiated through President Nasser and to a peacekeeping group under the aegis of the Arab League, opting for regional rather than UN supervision, even though this was the first regional venture of its kind. The Tunisian-led observer group, however, was unable to maintain the truce or to prevent a systematic effort on the part of the king's forces to eliminate the armed Palestinians.[46] Not only did governments refuse to become involved (which constituted *de facto* support for Hussein); the Secretary-General also refused to comment on the implications of events in Jordan for UN operations there, particularly the functioning of UN programs for Palestinian refugees.[47]

Adding to the bleak record of UN tokenism in Nigeria and noninvolvement in Lebanon and Jordan, other factors at the turn

[45]Soviet concern about the guerrilla role is well represented in Y. Dmitriev, "The Arab World and Israel's Aggression," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1970, p. 23; I. Belyaev, "Ways of Ending the Middle East Crisis," *ibid.*, October 1968, p. 28; and M. Kruglov, "The Palestine Liberation Movement," *New Times*, September 17, 1969, p. 13.

[46]*Christian Science Monitor,* January 16, 1971, p. 1.

[47]See, for example, *UN Monthly Chronicle,* July 1970, pp. 114-115.

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of the decade pointed to a decline in peacekeeping. Fighting in Indochina expanded geographically, presumably as part of the American de-escalation in Viet Nam, without significant reference to roles the organization could perform.[48] The withdrawal of UNEF at the start of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war had posed a number of complex questions about the function of a peacekeeping force in time of crisis when the host state's consent was retracted and about the appropriate response of the Secretary-General to such an abrupt dismissal.[49] Continuation of the UN Force in Cyprus raised additional questions about the effect of a successful peacekeeping force on peacemaking, and whether the organization might find itself with a permanent obligation when it prevented violence without being able to facilitate resolution of the basic issues involved.

Conclusions

UN peacekeeping has been approached more cautiously recently because it is better understood — particularly in cases of domestic instability. It is still referred to as neutral by governmental spokesmen, military practitioners of the art, and academicians,[50] but such comments are misleading. No system of order, even that order temporarily facilitated by UN peacekeepers, is absolutely neutral — i.e., value free. Under any order, some elites are preferred over others, some claims are endorsed over others. The Cyprus situation is usually regarded as an example of impartial peacekeeping, but the conflict was stabilized only as long as

[48]Thant had, of course, spoken out against various actions in the war, and had tried to serve as secret emissary (see Gordenker, *The UN Secretary-General . . . , op. cit.*, p. 175). On the general subject of the Viet Nam situation as a civil war, see especially Richard A. Falk, "International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War," in Richard A. Falk and Wolfram Hanrieder, editors, *International Law and Organization* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), pp. 145-182.

[49]See further Charles Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War: How It Began," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1968, pp. 304-320; Yashpal Tandon, "UNEF, the Secretary General, and International Diplomacy in the Third Arab-Israeli War," *International Organization,* Spring 1968, pp. 529-556; and Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

[50]Yost for the United States has argued that "U.N. action take account of the interests of all parties concerned, that it be impartial in both intent and application, and that it be calculated to induce the cooperation of contending parties as well as those on whom it must depend for manpower and funds." ("Key Requirements . . .," *op. cit.,* p. 15.) Brigadier Michael N. Harbottle, previous commander of the UNFICYP, has written that "in Cyprus . . . the neutrality and special status of the UN soldiers have been respected by both communities." ("Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," *Military Review: Professional Journal of the U.S. Army,* September 1969, p. 44.) See also Arthur M. Cox, *Prospects for Peacekeeping* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 4, where he posits that "the soldiers who wear the blue insignia of the UN are politically neutral . . .," and *passim.*

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the Makarios government did not renew the effort to change the Cypriot constitution so as to diminish the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority. UN peacekeeping helped to consolidate the position of the Turkish Cypriots, while at the same time reinforcing Makarios' acknowledgment of its strength as backed by threat of Turkish invasion. The UNFICYP indirectly supports the 1960 constitution rather than the proposed new one which touched off the violence in 1964. The Cyprus Force can be considered neutral only in the sense that it seeks to patrol a tacit agreement between the government and the minority not to alter the 1960 status quo without explicit bargaining between the two parties, and thus seeks to "keep" what the parties want "kept."

The Cyprus type of UN involvement is likely to gather more support than the Congo model in which the United Nations enforced an order of its own determination. There seems to be a tendency on the part of governments to accept the Lefever thesis with respect to peacekeeping in general, that "U.N. action should not be regarded as the first option for crisis management, but rather as a last resort,"[51] even though the basis for the original thesis was only the episode in the Congo. Yet the systemic factors giving rise to the need for UN peacekeeping — the same factors that undermined the notion of collective security — persist.[52] The United Nations remains useful as a "container" if not as an authoritative "resolver," a function stemming from the organization's essence as a regulator in a balance of power system. UN peacekeeping has particular utility in conflicts outside Soviet-American spheres of influence, where the two superstates back different factions, and where the factions are relatively balanced in power.

Nevertheless, because of political ramifications from peacekeeping, the superstates hesitate to delegate power and authority to the Secretary-General.[53] The Secretary-General is not likely to try to assume the instruments of influence against the effective opposition of the United States and the USSR. And Third World governments are reluctant to resort to UN channels if there is the

[51]Ernest Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 220. The same thesis is found in his other writings on the Congo and UN peacekeeping.

[52]See Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "International Organizations and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* September 1966, pp. 297-313. Cf. Oran R. Young, "The United Nations and the International System," *International Organization,* Autumn 1968, p. 911.

[53]Lack of progress in the Committee of 33 is again evident; *UN Monthly Chronicle,* December 1970, pp. 52-55.

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possibility that such recourse would strengthen the bargaining position of challenging factions.

There is no movement at present for a radical restructuring of patterns of authority in world politics to enable the United Nations to perform its function of crisis management with more certainty.[54] Response to crises continues to be *ad hoc* and imbued with elements of ambiguousness. Advocates of extensive change are to be found generally within academic circles or in private, nongovernmental positions. Acheson-like, most governmental officials tend to regard the UN as something of an irrelevant "legacy of the nineteenth century."[55] The outcome is continuing tension between an interdependent world and the assertion of national prerogatives. U Thant perceptively depicted the present condition:

> It is our dilemma that, short of some fearsome and imminent threat of disaster, dramatic change in the attitude of Governments to international order is unlikely, especially where their own interests or sovereignty are vitally concerned. In the present state of affairs Governments tend to cite the attitude of others as a good reason for making no concessions themselves. To that extent sectional interests continue to dominate over the common good. It is a dangerous fact, which should never be forgotten, that on the international scene we still live in a state of perpetual insecurity comparable to the condition of a country where no central authority, no police force and no enforceable code of law are yet consistently functioning. Instead, we improvise at the last minute, within the broad framework of the United Nations Charter. United Nations peace-keeping operations—successful though most of them have been in their limited objectives—are essentially *ad hoc* and voluntary improvisations to meet a particular danger. Although they are a fine example of international cooperation in pioneering new methods of keeping the peace, they are no substitute for a system which by its regular existence and acceptance could create confidence and understanding among nations. The tension, suspicion and fear which now bedevil and endanger our society and demand vast expenditures in armaments and defence will not be dispersed until we begin to develop such a notion. In this context idealism is also realism.[56]

[54]This article was written before the People's Republic of China was admitted to the UN and before the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Contemporary politics in South Asia, in particular the lack of enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping, would appear to support its findings. The admission of the People's Republic may well affect future UN peacekeeping, but China's impact will have to be analyzed against the background of Soviet-American bargaining positions in the Committee of 33.

[55]*Present at the Creation, op. cit.*, p. 38.

[56]"View from the Bridge," Address by U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, delivered at a meeting of the United Nations Association of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Central Hall, London, April 25, 1969, reproduced in *UN Monthly Chronicle*, May 1969, p. 62.

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FRANCE ENSNARED: FRENCH STRATEGIC POLICY AND BLOC POLITICS AFTER 1968

by Edward A. Kolodziej

CHARLES de Gaulle's France made telling points in the debate over bloc politics and American imperial proclivities for more than a decade following the inception of the Fifth Republic. But for all its rhetorical brilliance, and the pleasure it may have given European partners, the Gaullist argument won no professed converts. France's deviant behavior illustrated more than determined the growing diplomatic pluralism of international relations in the 1960's; its efforts alone did little to challenge seriously the bipolarity of global security relations dominated and defined by the Soviet Union and the United States. After 1968, even Gaullist rhetoric ceased to command much world attention. Social and economic turmoil within France and conflicts with America and Germany over monetary policy — and with the Soviet Union over European security in the wake of the Czechoslovakian invasion — exposed the shaky material foundation on which the French critique rested and robbed it of much of its practical, if not all of its theoretical, merit.

It may be instructive to summarize the changed internal and external conditions that prompted a revision of French strategic policy and then sketch and analyze briefly the principal components of the French shift in the post-1968 period.

French Strategic Policy and the Changing Economic and Political Environment

First, student and worker protests throughout France in May 1968 forced a reordering of governmental priorities. However much the workers and students may have approved Gaullist assaults on American hegemony or taken pride in such prestige symbols as the *force de frappe*, they were interested ultimately in more mundane objectives. The workers wanted better housing, lower prices, higher salaries and improved working conditions. The students focused on relevant education for later careers, jobs after graduation, closer student-faculty relations, a greater say in the governing of their universities, access to institutions of higher

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learning and reforms in conditions of student life and study. Only a minority of Frenchmen could be said to have desired the toppling of the regime.

In bringing most of the country's productive activities to a halt, the student-worker strikes effectively withdrew political support from the regime's foreign and security policies. The majority victory of the Gaullist party, the UDR, in the special parliamentary elections in June 1968, called to produce a new mandate for Gaullist rule, deflected attention from the serious blow struck at President de Gaulle's personal prestige and at his administration. De Gaulle had rested his authority on the French people, not on the National Assembly and still less on the parties. But in the aftermath of the May crisis he had to rely on these previously scorned instruments to cling to the appearances of power. The May events were tantamount to an unscheduled referendum on ten years of Gaullist rule. The rejection in April 1969 of de Gaulle's plan to reform the Senate and decentralize French administration was anticlimactic. "Why did you leave on a question so secondary as that of the regions," asked André Malraux in his last interview with de Gaulle. "Because of the absurdity?" "Because of the absurdity," replied de Gaulle.[1] What a majority of Frenchmen wanted, as Pierre Viansson-Ponté later recognized, was *bonheur*, not *grandeur*.[2]

Second, the May 1968 events triggered an economic and financial crisis that revealed how dependent the ambitious French military program was on the support of its allies. The first casualty was the franc, on which the de Gaulle Government had founded its foreign and domestic policies.[3] A run on France's $6 billion in gold reserves quickly enfeebled the franc. Millions of francs fled the country, seeking refuge in American dollars and German marks. Between May 1 and July 4, reserves dropped $1.8 billion. France's balance of payments position also slipped rapidly. By the end of the year, a deficit of more than $3 billion was registered. Almost overnight the nation found itself suppliant, not solvent.

To halt the downward plunge of its foreign deficits, France instituted selected import quotas and advanced aid to exporters. The EEC subsequently acceded to these *faits accomplis* even though they qualified France's obligation to remove all remaining barriers to the creation of a full customs union by July 1, 1968. On

[1]André Malraux, *Les Chênes Qu'On Abat* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), pp. 40-41.
[2]*Le Monde*, May 9, 1971, p. 1.
[3]Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'Espoir: Le Renouveau, 1958-1962* (Paris: Plon, 1970).

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May 30, the French government established exchange controls, and in July a $1.3 billion "swap" was made with European central banks and the Federal Reserve of New York. When another serious attack against the franc was launched in the fall of 1968, the Group of Ten within the International Monetary Fund extended $2 billion in credits to France. The principal donors were the United States and Germany.

American and German help galled French pride. It forced a truce in the "gold war" campaign led by de Gaulle against the credibility of the dollar, the complement to his earlier offensive on the alleged unreliability of the American nuclear deterrent.[4] The Johnson Administration eased the French government's resignation to American financial dominance by minimizing public notice of the dollar's support of the franc. Messages of encouragement were quietly dispatched during the crisis, including a personal exchange of cables between Presidents Johnson and de Gaulle. Johnson's halt of bombing on North Viet Nam and his request to establish peace negotiations in Paris, beginning in May 1968, nursed a cordiality between the two states forced as much by domestic upheaval in both countries as by conscious desire on the part of their governments.

German assistance was also a source of concern. Bonn's help was eventually effective, but the manner in which the aid was furnished unsettled French national sensitivities. The ruling German coalition of Socialists and Christian Democrats was cool to French suggestions and broad American and British hints that the mark be revalued upward. In the fall of 1968, Germany extended credits to France and instituted export controls but went no farther. These positive steps were not strong enough to quell French fears that Germany's assertion of its own economic interests forewarned of future demonstrations of German political independence. New anxieties over a revived Germany, capable of exerting weighty economic and diplomatic influence in the service of German national goals, were by his own accounting uppermost in de Gaulle's thinking during his last months in office.[5] They were no less present in the minds of some French officials in the wake of the April 1971 financial crisis, when Bonn chose to float the mark over the wishes of its EEC partners, and especially France.[6]

[4]The felicitous phrase is Guy de Carmoy's in "The Last Year of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy," *International Affairs,* July 1969, p. 430.

[5]See C. L. Sulzberger's final interview with President de Gaulle, of February 1969, published November 11, 1970 in the *Herald Tribune,* International Edition, pp. 1, 4.

[6]Author's interviews, Paris and Brussels, April-May 1971.

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Third, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, in August 1968, underlined how much France depended on the American security guarantee. Moscow's action diluted the political utility (not to mention the domestic financial claims) of an independent *force de frappe*. The French nuclear system had been advanced as an indispensable ingredient of a new security framework for Europe in the post-bloc period, marked by the diminishing importance of the NATO and Warsaw organizations and the decreasing presence of American and Soviet forces in Central Europe. Continued polycentrism in Eastern Europe and the gradual liberalization of the totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union were to be the political foundation stones of the new order. The Czech incident dashed French hopes that such a political base could soon be realized. Although the government refused to concede that its détente policy had been seriously damaged — Czechoslovakia was characterized as "an accident along the route" — there were increased signs of a major re-evaluation of the strategic threats facing France. Efforts were set in motion, too, to repair sagging alliance fences with Western allies and, specifically, the United States.[7] Attacking the United States was profitable only so long as the threat from the USSR appeared remote. As the Soviet military threat suddenly became real and as America's attention turned from Europe (partly because of engagements elsewhere, partly because of growing impatience with the size of its global burdens) the strategic dilemma became more sharply focused.

Faced with the need to cut back military expenditures, a heightened perception of threats abroad, and an Atlantic partner itself suffering from bloc fatigue — in part brought on by repeated Gaullist attacks — French strategists had to pose a security question that had been conveniently slighted during the heyday of de Gaulle's détente policy toward the Soviet Union between 1965 and 1968: How could France reduce or escape dependency on the United States without reducing the dependability of the United States? In other words, how could she "get away closer" from the American colossus?

Realignment a la Carte

Major operational shifts were soon discernible as France worked at harmonizing the strategic imperatives with political needs and aspirations. Changes could be detected in its announced strategic doctrine, its alliance diplomacy, the size and distribution of ex-

[7]Sulzberger interview, *op. cit.*

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penditures for force levels and weapons systems, and the greater attention devoted to the relation of military spending to economic growth and foreign trade. This reordering began in the final year of the de Gaulle administration and continued into the Pompidou presidency, culminating in the third military five-year plan under the Fifth Republic passed by the National Assembly in November 1970.

As early as November 1968, less than a year after the announcement of the Ailleret doctrine of an all-horizon defense, criticism of French policy began circulating discreetly within French military circles. The November 1968 number of the prestigious *Revue de Défense Nationale* featured General Edmond Combaux's critique of "défense tous azimut."[8] Combaux attacked General Charles Ailleret's strategic recommendations for warping military spending at the expense of conventional forces, for weakening the tie between the nation and national defense in assigning the state's military functions to a professional elite, and, worse, for actually increasing France's dependence on the United States. The latter charge was crucial, for it disarmed Ailleret's argument.

Combaux posited the rule that "the range of the arms always determines the radius of the fortresses or the size of the fortified areas."[9] Thus, the superpowers, acting implicitly on this principle of military logic, created a global alliance network in order to establish their primary defenses as far from their shores as possible. According to the Combaux analysis, Ailleret's strategic notions also implied a defense that would be far from population centers and grounded in large and secure terrain on which to maneuver — which France alone could not provide. Ailleret was unable to accept the conclusion of his own thinking, for it would have led to the recommendation of closer, not weaker, alliance ties. This was precisely what he sought to avoid. Yet only allies could afford France the geographic scope and material possibility of executing Ailleret's strategic notions of national independence.

"It is not sufficient for France to possess rockets of intercontinental range," concluded Combaux. "It is essential to recognize the environment in which these weapons operate and the limitations of their use. They will have value only if they are part of a coherent defense system. Because the dimensions of the

[8]"Défense Tous Azimut? Oui, Mais . . . ," pp. 1600-1618. See also the useful analysis of Combaux's thought in *Combat*, November 4, 1968, p. 2.

[9]Edmond Combaux, "French Military Policy and European Federalism," ORBIS, Spring 1969, p. 151.

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system greatly exceed the capabilities of our nation, the need for a permanent defense association between France and her neighbors is inescapable."[10] For Combaux, if Atlantic ties were ruled out by Gaullist fiat, the only feasible alternative open to France to salvage Ailleret's (and the government's official) doctrine was, ironically enough, a global alliance framework based on cooperation with her European partners. Ailleret's (and de Gaulle's) globalism was not so much questioned as was its operational effectiveness if built solely on the limited striking power and territory of the French state.

The confirming signal that France had amended its strategic doctrine was given in May 1969, in a *Revue de Défense Nationale* article under the signature of General M. Fourquet, Ailleret's successor as commander-in-chief. First, Ailleret's notion of a strategic threat arising from any point in the globe was revised in favor of the traditional view of "an enemy coming from the east."[11] Second, a modified version of NATO's graduated response strategy was substituted for Ailleret's largely all-or-nothing doctrine. Barring a direct enemy strike against France, the first encounter with enemy forces was portrayed as occurring at the conventional level. Once this was breached, the second clash would be at the tactical nuclear plateau. The employment of these weapons would test the intentions of the adversary in order to prevent a premature launching of strategic forces and would manifest France's will to resist. Fourquet also narrowed previous French conceptions of the autonomous use of tactical and even strategic nuclear weapons. Although their independent employment was not ruled out, emphasis was placed on their utilization in coordination with the Western allies, but with more an Atlantic thrust than the European direction indicated by Combaux.

If the French conception of an escalation ladder had few rungs, owing partly to the limited nuclear means disposed by France, Fourquet's formulation was still more in accord with announced NATO strategy. Troop reductions in NATO in the late 1960's induced NATO planners, too, to rely on earlier use of nuclear weapons than had initially been envisioned when the American shift to graduated response had first been proclaimed. These changes had the effect of drawing French and NATO views closer together although for different reasons.[12]

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 152.
[11] General M. Fourquet, "Emploi des Différents Systèmes de Forces dans le Cadre de la Stratégie de Dissuasion," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, May 1969, p. 762.
[12] *Le Monde*, April 5, 1969, p. 5.

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Doctrinal alignments between NATO and French strategy also found practical, albeit limited, expression in what Michel Debré, as Defense Minister in the Chaban-Delmas cabinet, termed a policy of selective cooperation between France and its alliance partners.[13] Even immediately after the 1966 military withdrawal from NATO, France continued to participate in the technical weapons development group at The Hague. French experts increased their membership on NATO technical committees. Ties to the NADGE alert system, indispensable for the protection of France's Mirage forces, were retained; French companies built radar components for the network, and a French general assisted in installing the warning system in Turkey.[14] Likewise, progress has been recorded in coordinating French-NATO air defenses, and France took steps, since proven abortive, to join in the construction of a new NATO communications network. French-NATO contacts have been multiplied in joint training exercises to improve the efficiency of French conventional forces. As early as the fall of 1968, French naval and air units participated discreetly in NATO maneuvers in the Mediterranean and assumed surveillance functions over Soviet operations in the area.

French authorities insist, nevertheless, that these activities in no way contradict France's decision to quit NATO's integrated command structure or suggest any desire to return to the NATO fold.[15] Such assertions of Gaullist creed do not square easily with some forms of NATO cooperation in which the French have shown an interest. Participation in the NATO communications network or aerial defense, for example, implies French acceptance of NATO priorities under certain defined operating conditions. What passes for integration within NATO has largely been the product of consent arrangements among member states. The French argument over the loss of independence within the alliance has always been overstated. NATO has never achieved the hopes of its public pronouncements in integrating the military capabilities of the member states within a single command structure. The French were not unaware of the difference, but preferred, often solely for reasons of domestic and international consumption, to beat the NATO horse when political opportunity beckoned.

The inadmissibility of France's return to the NATO structure

[13]Michel Debré, "France's Global Strategy," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1971, pp. 395-406.
[14]*Le Nouvel Observateur,* January 1, 1971, p. 26.
[15]Author's interviews, Paris, January-May 1971; Brussels, March 1971.

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has not precluded gestures of loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance. Apprehensions that France would leave the alliance after 1969, when member states had the right to renounce their treaty obligations unilaterally, were quickly laid to rest. New oaths were taken of the nation's commitment to the Western alliance and specifically to its special security ties with the United States. In a speech before the Ecole Militaire in July 1970, Debré acknowledged the critical defense role played by American military power. "We ought to be aware," he said, "that there exists around us a circle of nations to which we belong and which have in common a cultural and moral treasure as well as a conception of social life. The security of this grouping, in many ways, makes a whole whose principal pillar remains the United States. *It is normal to give a privileged place to Franco-American relations.*"[16] In welcoming Leonid Brezhnev to Paris for an official visit on October 25, 1971, President Georges Pompidou emphasized France's economic and social links "to the Western world" and "its alliances" as "an integral part of her policy."[17]

After 1968, the French security problem was posed less as a matter of blocking American penetration of Europe than of assuring the availability of American military power as a calculated hedge against Soviet expansion. The French reaction to the SALT and MBFR talks, discussed below, is partly explicable in these terms.

The Search for Independence

In temporarily acceding to American financial and strategic power, post-1968 France did not abandon the search for independence.[18] It was being pursued at different rates of speed and intensity in at least five areas: (1) the development of national military forces; (2) East-West negotiations; (3) bilateral security ties with Third World states; (4) arms sales; and (5) bilateral security ties in Western Europe.

The Military Program

The French strategic and tactical nuclear program continued under tight national control. The third five-year plan for military

[16] *Le Monde,* July 3, 1970, p. 5. (Emphasis added.)

[17] Address delivered by Georges Pompidou at the Grand Trianon on October 25, 1971, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information.

[18] Space limitations prevent an explanation of the French criticism of American economic and monetary policy, especially in the wake of the August 1971 dollar crisis. See, for example, *Le Monde,* September 4, 1971, p. 1.

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expenditures, passed by the National Assembly in November 1970, called for maintenance of the Mirage nuclear force until 1976, emplacement of eighteen IRBM's in concrete silos (instead of the twenty-seven first projected), and completion of three Polaris-type submarines by 1974-1975. France was expected to dispose thermonuclear weapons by the middle 1970's.

After a decade of relative neglect, new impetus was given to the development of tactical nuclear forces, based on mobile ground and air delivery systems. Planning for the use of these forces remained national, and no official efforts were made to coordinate them with NATO elements, although informal contacts between French and NATO officers have been reported.[19] What function they would perform in allied defense was not seriously broached. While military doctrine manifested more realism regarding the vulnerability of tactical nuclear forces, the political objections of the Pompidou regime to bloc politics sustained the dubious strategic propositions that France could still act separately in a nuclear war, even in Europe, and that joint nuclear planning inherently weakened overall deterrence between East and West. "Because the nuclear risk is not divisible," wrote Defense Minister Debré in the April 1971 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "any nuclear cooperation which might have a strategic character is simply not possible. The decision to employ nuclear forces can be made only by a single nation, which is to say that any regulations laid down in advance, which set forth the conditions for employment, diminish the deterrent's credibility."[20] The indivisibility of the nuclear risk partially underlies the rationale for French refusal to participate in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group.

These assertions of independence are less impressive, however, when the military expenditure program is examined. Pompidou's five-year military plan reinforced the downward trend in military expenditures relative to overall governmental spending and GNP that had been established in the two previous five-year plans of his predecessor. Military spending in proportion to these two factors declined steadily and consistently between 1960 and 1970. In 1960 it composed 28 per cent of the government's budget and 5.5 per cent of France's GNP. Eleven years later, in 1971, the respective figures were 17.2 per cent and 3.27 per cent.

The events of 1968, as the Defense Ministry admitted, ac-

[19]Author's interviews, Paris and Brussels, March-May 1971.

[20]*Op. cit.*, p. 401. Also of interest is Debré's "Les Principes de Notre Politique de Défense," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, August-September 1970, pp. 1245-1258.

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celerated this downward slide. While the rate of increase in government spending jumped from 9.4 in 1968 to 16.4 a year later, reflecting increases in social service spending, the rate of growth in military expenditures declined in the same period from 6.1 to 3.9 per cent. In 1970 and 1971, for the first time, more funds were devoted to national education than to defense. Higher absolute spending on defense ($5.2 billion in 1971 against $4.2 billion in 1965) was further offset by inflation, the 12.5 per cent devaluation of the franc in August 1969, and larger expenditures on military personnel to retain and attract experienced cadres. Consequently, program objectives were stretched out and the combat effectiveness of units, especially among conventional forces, was permitted to lag. Arms purchases and arms development were also reoriented to respond as much to the economic demands of foreign arms competition as to strategic imperatives.[21]

East-West Negotiations

In bloc politics, France strove to distinguish its views on East-West negotiations from those of its Western allies. French policy has been most active and visible in this area. Attention has centered on the American-sponsored NATO proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), SALT, the renewed Soviet call of March 1969 for a European security conference, and Big Four talks over Berlin. Paris showed least enthusiasm for MBFR. It refused to associate itself with the June 1968 NATO resolution proposing force reductions between the Western and communist military pacts. The grounds of the refusal were not entirely consistent. The proposal was condemned as a reinforcement of bloc politics since multilateral negotiations were envisioned rather than bilateral contacts between states. The French also argued that the Soviet Union was not interested in MBFR, a view later contradicted by Moscow's offer of May 1971 to put East-West talks on just such a basis.[22] More plausibly, they suggested that if the Soviet Union should accept the NATO proposal there was serious risk that European security would be compromised, since the geographic and military positions of the two superpowers in Europe were asymmetrical. A uniform formula for force reduc-

[21]The relevant documents are published by the Comité Interministeriel pour l'Information: *Le Budget de la Défense Nationale* (January 1970); *Le Budget de la Défense Nationale en 1970* (December 1970); and *La Troisième Loi de Programme Militaire* (November 1970).

[22]*Herald Tribune,* International Edition, May 15-16, 1971, pp. 1, 2.

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tions applied to both camps would necessarily weaken the Western alliance.[23]

There are indications that, at the military strategic level, France is not interested in any change in the European East-West balance, however much it presses for broader diplomatic, cultural, economic, scientific and technical exchanges between all European states.[24] Before coming to the United States in early 1970, President Pompidou thought it was "normal that there be an American presence in Europe."[25] He has not departed from this position. The argument against American or allied troop withdrawal before tangible gains have been realized in negotiations with the Soviet Union has instead been strengthened. In his news conference of September 23, 1971, Pompidou implicitly drew a distinction between détente through increased nonmilitary cooperation among European states and détente through changes in the military disposition of member states. Concern for progress in nonmilitary areas was not to interfere with the maintenance of the West's defense capabilities. There has been a shift away from the Gaullist stress on détente over defense.[26] On the other hand, Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann objected before the National Assembly on November 3, 1971 that MBFR was an obstacle to the calling of a European security conference.[27] These conflicting posturings were tantamount to a French call for an armed détente: "Yes" to any nonmilitary moves that would lessen East-West tensions; "No" to any weakening of the West's bargaining position, stemming from a diminution of American troop strength or Western military capabilities.

The French also took a dim view of SALT. Both MBFR and SALT ran counter to their preference for political accords between East and West states. Security arrangements such as SALT had the disadvantage that they would probably suit the economic needs and global security imperatives of the superpowers better than those of the small and middle powers of Europe. De Gaulle had repeatedly warned against a U.S.-USSR agreement over the heads of the European states whose protection depended upon one or the other of these continental powers. The

[23]Author's interviews, Paris and Brussels, January-May 1971.

[24]See, for example, "Statement of the Principles of Cooperation between France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 30, 1971," Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information.

[25]*U.S. News and World Report,* March 2, 1970, p. 44.

[26]*Le Monde,* September 25, 1971, p. 3.

[27]Address by Maurice Schumann before the National Assembly, November 3, 1971, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information.

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theme continued to be struck in the counsels of the Pompidou regime. Defense Minister Debré, pressing the point even further than de Gaulle, contended that a Soviet-American settlement on weapons and military expenditures might actually increase political instability in Europe. French logic dictated that the nuclear balance between the superpowers inevitably made Europe an area of secondary value for them in the event of a nuclear exchange and disposed them to compromise their differences at the expense of the other European states.[28] In the absence of a European political solution, responsive to the views of all affected parties and specifically approved by France, there was the risk that the states whose demands would not have been satisfied would have an incentive to upset the Soviet-American agreement. Precedent could be found in the aerial highjackings undertaken by the Palestinian Arabs in order to assert their interests after having been excluded from the Rogers Plan for the Middle East.[29]

In any event Soviet interest in military disengagement was perceived as considerably less than that of the United States. Either SALT or MBFR or both might leave Europe militarily exposed. After Czechoslovakia, the Gaullist prophecy that the United States could not be trusted to defend Europe began to haunt French policymakers as much as the possibility that an American-Soviet accord, in the form of a strategic arms agreement, might compromise France's security and political interests. Some, like Debré, clung to the notion that America's commitment to defend Europe depended "on the strategic superiority of the United States."[30] The passing of American strategic superiority, however much due to technological change rather than diminished resolve, could not but heighten doubts about U.S. security guarantees.[31]

The residual hope that a strictly defined military accord between the superpowers to slow down the arms race might increase the marginal strategic value of the *force de frappe* further complicated the French calculus. But in the renewed realism of the post-1968 period, this expectation was given less weight than before in announced and operational French strategic maneuvering. Officials no longer pretended that the French nuclear force could substitute for the American guarantee in the near future. The most they could hope for was that an enhanced *force de frappe* would strengthen the French bargaining position over a

[28]Debré, "France's Global Strategy," *op. cit.*, p. 403.
[29]*Le Monde*, September 26, 1970, p. 1.
[30]Debré, "France's Global Strategy," *op. cit.*, p. 397.
[31]*Le Monde*, October 2, 1971, p. 10.

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European political settlement.[32] Nuclear weapons were also the entry fee for a prominent place at the world disarmament conference table, a mark of France's status as a global power. Their possession supported her legal position as a member of the Big Four (and therefore an arbiter of Germany's fate) and as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Not surprisingly, the French displayed more interest in a European security conference. Whatever its possible snares — and reinforcement of bloc politics and superpower dominance were high among them — it offered greater room for diplomatic maneuver than military accords. France's strength lay, if anywhere, in its subtly calibrated diplomacy; in military power plays its record since 1940 has been undistinguished. Political, not strategic, understandings with adversary states was the preferred French method.

President Pompidou, like his predecessor, nurtured the Franco-Soviet détente begun in the middle 1960's. The vigor of German Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* gave new impetus to efforts to keep France in the running as the favored European interlocutor of the Soviet Union. The French President staked out the diplomatic terrain in his first speech at the Kremlin during his eight-day visit to the USSR in October 1970. Expressing optimism that a security conference could promote the independence of European states, he urged active preparation for such a meeting.[33] In his January and September news conferences in 1971 and in his meeting with Brezhnev in October,[34] he called for an early convening of a security conference. The French position was also aimed at responding to the sentiment of the East European states, which looked upon the conference as a means of stabilizing European security and as a diplomatic lever on the Soviet Union, impeding its resort to the Brezhnev Doctrine.

While Pompidou conciliated the Soviets and the East Europeans, his ministers were more qualified in their pronouncements concerning a conference. Within a month of the Soviet proposal Debré, attending NATO anniversary celebrations in Washington, had observed unofficially that the Soviet suggestion might bolster the superpower hold over Europe. French officials privately expressed the same view, emphasizing that a conference could be held only after careful preparations and with the consent of all af-

[32]Author's interviews, Paris and Brussels, January-May 1971.
[33]Comité Interministeriel pour l'Information, *Visite Officielle du Président de la République en U.R.S.S.* (6-13 Octobre 1970), No. 69, October 1970, p. 8.
[34]See *Le Figaro,* January 22, 1971, p. 6.

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fected parties.[35] These temporizings were supplemented by a more explicit French qualification: a security conference was contingent on progress in Big Four talks over Berlin. In November 1970, Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas stated during his official visit to Poland that France could neither agree to the convocation of a security meeting before a Berlin settlement had been achieved nor even engage in multilateral contacts to prepare such a conference in the absence of a Berlin accord.[36] A month later, Foreign Minister Schumann supported a strong NATO resolution citing Berlin in effect as a prior condition for the Soviet-sponsored conference.

President Pompidou attempted to reconcile the divergent views issuing from the Elysée Palace, the National Assembly, the Quai d'Orsay and the Defense Ministry in his January 1971 news conference. He drew a careful distinction between a juridic prerequisite, which France had not invoked over Berlin, and political prudence which suggested that success in reaching an accord on European security was not likely unless the Berlin question had first been resolved.[37] Schumann's reported remarks at the June 1971 NATO meeting in Portugal lent additional weight to the view that a Berlin accord was the French (and allied) price for a European security conference. By then, the major Western powers of the Atlantic Alliance were agreed that sufficient progress had been made in Big Four talks to soften NATO resistance to the Soviet proposal.[38]

Fall 1971 brought more explicit conditions. Partly in deference to German wishes, these included final settlement of the Big Four Berlin accord signed on September 3, mutual ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, and the successful conclusion of intra-German talks. The French also have elaborated on the Finnish suggestion of multilateral discussions to be held in Helsinki preparatory to convening the security conference. France would prefer, as Schumann observed, "a conference meeting alternately at two levels: at the level of foreign affairs ministers . . . and . . . at the level of three committees charged with . . . the areas of security, exchange of goods, and also exchanges of ideas or people. . . . It goes without saying that — if the results so justify — a meeting at the highest level could crown the undertaking."[39]

[35]Author's interviews, Paris and Brussels, January-May 1971.
[36]*Le Monde,* November 28, 1970, p. 7.
[37]*Le Figaro,* January 22, 1971, p. 6.
[38]*Herald Tribune,* International Edition, June 4, 1971, pp. 1, 2.
[39]Address by Maurice Schumann, *op. cit.,* p. 6.

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Accordingly, the French have renamed the Soviet proposal the "Conference on Security *and Cooperation* in Europe."[40] The conference might still legitimate Moscow's Eastern empire, but the French expect that it will also elicit Soviet concessions, permitting greater contacts between East and West European states. The Soviet Union might even allow itself to be drawn into an institutional framework growing out of the conference, aimed at encouraging European ties in all nonmilitary sectors and at containing Soviet maneuverability in Europe as much by diplomacy as by military threats. Judging by the communiqués that were issued, institutionalizing the process of East-West cooperation in Europe as an outcome of the conference appeared to be the thrust of Schumann's visits to Hungary and Bulgaria in September 1971.[41]

In French eyes, the oscillations and reservations in governmental pronouncements on a European security conference had political merit. On the one hand, France could assert that in principle it was still in the vanguard of efforts to reconcile East and West. On the other hand, its reservations served as a brake on convening a meeting precipitately. The conflicting French reactions to the security conference, SALT, MBFR and Berlin were all of a piece. They evidenced the growing hesitancy of the government to entertain new military proposals for European security. Preserving existing defense arrangements, however unstable they might be, took precedence over initiatives, like MBFR, whose consequences were necessarily uncertain. After 1968, initiatives for defense changes arose elsewhere. Paris lagged behind its Atlantic and European partners, whereas it had once led the search for cheaper, more durable and politically viable security arrangements.

Even the Brandt Government's *Ostpolitik* was questioned increasingly in French ruling circles, although France could justly claim to have been in the forefront of the détente race to win Soviet favor.[42] France had always considered itself the appropriate interlocutor for Germany with the Soviet Union. The Brandt Government, acting on its own advisement in normalizing

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 7. (Emphasis added.)

[41] *Le Monde,* September 10, 1971, p. 4; September 12-13, 1971, pp. 1, 3.

[42] Useful for a review of French official thinking is the publication of the Comité Interministeriel pour l'Information summarizing President Pompidou's visit to the Soviet Union, *op. cit.* An annex presents Foreign Minister Schumann's analysis of the German-Soviet treaty of August 12, 1970, in which he seeks to quiet French fears of another Rapallo, pp. 37-40.

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relations with its Eastern neighbors, offered little opportunity for the French to play their self-conceived intermediary role. However much they might applaud Germany's efforts to improve its relations with Eastern Europe as a confirmation of their own Eastern policy, Brandt's independent brand of *Ostpolitik* could not but reinforce the image of an emergent Germany, progressively beyond French influence, and raise anxieties about the strategic, political and economic implications of the German-Soviet rapprochement.

Still there was little else for the French government to do than to second the German effort, as Pompidou did at the Kremlin,[43] and to sign a new protocol with the USSR that attempted to match in importance the treaty signed by Germany the preceding August. The Bonn-Moscow treaty recognized the frontiers established by World War II and promised important economic and technological concessions to the Soviet Union.[44] The Franco-Soviet accord, rather than defining new areas of agreement, reaffirmed the allegedly privileged diplomatic relations between the two countries, their special global security responsibilities, especially within the United Nations Security Council, and their determination to enlarge economic ties.[45] The diplomatic tit-for-tat between Bonn and Paris continued into fall 1971, when, partly to counter the German-Soviet communiqué of September 1971, which raised the possibility of two Germanys in the United Nations, France signed not only another economic, technical and industrial accord with the Soviet Union but a "Statement" of Franco-Soviet principles of cooperation and a "Declaration" of their points of agreement on world issues.[46]

In general, however, the French felt themselves being ensnared against their better judgment — and to some degree their will — in a web of relations principally spun by the United States, the Soviet Union and West Germany. They seemed often to prefer the part of Penelope, unraveling rather than binding the tapestry of military security relations being woven. Toward the United States, France saw utility in developing limited concrete forms of

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.

[44] *L'Express,* August 7-23, 1970, pp. 14-17.

[45] *Visite Officielle du Président de la République, op. cit.,* pp. 3-5, 36. France's dubious favor in Soviet circles is raised further into question if one observes the close parallel in language between the protocols signed by the Soviet Union with France and later with Canada in May 1971. Privileged relations have now been reduced to little more than an intent on the part of the consenting states to engage in regular political consultations at fixed intervals. Whereas French-Soviet officials will confer twice a year, Canadian-Soviet representatives will meet only once. *Le Monde,* May 21, 1971, p. 5.

[46] See the issues of *Le Monde,* October 26 to November 1, 1971.

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cooperation with NATO. On the other hand, although it shared some U.S. doubts about a European security conference, it remained skeptical principally over SALT and MBFR. Toward the Soviet Union, French diplomacy temporized over the security conference while citing an expanding series of conditions, in accord with Germany and other Western allies, as a test of Soviet intentions. Toward Germany, maintaining war-won rights still controlled French strategic thinking. The Pompidou regime, like its predecessor,[47] was alert to any move by another power that might dilute France's privileged right to participate with the superpowers on equal terms in settling Germany's future.

Little comfort was drawn from Leonid Brezhnev's suggestion, at the Twenty-fourth Communist Party Congress in Moscow in April 1971, to hold disarmament talks among the five nuclear powers, although due notice was given to the Soviet proposal during Brezhnev's visit to France. Before 1968 the Soviet initiative, which acknowledged France's special responsibilities for global security, would have been recognized as a victory for French diplomacy. After French weakness became apparent in the final year of de Gaulle's rule, the Paris government preferred to hold on to the legal and political gains already secured, as in Berlin and Germany, rather than to gamble for more influence in security matters through initiatives that might change the existing military balance. What remaining capacity France had to influence events bearing on its security interests was seen to lie more in frustrating the designs of other states than in imposing its will on them; its juridic claims and agile diplomatic maneuvering now served it better than its strategic striking power or economic strength.

Security Ties with Third World States

French presence in the underdeveloped world represents the third major element of the search for independence in the post-1968 period, and this is linked closely to the sale of arms abroad. The Pompidou Government's stress on regionalism over Gaullist globalism, symbolized in France's much heralded Mediterranean policy, became the guideline for military planning.[48] "Our zone of privileged action," explained General Mitterand to a group of distinguished defense specialists, "remains . . . the Mediterranean,

[47]De Gaulle was clear on this point in his revealing talk with Sulzberger, *op. cit.*, p. 4: "The real sovereignty of Berlin was awarded to the victors of World War II. . . . The allies — you [the Americans] we, and the British — have the responsibility of sovereignty."

[48]For an elaboration of the Pompidou regime's accent on regionalism, see my article, "French Mediterranean Policy: The Politics of Weakness," *International Affairs,* July 1971.

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the Atlantic facade of Brest to Dakar, and Northern equatorial Africa."[49]

France is linked to most of the states of this region in a series of bilateral military assistance accords. Approximately twenty technical military assistance groups were operating in 1970 in Africa and Asia; approximately 12,000 French troops were stationed in various parts of Africa. A small, highly mobile force, capable of intervening abroad in limited engagements to support French interests and treaty obligations, had already been established under the second military *loi-programme*. Direct military support for the government of Chad since August 1968 suggested the kind of intervention contemplated.[50] It followed the Gabon example of February 1964, when French paratroopers reinstated the deposed President.[51] French military planning is oriented toward responding rapidly to prevent the subversion of friendly governments. To carry on a war of attrition, as before in Indochina or Algeria, would quickly sap France's limited conventional capabilities, not to mention domestic political will.

Arms Sales

Arms sales abroad have represented perhaps the most striking advance in France's relative strategic standing.[52] In 1970 French arms shipments tripled in value over those of the previous year, jumping from $456 million to $1.3 billion. France replaced Britain as the third most important exporter of arms, exceeded only by the United States and the Soviet Union, whose respective arms exports were worth $2.7 billion and $2.0 billion. In 1970 military sales totaled 8 per cent of all France's exports and 25 per cent of its

[49]General J. Mitterand, "La Place de l'Action Militaire Extérieure dans la Stratégie Française," *Revue de Défense Nationale,* June 1970, p. 901.

[50]Reports on French participation in the fighting in Chad are difficult to find in French or foreign newspapers. For bits of information about the effort, estimated to involve 1,500 troops, see *West Africa,* October 18, 1969 and September 5, 1970; *Herald Tribune,* International Edition, March 31, 1970; and *The Observer,* October 26, 1969. *The Military Balance 1970-71* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970) lists 2,500 troops in Chad as of June 1970, and 12,500 in Africa. The Chad figures appear high.

[51]Useful newspaper accounts of the Gabon expedition are found in *The Guardian,* February 20 and 24, 1964, and *The Sunday Times* (London), February 24, 1964.

[52]The annual issue of *The Military Balance* provides a running account of French arms deals. Useful summaries of French arms policy are found in Jean Klein, "Commerce des Armes et Désarmement," *Politique Etrangère,* No. 4/1968, pp. 351-360, and "Les Aspects Actuels de la Règlements du Commerce des Armes," *ibid.,* No. 2/1969, pp. 161-190; and Jacques Isnard, "French Arms Exports," *Survival,* April 1971, pp. 134-135. Also helpful are articles by C. L. Sulzberger, *Herald Tribune,* International Edition, February 22, 1971, p. 4; Josette Alia, *Le Nouvel Observateur,* November 1, 1971, pp. 24-25; Richard Booth, *Le Monde Diplomatique,* April 1970, p. 10; and Georges Chafford, *Combat,* February 5, 1969, p. 7.

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industrial shipments abroad. The bulk of the French success has been in aerospace, where Mirage sales in 1970 alone posted contracts valued at $650 million. The spectacular performance of Mirage in the Six-Day War helped to expand sales to almost twenty states around the globe. Helicopters, tanks, missiles and missile-launching patrol boats composed most of the other attractive sellers.

The French merchandised these military products much like soap chips or automobiles. Easy credit, weak political restrictions and service contracts were part of each package deal. Even arms fairs were organized to attract customers.[53] They were particularly successful in penetrating American arms markets — from industrial states like Germany (Bonn placed an order for over $200 million in patrol boats in 1970) [54] to less developed states like Colombia, Brazil, Argentina and Peru, which bought Mirages and, in the case of the latter two South American countries, other arms, including AMX tanks. The expansion of French arms sales to Latin America provides some measure of the vulnerability of the previous U.S. monopoly. Franco-American competition had grown so intense by the spring of 1971 that it elicited presidential notice on both sides of the Atlantic. In a May 1971 report to Congress, President Nixon recommended that military assistance to Latin America be doubled from its base of $75 million a year. Arms manufacturers were also advised to boost sales abroad.[55] On May 23, President Pompidou was reported to have advised the French military to develop simple, cheap and *exportable* arms.[56]

The motivation for the French marketing effort in arms is varied. While its principal root remains the desire for an independent strategic and diplomatic policy, economic considerations presently predominate. Military sales have maintained France's delicate balance of payments, created jobs and spurred industrial expansion (a high priority of the Pompidou-inspired French VI Plan). In 1970 the number of defense workers engaged in foreign exports doubled over the previous year, reaching a peak of 100,000, or more than one-third of the entire defense work force of 270,000. Arms exports supported an indigenous arms industry that would otherwise have shrunken with the secular decline of conventional forces and thus reinforced French dependency on the United States. It was hoped that these initial

[53] *Le Monde,* September 17, 1970, p. 14.
[54] *Ibid.,* October 26, 1970, pp. 1, 2.
[55] *Herald Tribune,* International Edition, May 22-23, 1971, p. 3; *Le Monde,* May 19, 1971, p. 32.
[56] *Le Monde,* May 23-24, 1971, p. 32.

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commercial successes would lead to greater military and even civilian sales of French products.[57]

The anticipated political gains of arms exports are difficult to assess. The de Gaulle and Pompidou regimes have had to weather serious internal political storms over their arms policies. Pro-Israeli elements in France sharply attacked the Gaullist embargo on arms to Israel. Their criticisms intensified as French arms sales increased to Arab countries, capped by a contract for 110 Mirages to Libya in early 1970.[58] Black African states have also criticized France for arms sales to South Africa and Portugal, but to date have had to be content with eliciting an Elysée promise that sales would be for defense purposes only and that no arms would be sold to states using them against rebel forces in Africa.[59] Besides the embargo of arms to belligerents in the Middle East and Viet Nam, France has reportedly refused to let contracts with approximately twenty countries because of their insolvency, aggressive foreign policies or suspected duplicity in acting as agents for states with which Paris would not deal directly.[60]

Security Ties in Western Europe

There are faint signs of renewed French interest in developing security ties with other West European states, but speculation has easily outdistanced the government's policy in exercising its European options. The negligible progress made in Anglo-French nuclear cooperation despite its tempting prospects is a rough index of the hesitancy of the Pompidou regime to develop closer defense ties rapidly. Greater mutual understanding between the two states, signified by Britain's entry into the Common Market, has been a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for military cooperation, especially in nuclear affairs. With Britain entering the EEC, France can presumably draw to some degree on Anglo-American defense ties to underwrite its security objectives in Europe without being forced into more formally binding relations with the United States within NATO. France's relative

[57]Two articles by Paul Balta, Middle East correspondent for *Le Monde*, provide a revealing analysis of French thinking regarding arms sales to Arab states: "La France et le Monde Arabe: Les Réalités Economiques," I, *Revue de Défense Nationale*, May 1970, pp. 813-835; and "La France et le Monde Arabe: Les Réalités Politiques," II, *ibid.*, June 1970, pp. 924-934.

[58]The Israeli case is summarized in Uri Dan, *et al., De Gaulle contre Israel: Documents sur l'Embargo* (Paris: Jacques Lanzmann, 1970). The French defense, presented by Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas, is found in Comité Interministeriel pour l'Information, *La Politique de la France en Mediterranée*, February 1970.

[59]*Herald Tribune*, International Edition, October 22, 1970, p. 1.

[60]*Le Monde*, May 22-23, 1970, p. 32.

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strategic standing would also seem to have been enhanced vis-à-vis Germany and the USSR, although it is too early to say what concrete benefits, if any, will derive from what Pompidou indirectly called a new *entente cordiale* during his appearance on BBC in May 1970.

Specific examples of progress in French-British nuclear cooperation are difficult to find. As early as May 1969, Pompidou, during his campaign for the French presidency, floated suggestions that he would be "ready to talk to the United Kingdom about an agreement" on nuclear defense policy which would be the basis for an independent West European effort. Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas a month later echoed Pompidou's views.[61] These probes, which never materialized in concrete proposals, were consistent with de Gaulle's vague hints to the newly arrived British ambassador, Christopher Soames, in February 1969, that France and Britain might form the nucleus of a European grouping to coordinate foreign and defense policies.[62] That little has actually occurred in defense talks between the two states is suggested by the reported French (and British) reluctance to raise defense issues during the Paris summit between Prime Minister Edward Heath and President Pompidou which opened the way for Britain's entry into the Common Market.[63]

On the surface, there would appear to be compelling economic and technical arguments disposing France to favor joint efforts with the British in nuclear policy.[64] The British are far ahead in nuclear weapons development, including multiple warhead technology, penetration devices and hardening techniques. They are especially advanced in the design, manufacture, propulsion and operation of nuclear-powered submarines. France has experienced considerable difficulty making rapid headway precisely in these areas. The nuclear propulsion program got off to a false

[61]Quoted in Ian Smart, *Future Conditional: The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 78, 1971), p. 28.

[62]For commentary on the Soames affair, see André Fontaine, *Le Monde,* February 20-21, 1969; Roger Massip, "Complot contre le Marché Commun," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire,* March 1969, pp. 5-8; and extracts from the British parliamentary debates, *The Times* (London), February 25 and 26, 1969.

[63]Author's interviews, Paris, May 1971, and *Herald Tribune,* International Edition, May 22-23, 1971, p. 2.

[64]See Smart, *op. cit.,* for a searching analysis of the prospects of Anglo-French nuclear policy. Most of the technical and economic data included in this discussion are drawn from Smart's work. Another useful appraisal, more optimistic in forecast, is Andrew J. Pierre, "Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France, and America," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1970, pp. 283-301. There is also the proposal of two British MP's, Eldon Griffiths and Michael Niblock, "Anglo-French Nuclear Deterrent," *Atlantic Community Quarterly,* Summer 1970, pp. 196-209.

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start, for example, when the French attempt to use natural uranium as a fuel proved abortive after a great deal of money and time had been spent on the project. Throughout the 1960's the nuclear program was plagued by high and continually mounting costs and slow technological development. In the seven-year period, 1965-1971, an average of 25.5 per cent of the French defense budget was devoted to nuclear weapons; approximately half of the expenditures for heavy equipment went into the nuclear program. Furthermore, to speed deployment of the French nuclear fleet and to make it more effective, Britain has much to offer in computer technology, intelligence and satellite systems, navigational equipment, logistics support, management techniques and command and control data. For its part, France has made appreciable strides in missile technology where Britain is weak. This includes both long-range missiles and tactical nuclear missiles such as Pluton. The common problem facing both states is that work must begin now on planning for a new generation of weapons for the 1980's. Neither country can easily bear the technological and economic costs of this enterprise alone.

The French have an acute short-term problem of strategic vulnerability. The retarded development of a fully operational submarine-launched ballistic missile system saddles them with a highly vulnerable nuclear striking force until the middle to late 1970's. Their thirty-six operational Mirage IVA bombers (the remainder of the sixty-two Mirages is held in reserve) and the eighteen IRBM silos in Haute-Provence are relatively easy targets for Soviet strike forces. Even if the French meet their scheduled projection of three nuclear submarines by 1974-1975, they are not likely to be able to maintain one submarine always on station. Here, too, coordination with the British fleet of four boats would appear advisable. Between the two states, they could maintain as many as four ships at sea at peak periods. The greater range of British missiles and the longer operational experience of the British fleet also encourage the French to re-examine their nuclear policies in search of possible areas of cooperation.

Working out cooperative technical accords, however attractive the incentives, is easier to state than to realize. If experience is any guide, the French record in developing successful arrangements with allies in aircraft and civil nuclear energy programs offers no great encouragement.[65] There is little assurance that France would not run into compounded difficulties in the politically more sensitive area of national defense. For the immediate future the

[65]René Foch, *Europe and Technology* (Paris: Atlantic Institute, 1970).

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political obstacles to greater Anglo-French nuclear cooperation are formidable.

Looking only at the French side of the equation dampens optimism. Most of the already voiced antipathies to NATO integration apply. Opposition to bilateral or multilateral control arrangements that might constrict France's nuclear independence is still strong in the Pompidou Government. As recently as October 1971, Defense Minister Debré reaffirmed his hostility to any transnational controls on French armed forces, including purely European schemes. That "would be the end of France, the end of our nation, the end of our country, with its personality, its pride, and its liberty. . . ."[66] On the other hand, Debré has cited European political unity as the precondition for military integration.[67] Prospects for union remain dim. There is little reason for President Pompidou to change the view he expressed shortly before his trip to the United States in 1970, "that it's more difficult to unify seven than six, eight than seven, or ten than nine" states.[68] Recent sharp differences among the Six, and particularly between France and Germany, over monetary, trade and agricultural policy give slight evidence of growing convergence in the foreign economic policies of the EEC states.

Barriers on the British side are equally impressive. Control problems are sticky. Working outside the NATO and Nuclear Planning Group is not within the range of possibility at the moment. The Conservative government of Prime Minister Heath is intent on reconciling Britain's new commitment to Europe with continued strong support for NATO. Britain participated in the decision of most NATO states at the close of 1971 to increase their defense spending for alliance purposes by more than $1 billion. Moreover, restrictions arising out of Anglo-American nuclear accords limit what nuclear information can be passed to the French without U.S. consent. These include the 1963 sale accord on Polaris missiles and the 1955 and 1958 agreements on nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion.

The American and British governments are also of one mind that a place must be found for Germany in any nuclear relationship between France and Britain. France, however, is not prepared to entertain proposals that might revive the possibility of increased German access to nuclear weapons. "What would become of peace," Debré has said publicly, "if in the name of Europe, Germany had access to nuclear force? That is presently to

[66] *Le Monde,* October 2, 1971, p. 10.
[67] Smart, *op. cit.,* p. 26.
[68] *U.S. News and World Report,* March 2, 1970, p. 45.

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state the immediate limit of any political coordination."[69] Even if France could vault these apprehensions, closer German collaboration in nuclear affairs could not be easily reconciled with Bonn's diplomatic effort in Eastern Europe.

Finally, progress toward Anglo-French nuclear cooperation depends on the outcome of U.S.-Soviet strategic discussions. Few presently can hazard a guess whether the superpowers will be able to compromise their strategic differences and, if they do, what the effect of their growing agreement will be on European security. It remains to be seen whether sharper lines will be drawn to contain Washington's present proclivity to reduce its defense commitments in Western Europe. Until the SALT negotiations conclude, France and Britain will have incentive to hold off launching a major initiative in nuclear cooperation. The French are alternately torn between making gestures to assure the retention of the U.S. security guarantee at low strategic, political and economic cost, and preparing for the day when the American commitment will be reduced and troops withdrawn. Yet they are reluctant to make too obvious and precipitate an adjustment out of fear of accelerating the American disengagement before an adequate European security framework can be substituted.

In the early 1970's the limits of European defense cooperation appear clearer than the opportunities for its development. It would be too much to argue that France will abandon its efforts with European allies to reconcile the competing demands for lower defense spending, maximum security, increased political influence abroad and national independence. Rather, the French government, following a line made clear in 1968, sees little chance of reconciling these imperatives in the immediate future and is reluctant to promote innovations in its defense relations with Western allies. The Pompidou Government remains focused on strengthening its domestic political and economic base and on encouraging closer Anglo-French economic and political cooperation. It bides its time for the day when again France might attempt to dominate the world stage on questions of peace and war. De Gaulle sensed the change in his conversation with Malraux in December 1969: "What we wished — between you and me, why not give it its true name: grandeur — is finished. Oh! France can still surprise the world; but later. She is going to negotiate everything. With the Americans and even the Russians, with the Germans and the Communists. It has begun."[70]

[69]Debré, "Les Principes de Notre Politique de Défense," *op. cit.*, p. 1249.
[70]Malraux, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

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THE NEW ORDER IN SOUTH ASIA

by Norman D. Palmer

A DRASTIC reorderng of the pattern of power in South Asia has taken place, directly affecting the future of more than one-fifth of the human race. As a result of what might be termed the second partition of the subcontinent, the political picture in South Asia has a wholly different complexion, and several new factors have been introduced into the Asian and the larger international scene. The Pakistan that had existed since 1947 has disappeared. In its place is a truncated remnant in West Pakistan, with some fifty-eight million people (less than half the population of the former state), an unstable government, a shaky internal situation, and an economy incapable of supporting the previous levels of military and political activity. India has clearly become the dominant South Asian power — a position its spokesmen claim is simply a consequence of "the natural balance" in the subcontinent. Under the determined leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who in some respects is even more powerful than her father, India is exhibiting a new assertiveness and self-reliance in domestic, regional and international affairs.

A new state — Bangla Desh — has emerged in what was formerly East Pakistan (East Bengal). In demographic terms it is the world's eighth largest nation and the second largest Muslim state. Within little more than a year the people of this area suffered from the worst natural disaster and perhaps the second worst man-made disaster (second only to Hitler's extermination of the Jews) in the twentieth century. In December 1970, in the first nationwide general elections on the basis of direct adult franchise in the history of Pakistan, they had voted overwhelmingly for a single party, the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and dedicated to an extreme degree of autonomy for the East wing of the country. When negotiations between their leader and President Yahya Khan and Z. A. Bhutto, whose Pakistan People's Party had won a majority of the votes in West Pakistan, broke down, they resorted to violence. After March 25, 1971, when Yahya Khan ordered the armed forces, most of whom were West Pakistanis, to use whatever degree of force was necessary to coerce them, their demands escalated in favor of complete inde-

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pendence. This objective was achieved after a bloody civil war between the Mukti Bahini and other champions of an independent Bangla Desh, on the one hand, and the Pakistani armed forces, aided by some collaborators, mostly Behari Muslims, on the other. During the conflict some one million people were slaughtered and ten million more fled into India as refugees. Undoubtedly the civil war would have gone on for a much longer time if the increased tension between India and Pakistan resulting from the crisis had not culminated in the two-week war of December 1971.

Thus Bangla Desh is of tragic origin, the product of West Pakistani exploitation and ultimate repression, East Bengali resistance and civil war, and India's armed action.

I

From the outset Indian sympathies were openly on the side of the East Pakistanis, and after March 25, 1971 they were vociferously expressed. A resolution introduced by Mrs. Gandhi and adopted unanimously by both houses of the Indian Parliament on March 31 expressed "wholehearted sympathy and support" for the people of East Bengal, and called on the government of Pakistan "to put an end immediately to the systematic decimation of the people, which amounts to genocide."

India was affected by the tragic events in East Pakistan in innumerable ways. The spillover effects placed grave new strains on its political system, social structure and economy. Fortunately, the political system had been given new stability and direction as a result of the decisive victory in the fifth general elections, in March 1971, of the new Congress Party, led by Mrs. Gandhi. The economic outlook, while still by no means promising, seemed to be improving, and the threats to law and order, especially in the volatile state of West Bengal, seemed to be lessening. The influx of refugees from East Pakistan, mostly into the already depressed and troubled state of West Bengal, created serious problems. Refugee relief became a well-nigh intolerable economic burden, especially since the international community provided amazingly little financial support. By December 1971, the refugees numbered around ten million, their flight marking one of the greatest such movements of "the century of the homeless man," and relief for them was costing India between two and three million dollars a day. Increasingly Indians voiced demands for military intervention, if necessary, to create conditions favorable for the

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return of the refugees to their homes. The feeling was widespread that the actions of the Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan and the failure of the international community to come to India's aid in supporting the refugees or to bring an end to the "genocide" had left New Delhi with no option except a resort to force.

The Pakistan government repeatedly charged India with "deliberate and blatant interference" in its internal affairs, and with sustained efforts "to undermine the solidarity and national integrity of Pakistan." It insisted that it had been compelled to use force to preserve the integrity of the nation against a group of "miscreants and anti-state people" in East Pakistan, egged on by Indian agents and supported from Indian territory. Even though a large number of foreign correspondents, United Nations officials and other outside observers generally corroborated the Indian figures, it maintained that India was deliberately exaggerating the extent of the casualties in East Pakistan and the number of refugees who had fled into India. President Yahya Khan warned that war was inevitable unless India ceased to "intervene" in Pakistan's "internal affairs."

In all probability any prospects for holding Pakistan together ended on the night of March 25, 1971, when the Pakistan army was loosed with ruthless fury on the people of the Eastern wing. It may even be argued that Pakistan was doomed from the beginning because of the disparities and frictions between the two wings and the absence of the cement of nationhood. The growing estrangement between East and West was dramatized and polarized in the elections of December 1970 and the abortive negotiations among Yahya Khan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Z. A. Bhutto in the early weeks of 1971. Certainly the increased tensions between India and Pakistan after March 25, and Indian behavior under a determined leader supported by a people who suddenly seemed to have turned from "doves" into "hawks," made the hope of preserving Pakistan as a unified nation unrealistic.

As in a Greek tragedy, the two unfriendly neighbors drifted inexorably toward armed conflict which neither wanted or could afford. The drama became a classic case of escalation leading to a point of no return. Efforts of the United Nations, the United States, the Soviet Union and other members of the international community to avert the impending clash were pathetically halfhearted and ineffective; however well-intentioned they were, they showed little understanding of the nature of the developments in East Pakistan and in South Asia generally, the basic

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causes of the crisis, or the significance of the changes that were taking place. A day after the war broke out *The Times of India* declared editorially:

> There will be no dearth of advice to India from all kind of quarters. But men who have kept quiet in the face of the massacre of over half a million men, women and children and the expulsion of another ten million people from their homes have no moral right to advise this country, specially after the Pakistani aggression. New Delhi has given them long enough time to defuse the crisis in the sub-continent by ending the military occupation of East Bengal. It is under no obligation to listen to them now that the battle is joined.

II

War came to South Asia, for the third time since 1947, on the evening of December 3, 1971, when Pakistani planes launched simultaneous attacks on airfields in west and northwest India. New Delhi promptly recognized Bangla Desh as an independent sovereign nation and ordered Indian troops into the area. Within two weeks the Indians, in cooperation with the Mukti Bahini, forced the nearly 100,000 Pakistani troops in the East to surrender unconditionally, and representatives of Bangla Desh moved from Calcutta to Dacca. On the western front Indian forces resisted Pakistani attacks, especially in the Chhamb sector of Jammu and Kashmir where the hardest battles of the war were fought, undertook some probes into Pakistani territory, neutralized the Pakistan air force, and carried out essentially a holding operation. The Indian navy played a significant role in two daring raids on Karachi harbor, sinking two of Pakistan's four submarines (one of which was "on loan" from the United States), and effectively interdicting the access routes by sea to both West and East Pakistan. When the Pakistani forces in East Bengal surrendered, India proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire on the western front on the evening of December 16. Yahya Khan, in a radio broadcast, charging that India was determined to dismember Pakistan and had "expansionist and imperialist designs," pledged that "our armed forces will not rest content until we throw the enemy out of our borders. . . . the 'jihad' against the treacherous enemy . . . will continue till victory is ours." But twenty-four hours later he announced acceptance of a cease-fire, and the war was over.

On December 19 Yahya Khan, who had been the strong man of Pakistan since the abrupt end of Ayub Khan's long rule (October 1958 to March 1969), was forced to resign, apparently on the decision of Pakistan's top military leaders. Z. A. Bhutto succeeded

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him as President and Martial Law Administrator. While Bhutto promised, in a rambling and emotional radio address, not to rest until Pakistan was reunited and the military defeat by India was avenged, it was clear that the Western remnant of the country lacked the capability to achieve either objective. Indeed, Bhutto's own political future, and the future of West Pakistan as a single national entity, were in jeopardy. A central question in South Asia today is whether West Pakistanis, under the leadership of Bhutto or his successors, can recover from the traumatic shock of the country's breakup and military defeat, adjust themselves to the unpleasant realities of a lesser role in South Asia and world affairs, and concentrate on the politics and economics of national survival.

Bangla Desh, with more than seventy million people in a naturally fertile but small and underdeveloped area, has been inaugurated with great *élan,* strong support from India, and good prospects of recognition and aid from many other countries and international agencies. In the long run, however, the present euphoric relations between India and Bangla Desh will have to give way to more prosaic and less intimate contacts. India, hampered by limited resources and its own serious economic problems, will not be able to provide the new state with the kind of long-range assistance it must have if it is to survive. Any attempt to guide the destinies of Bangla Desh too directly may provoke charges of Indian imperialism in the nation New Delhi helped to create. With the exception of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was imprisoned in West Pakistan during the entire course of the East Bengal crisis, from March 25, 1971 to early January 1972, the leaders of Bangla Desh are relatively unknown and untried. If they cannot build a new polity from scratch, they will probably be thrust aside and more radical leaders — perhaps of a Maoist type — may take over and try to turn the proclaimed democratic, secular and socialist state into a "people's republic" of an all-too-familiar type.

During the war India's political and military leadership was united, strongly supported by the Indian people, and highly effective. After Pakistan's abortive first aerial strike, India dictated the course of the fighting and brought the war to an end in a remarkably short time. In 1971, unlike the conflicts in 1948 and 1965, there was no question which side had prevailed. India resented — and resisted — international pressure, especially from the United States and the United Nations, for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal before its stated objectives were achieved. Hav-

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ing achieved these objectives — as publicly stated — it immediately proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire which Pakistan had no choice, short of military and perhaps political suicide, but to reciprocate. In spite of the extra burdens on its economy that the military operations entailed, India emerged from the war in a much stronger political and strategic position than before. It had clearly established its predominance in South Asia, and it had forcefully asserted its claims to a greater role in Asian and world affairs. Yet it was disillusioned by the failure of the international community to give due attention to the tragedy in East Bengal and to rally to its support. It was particularly disillusioned by the actions and policies of the United States, and to a lesser degree of the Arab states. Only the Soviet Union gave it the kind of support it desired, and as a result Soviet prestige and influence in India, already great, rose to unprecedented heights.

In the immediate aftermath of the military victory India was in a state of exaltation. Mrs. Gandhi and other spokesmen asserted that their country should now be recognized as an important factor in the world; some described it as a new great power.[1] India, they declared, would henceforth be more self-reliant, and would not yield to outside pressures or threats. In place of a dependent, humble and divided India there seemed to arise a changed nation — confident, proud and united. Its new image of itself and its disillusionment with others were reflected in an editorial in a sober financial journal, the *Economic Times*, on December 17:

> India's triumph also serves notice on the world. This country cannot be taken for granted any more. It is a power to be reckoned with, at any rate in this region. Persistently, for decades, there has been a concerted attempt to bamboozle this country, hamstring its industrial growth and to decry any attempt of the national leadership to fulfill the country's desired goal.
>
> In the most critical hours of our national life a bitter realisation has come to the people in this country that it is the nation's own strength that ultimately counts and not the dependence on any foreign interests, however friendly they may profess to be. This is very true of the political freedom of the country, and more so of its economic freedom.

III

During the crisis, relations between India and the United States plummeted to an all-time low. To the Indians U.S. policies were unfathomable, except in terms of sinister American intentions and

[1]Mrs. Gandhi, however, stated on January 2, 1972, at a mammoth rally in Delhi: "We do not want to become a big power. We want to remain a peaceful and proud nation without hurting anybody and wishing that none dare hurt us."

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machinations apparently related to the conception President Nixon and his foreign affairs adviser, Dr. Kissinger, had of U.S. global interests, including the new approach to China and the maintenance of Pakistan as a united country. The American government took a series of actions and its spokesmen issued a string of statements which convinced Indians that the U.S. Administration was pro-Pakistan and anti-Indian on almost every count. Bewildered and often outraged by the American position, Indians accused the United States of siding with a dictatorial regime, which after March 25, 1971 was guilty of "genocide" on an incredible scale. They pointed out that President Nixon and other top American officials had little to say about thousands of East Bengalis being massacred by Pakistani troops and their supporters, but instead were openly critical of Indian moves to cushion sensitive border areas against the turmoil in East Bengal and of India's support of the Mukti Bahini. They felt that the United States showed little sympathy for the plight of the millions of refugees from East Bengal, and did little to help India meet the growing costs of refugee relief. They claimed that, in spite of Mrs. Gandhi's clear warning that India might have to resort to force if the situation did not improve so that the refugees could go home in safety, the United States brought no effective pressure on Yahya Khan to stop the massacre, withdraw his troops, release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and halt the military buildup against India. They stepped up their criticism of U.S. policy in Viet Nam and elsewhere; asserted that Nixon and Kissinger, in spite of their talk about reducing tensions and disengagement, were still influenced primarily by a Cold War mentality; and, in general, concluded that U.S. foreign policy was detrimental to their national interests and welfare.

In the course of the two-week war their criticisms of Nixon, Kissinger and U.S. policy rose to a shrill crescendo. Indians were particularly incensed by the assertions of high American officials that India was mainly responsible for the growing tensions and the war (even including charges of "aggression"), that India intended to move into West Pakistan and annex Pakistani territory, and that Delhi was forced to suspend hostilities largely because of pressure brought upon it by Washington. Almost every day some American actions or statements aroused their ire and confirmed their deepest suspicions. There were repeated rumors — seldom if ever confirmed — that American military supplies were being provided to Pakistan by devious channels. In the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly U.S. representatives made

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accusations against India, not Pakistan, and supported resolutions regarded as anti-Indian.

Indian apprehension and indignation reached new heights when, in the closing days of the war, a formidable task force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise,* entered the Bay of Bengal. Although nominally these ships had been dispatched to Indian waters to stand by for the possible rescue of the few American citizens remaining in Dacca, their appearance was a "show of force" which the Indians considered the crudest kind of "gunboat diplomacy." Shortly after the war ended, Indian indignation was again aroused by America's five-day resumption of bombing of North Viet Nam; as was often pointed out, this was hardly in keeping with the United States' unsolicited advice to India that bombs and bullets could not bring peace.

Indian newspapers carried editorials, columns and letters bitterly condemning the Nixon Administration for its policies regarding South Asia. On December 5 an editorial in *The Times of India* declared:

> Over the years, the USA has helped to build up in Pakistan a military machine of a size out of all proportion to the country's genuine needs. This has prevented the natural balance of power from asserting itself in the region, distorted the development of the entire sub-continent and created bad blood between the two neighbouring peoples.

On the following day the editor of this influential journal, in a long article entitled "American Record in Asia: Consistent Support for Tyrants," wrote: "The entire course of its policy in the third world has been a shameful betrayal of the principles by which the U.S. swears." The *National Herald* of December 8 stated that "The U.S. attitude is not only shocking and surprising but sickening." The editor of *The Indian Express,* Frank Moraes, one of India's most prominent journalists, who knows America well and who is usually pro-American in his views, bluntly called President Nixon "a dunderhead." An editorial in *The Times of India* of December 15, entitled "U.S. Playing with Fire," advised that the United States

> should give at least some thought to the likely consequences of its actions. It is polarising the sub-continent as it has never been polarised . . . before. . . . It is shocking that President Nixon and his foreign affairs advisers . . . do not realise that they are jeopardizing the future peace and stability of the area. . . . Washington cannot be expected to admit that it is not India but the United States which is primarily responsible for the break-up of Pakistan. . . . the United States cannot disown responsibility either for the past or for the future."

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Criticism of President Nixon and U.S. policy continued after the hostilities ended. On December 27 *The Times of India* warned:

> America has made nonsense of its Asia policy in the post-war period because of its failure for long years to realise the strength of Chinese nationalism. It will be repeating the same story if it makes no attempt to understand the true character of Indian nationalism.

Three days later, while the renewed American bombing of North Viet Nam was in its fifth (and last) day, the same newspaper flatly stated: "Mr. Nixon and his chief adviser, Mr. Kissinger, are mindless bullies."

The U.S. role in the South Asian crisis was a main topic of letters to Indian newspapers. Almost all of the letters were highly critical. Some writers expressed extreme disillusionment with America, which in their opinion had departed from its democratic principles. One political scientist, who had been a research scholar at a major American university, was so incensed by the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet task force to Indian waters that he demanded that "the American citizens living in our country should be asked to leave immediately so that we may feel secure against any . . . eventuality in which rescue operations may bring nuclear war to our doors." A well-known professor at the leading Indian center for international studies, who holds a Ph.D. degree from one of the best of America's universities, charged that the United States was trying "to malign, pressure and threaten us," that its main aim in South Asia was "to weaken India politically" and "to establish complete American sway over South Asia," and recommended that "all American agencies, or their subdivisions, active in the economic, cultural and academic fields" should be asked "to close their operations."

Indians were also well aware that many Americans sympathized with them and strongly disapproved of Nixon's policies in the crisis. Hundreds of letters to this effect were sent by Americans to Mrs. Gandhi and other Indian officials and to friends in India, as well as to Nixon, Kissinger and other American officials. Scores of such letters appeared in both American and Indian newspapers. Specialists in South Asian studies, in particular, were almost unanimously critical of the Nixon policies.

Mrs. Gandhi frequently expressed regret that President Nixon apparently did not understand what kind of person she was or what kind of country India was. Again and again, with obvious reference to the American President, she asserted that India would not yield to threats or pressures from any quarter. During her

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three-week visit to Belgium, Austria, Britain, the United States, France and West Germany in October-November 1971, she explained the Indian position in the South Asian crisis candidly and firmly. While she was cordially received by President Nixon and talked with him at some length, she was not able to change his mind — nor was he able to change hers. On December 15, one day before the Pakistan troops in East Bengal surrendered and India proclaimed a cease-fire on the western front, she sent a remarkable letter to Nixon. A few excerpts will suggest its tenor:

> I am writing at a moment of deep anguish at the unhappy turn which the relations between our two countries have taken. . . . The tragic war . . . could have been averted if during the nine months prior to Pakistan's attack on us on December 3, the great leaders of the world had paid some attention to the fact of revolt, tried to see the reality of the situation and searched for a genuine basis for reconciliation. . . . War could have been avoided if the power, influence and authority of all the states, and above all of the United States, had got Sheikh Mujibur Rahman released. . . . Lip-service was paid to the need for a political solution, but not a single worthwhile step was taken to bring this about. . . . We are deeply hurt by the innuendos and insinuations that it was we who have precipitated the crisis and have in any way thwarted the emergence of solutions. . . . it is my earnest and sincere hope that . . . you . . . will at least let me know where precisely we have gone wrong before your representatives or spokesmen deal with us with such hardness of language.

President Nixon's reply was not made public. Apparently, however, the exchange between the leaders of the two largest democracies did little to clear up existing tensions and misunderstandings. On December 31, in her first news conference following the end of the war, Mrs. Gandhi said: "We should very much like our relations to be friendly again. . . . Much . . . depends on whether the U.S. Administration wants friendship or not."

Since the United States had supported Pakistan throughout the crisis and had officially neither condemned the brutalities of the Pakistan troops in East Bengal nor supported the resistance movement, its position and policies won widespread approval from the supporters of Yahya Khan and later of Z.A. Bhutto and condemnation from the leaders and peoples of Bangla Desh. But if difficulties mount in what is left of Pakistan, as they inevitably will, the United States may prove to be a convenient scapegoat; at the least, disillusionment may set in with what may be interpreted as too little American support. If more radical leaders assume control in Pakistan, the United States may also be accused of propping up reactionary leaders and frustrating "democratic" movements. Thus the United States could be a loser all around —

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certainly in India and Bangla Desh, and probably in Pakistan as well. The effects of its approach and policies on its larger interests in Asia and the world as a whole are still undetermined.

IV

Communist China would seem to have been another loser in South Asia, for its support of the Yahya Khan regime was even more unqualified and more vocal than the U.S. Administration's. It has, however, scored some short-term gains, and it may be able to escape any serious adverse consequences. It has entrenched its position and increased its influence in Pakistan. The correspondence (but not interlinking) of interests between the United States and China in the crisis may have helped to pave the way for Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, and for other steps to develop a new Washington-Peking relationship. China's relations with India have been strained for some years, especially since the Tibetan revolt of 1959 and the border war of October-November 1962. Except in ephemeral ways, it has failed to reciprocate India's avowed interest in improving these relations.

Supporters of Bangla Desh could not understand why a revolutionary nation which has posed as a leading champion of "national liberation" movements in Asia and Africa should support a reactionary regime following genocidal policies and fail to encourage and support what they often called "the largest national liberation movement in Asia in the twentieth century." China seems to be reconciled to the separation of Bangla Desh from Pakistan, but it also seems to believe that in time the "bourgeois" leadership of Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League will give way to a more revolutionary regime of a Maoist type, with which it can have extensive influence and contacts. Its relations with India, too, may improve over time if Peking so desires. Hence, while China seems to have been a short-run loser it may be a long-time winner, regardless of what happens in South Asia in the coming months and years.

India was surprised and shocked by the position taken during the crisis by many states it regarded as its friends. All of the Arab states except Oman, most African states, and Yugoslavia, Ceylon and Rumania voted in favor of a resolution passed by the UN General Assembly on December 7, 1971, calling on India and Pakistan "to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for the withdrawal of their armed forces" from each other's territory. The vote was 104 to 11, with some abstentions.

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Since Indian troops in East Bengal had not yet defeated the Pakistani armed forces, this resolution was regarded in India as anti-Indian. In most cases, however, states favoring this resolution were motivated not by any feeling against India but by considerations of their own national interests and problems and by concern that the intervention might set a precedent. After the war, when Bangla Desh had clearly emerged as an independent state, most of the countries that had voted for the resolution accepted the new realities in South Asia and adapted their policies and pronouncements accordingly, although recognition of the new entity was slower than India and Bangla Desh would have liked. The stand of most of the world's nations in the crisis nevertheless strengthened India's disillusionment and determination to look to its own strength and resources for security and development.

The one clear external winner was the Soviet Union. Throughout the crisis Moscow consistently supported India, in tangible and intangible ways, and championed the cause of Bangla Desh. It strongly condemned the position of both China and the United States and warned both countries not to interfere in the affairs of the subcontinent. In August 1971 it concluded a twenty-year treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with India. This treaty had been in the making for some two years, but undoubtedly the time of its signing was related to the growing crisis in South Asia. In India the treaty was generally welcomed, especially since it seemed to guarantee the help of a powerful friend as a checkmate to any Chinese or American actions in the event of a military showdown between India and Pakistan.

The Soviet Union has been the main source of military supplies for India since 1965, and Indo-Soviet ties — with some ups and downs — have grown ever closer. Moscow's strong support during the war in December 1971 was deeply appreciated. In the UN Security Council the USSR successfully resisted U.S.-supported resolutions condemning India's "attack" on East Pakistan, twice by use of the veto. It voted against the General Assembly resolution of December 7. As a result of its position throughout the unfolding crisis, its influence in India has increased considerably.

American columnist Joseph Alsop, a long-time critic of India, who during the Indo-Pakistan war had called Mrs. Gandhi "the leading pious hypocrite in the modern world," alleged that as a *quid pro quo* for its support the Soviet Union would be allowed to establish a naval base at Visakhapatnam on the Bay of Bengal and would be able to proceed, with India's help, to expand its ac-

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tivities in the Indian Ocean. Alsop bluntly charged that Mrs. Gandhi "has, in effect, transformed India into a Soviet protectorate." But Indians, in their newfound pride, confidence and buoyant nationalism, were in no mood to be assigned to the orbit of a superpower. While India's capacity for self-reliance may have been exaggerated, other countries should not underestimate its capabilities and determination to be strong in its own right.

V

The immediate effects of the crisis are crystal clear. A new order of power has emerged in South Asia. India has assumed a more dominant position and cannot now be effectively challenged by any other state of the region. The numerically large but economically weak new nation created in what was East Pakistan is heavily dependent on India for its continued survival. This may lead to various kinds of cooperative political and economic policies — and perhaps in time to frictions and strains. Certainly, in spite of proclamations by Bangla Desh and Indian spokesmen, the new nation will need extensive outside contacts and assistance if it is to cope with its basic problems of survival and development. The balance of forces within it, as well as the quality of its leadership, is quite uncertain. Pakistan, reduced to what was West Pakistan, is now only the third largest state in South Asia. It will either waste its limited resources on military and other commitments which it cannot long maintain or, perforce, make painful readjustments to the stark realities of the new order. It may not be able to survive the coming ordeals. If it does, it will be a new Pakistan, in more than a territorial sense. Much will depend on evolving relations among the new India, the new Pakistan and the new Bangla Desh. If antagonisms continue, the prospects for a happier era in South Asia will be dim. If patterns of cooperation and cordial relations develop, the outlook will greatly improve. In any event, South Asia will almost certainly remain a troubled area of both hope and danger for some time to come.

The international effects of the changes in the area may soon be more manifest. Many nations, including the United States, have thus far shown a lamentable lack of understanding of the nature and implications of the recent developments in South Asia, and have paid far less attention to this important part of the world than it should receive. In the new era this mistake — a mistake the Soviet Union has not made — could have increasingly serious consequences and repercussions.

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SOVIET POLICY AND IDEOLOGICAL FORMULATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA

by Wayne S. Smith

AMERICAN hegemony in the Western Hemisphere has probably never been as complete in actuality as in the public mind. The Monroe Doctrine may have been a great American shibboleth, but it was successfully challenged over and over again throughout the nineteenth century. British naval power was a fact of life in the Caribbean until the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901. That Latin America did not fall prey to one or another of the European powers during the first half of the 1800's was thanks far more to the inhibiting presence of British naval units than to anything the United States did. Even in the present century, other powers at given times exercised greater influence than the United States in several Latin American countries. In Argentina, for example, British economic influence long surpassed that of the United States, and Axis political influence was more pervasive from July of 1940 until the end of World War II — and perhaps even somewhat beyond. Nonetheless, the notion that Latin America was, and should be, a safe and unchallenged U.S. preserve gained wide popular credence over the years. This was presumed to be in the right and natural order of things.

In the present era, one need not be an advocate of outdated jingoism to register concern over the growing Soviet involvement in Latin America. Given the adversary relationship existing between the United States and the USSR, Moscow's activities in the Western Hemisphere, in and of themselves, warrant careful scrutiny. Yet a lingering sense of the rightful order of things violated, by and large, renders dispassionate analysis extraordinarily difficult. The prevailing sentiment in some quarters seems to be that for a state to open diplomatic relations with Moscow is to take the first step toward communism. It has further been suggested that this "thrusting out" on Moscow's part is so aggressive in nature as to cast doubt on the future of U.S.-Soviet détente policies in general.

The conclusions of this essay, which will be stated at the outset, are at odds with such views. They are: (1) The primary Soviet objective is not to "communize" Latin America but to undercut U.S.

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influence in the area. (2) Moscow's efforts to achieve this goal are essentially cautious and opportunistic. The Soviets prudently seek to take advantage of unrest and growing anti-Americanism, but they do not create these conditions. They have little capacity to do so. (3) Soviet efforts are not likely to play a significant role in determining the outcome of events in Latin America. The Soviet presence may at times become a complicating factor in U.S.-Latin American relations and occasionally even an irritant in U.S.-Soviet relations, but in both cases it is apt to remain something of a side issue. The central equation in the hemisphere is and will be U.S.-Latin American.

Increasing Soviet Interest and Activities

Until quite recently Soviet activities in Latin America were insignificant. The Latin American region, located on the other side of the globe from the Soviet homeland and close under U.S. guns, was deemed by Soviet strategists to be beyond the effective reach of Soviet capabilities. As an area along the flank of their principal opponent, it offered strategic attractions, but the risks involved in establishing advance bases in the U.S. backyard were recognized as virtually prohibitive. Hence, except for a brief dramatic period in 1962, Latin America was left to one side of the strategic mainstream.

Since 1959, however, Soviet interest in the region has increased markedly, and Moscow's range has broadened during the past two years or more. The resolutions adopted by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU in April 1971 gave Latin America prominent notice within the context of Third World affairs, and as a result of the reshuffling that took place at the Congress there are now two full Central Committee members serving as Soviet ambassadors in Latin America — Tolubeyev in Cuba and Basov in Chile. Since only two other Soviet ambassadors to noncommunist countries share that distinction (Dobrynin in Washington and Pegov in New Delhi), the assignment of Tolubeyev and Basov to Latin America can be taken to indicate the area's growing importance in Moscow's calculations.[1]

The Soviets have sensed new opportunities as the entire political spectrum in Latin America shifts to the left. Essentially, this radicalization process is a function of Latin America's search for political identity and economic well being, not of communist

[1]See *Pravda*, April 10, 1971, for resolutions of the Twenty-fourth Party Congress and the membership of the new Central Committee.

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(and certainly not of Soviet) machinations or presence. Moscow did not create Castro, for example, and can take precious little credit for Allende's electoral victory in Chile. Not only did it not help bring the progressive military government to power in Lima but it persisted for months in attacking the new government as a typical "gorilla junta." To one degree or another, and in different ways, however, it has, over time, been able to take advantage of each of these situations. Moreover, Moscow clearly hopes these are but the portent of the future. As Politburo member M. A. Suslov noted in his November 6, 1970 Kremlin speech:

> The national liberation struggle of the peoples of Latin America is spreading and intensifying. More than 10 years ago the Cuban revolution smashed the chain of imperialist oppression in Latin American countries. New weak links in this chain have become apparent recently in Peru, Chile and Bolivia.[2]

Its perception of possible opportunities aside, in asserting itself as a global power the Soviet Union has increased the level of its activities in Latin America as elsewhere. In putting themselves forward as a global naval power, for example, the Soviets have extended their operations to seas as far distant as the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. As a part of this trend, in July 1969 a Soviet naval squadron visited the Caribbean for the first time. A second squadron called in Cuba in May 1970, and since August of that year Soviet warships have been rather steadily in and out of Cuban waters. In time the Soviet ensign may be seen almost as frequently in Havana, Valparaiso and Callao as it is in Alexandria, Conakry and Algiers.

Soviet diplomatic presence in Latin America is another case in point. For most of the 1950's, Moscow enjoyed full diplomatic relations with only three Latin American countries — Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay.[3] By 1960, however, the general relaxation of East-West tensions, a leftward political trend in several countries, and a desire on the part of the Latin Americans to find new markets had served to stimulate interest in resuming ties.

Cuba, under Castro, was the first to re-establish full diplomatic relations with Moscow — in 1960. Brazil followed suit the next

[2] *Ibid.*, November 7, 1970.

[3] Although a total of fifteen Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela) had extended recognition to the USSR by 1946, by 1954 all except Mexico, Uruguay and Argentina had either severed relations, denied that they existed, or conveniently forgotten that they had ever extended recognition.

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year and Chile re-established ties in 1964. With Colombia's resumption of relations at the ambassadorial level on January 9, 1968, the pace quickened. The USSR and Peru inaugurated diplomatic ties on February 1, 1969 and on June 13 of that year the first Soviet ambassador arrived in Lima. On November 13, 1969 the USSR and Ecuador announced an exchange of notes elevating diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level, and on December 3 Bolivia announced the "formalization of relations" with the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter, Ecuadorean and Bolivian embassies were opened in Moscow, and Soviet embassies were established in Quito and La Paz. On April 16, 1970, Venezuela resumed relations with the USSR; diplomatic missions were exchanged in December of the same year. Neighboring Guyana announced in December that it too had opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, though without resident ambassadors. Finally, also in December, Costa Rica announced an impending exchange of ambassadors to give substance to its already existing relations with Moscow, though as of this writing the exchange has not taken place.

Thus, from a situation in which they were virtually frozen out of Latin America, the Soviets have now reached the point of enjoying full diplomatic ties with every South American state save Paraguay, in addition to ties with Mexico, Costa Rica and, of course, Cuba.[4]

Rising levels of Soviet trade and aid have accompanied expanding diplomatic representation. From near zero in 1950,[5] for example, Moscow's trade with the OAS countries in 1969 had reached a total turnover of $129.3 million. That still represented only 5 per cent of Soviet trade turnover with the developing countries, however, and Latin America's percentage dropped still further when total Soviet turnover with the area plummeted to $83.2 million in 1970. Latin America receives only some 3 per cent of Soviet aid to the Third World.[6] These figures, which do not include Cuba, the single largest recipient of Soviet aid among the developing countries, reflect the fact that while the USSR's economic commitments in Latin America are increasing, they re-

[4]*For a useful discussion of Soviet-Latin American diplomatic relations, see* Department of State, *Communist Diplomatic, Consular and Trade Representation in Latin America*, Research Study RARS-11, August 3, 1970.

[5]UNCTAD, TD/B/303, June 26, 1970, *Trade Prospects in Socialist Countries. USSR: Conditions, Policies and Approaches, Annex 1.*

[6]See Department of State, *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1969,* Research Study RECS-5, July 9, 1970; also *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1970,* RECS-15, September 22, 1971.

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main quite small compared with such efforts in, say, the Middle East or India.

Restraining Factors

Despite the spread of activity, major restraining factors, which in the past discouraged the Soviets from a more adventurous policy in Latin America, will continue to influence their assessments for some time to come. First and foremost is the consideration of the United States' reaction and its superior power in the area. Even before World War II, Soviet self-restraint in the hemisphere had to do with Moscow's policy objectives vis-à-vis the United States. As Professor Adam Ulam has observed: "Before 1933 recognition by, and after 1933 good relations with, the U.S. were considered by the Russians to be of infinitely greater importance than communist successes in Mexico or Chile."[7] Today the frame of reference has changed but calculation of likely U.S. response must remain a prerequisite for any Soviet move in the area. Clearly, the Soviet Union's policy objectives in its power relationship with the United States would take precedence over any goals it might have in Latin America not directly germane to those strategic interests.

For a brief period after Castro's "turn to the left" in 1959 and 1960, and especially immediately following the U.S. disaster at the Bay of Pigs, the Soviets may have been tempted to conclude that the United States would easily acquiesce to the emergence of other Castro-type regimes and their utilization to extend Soviet military power into the hemisphere.[8] If so, such hopes were short-lived. Washington's resolve during the 1962 missile crisis made it clear that while the United States might accept radical anti-American regimes (and possibly even Marxist-Leninist regimes) in Latin America, it would not stand by quietly and see them used by Moscow in ways that threatened U.S. security. Hence, the potential value of such regimes to Soviet strategists was much reduced. Assuredly the latter can be expected to keep probing in this direction. Their move to establish a submarine base in Cuba during the fall of 1970 was such a probe. That they backed away rather than risk another confrontation à la 1962, however, underscores the fact that U.S. reaction continues to represent one of the factors

[7]Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 645.

[8]For an interesting discussion of rising Soviet expectations after the Bay of Pigs, see David D. Burks, *Cuba Under Castro* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 16, June 1964). See also Herbert Dinerstein's excellent article, "Soviet Policy in Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, March 1967.

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circumscribing their activities in Cuba — as in the rest of Latin America.[9]

A second consideration is that the Soviets are not oblivious to the possible costs involved. This is not to say they will in no case be willing to risk large sums in efforts to improve their position in the hemisphere. Under some circumstances they might do so, as they have in Cuba. In the main, however, they have given evidence of being somewhat skittish even over the price of successful efforts in Latin America, to say nothing of the possibility of costly failures.

Their experience with Cuba brought home to them just how expensive—and thankless—the support of an underdeveloped ally can be. So long as the client state remains noncommunist, the Soviets have considerable leeway in determining the levels of assistance to be provided. Once it becomes a full-fledged member of the socialist camp, however, Moscow's commitments to defend it and see that its economy stays above water are almost inevitably forced upward. Ideological formulations, like the seasons, may change their form and substance periodically, but there are a few tenets which must remain sacrosanct and immutable if the doctrine as a whole is not to collapse. The irreversibility of socialist construction is one such tenet.

The validity of Marxist-Leninist theory, in the eyes of the ideologues, is confirmed by the fact that, once having attained it, no ruling communist party (with the dubious exception of Bela Kun's 1919 regime in Hungary) has ever been removed from, or otherwise lost, power. Hence, the collapse of a communist state would represent not only a psychological and tactical setback; it would challenge the whole theory of irreversibility and to that extent reflect negatively on the legitimacy of the other ruling communist parties. Plainly, then, it is more vital that new com-

[9]See the *New York Times*, September 26, October 15, 19 and 20, 1970, for a description of the incident. Several columnists have advanced the view that this Soviet maneuver was so reckless and aggressive as to raise doubts about the wisdom of dealing with the Soviets at all. This would seem to represent an overreaction. A probe it was, and one which Washington had to treat seriously. It was not, however, carried out imprudently or without prior hints. In May 1970 a Soviet squadron including a nuclear missile submarine, the first to call in a Cuban port, entered the Cuban naval base at Cienfuegos. The fact that Radio Moscow announced on May 12 that the squadron was going in for resupply and repair would seem clearly to have been meant as a signal. A Soviet nuclear missile submarine was using Cuba as an advance station. If the United States had strong objections to such a precedent, the Soviets may well have expected them to be voiced privately then and there—before, that is, they went on to the next step. In subsequently bringing in their barges and submarine tender, they may have been proceeding under the tentative assumption that the United States did not intend to respond.

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munist regimes *survive* than that they come to power in the first place. The appearance of new communist states may tend to reinforce the theory of socialist inevitability. On the other hand, a phenomenon defined as inevitable becomes no less so if the time span is fifty years rather than five. The ideology would not in any way be disproved by, say, Brazil's failure to become a socialist state within the next few years — or even for another century or so. It would, however, sustain considerable damage should communist rule, once having been established, prove abortive.

The pressures on Moscow to forestall such failures are compelling, albeit sometimes unwelcome. At least in part, this explains the Kremlin's reluctance to recognize Cuba as a socialist state,[10] and, by the same token, its subsequent willingness to divert to an ally of questionable value and loyalty some $500 million a year from an already thinly sliced Soviet resource pie. If little Cuba is costing $500 million, one can imagine the mixed feelings Soviet decision-makers might have toward assuming the infinitely more costly responsibility for Brazil or Argentina.

Nor could they be certain that the political gains would be worth the economic costs. Experience has demonstrated that communist parties, once in power, tend to move successfully toward independent positions unless they are directly vulnerable to Soviet armed might — and sometimes, as in the case of Rumania, even if they are. China, Yugoslavia, Albania, Cuba and Rumania have all managed, in various degrees, to assert their independence of Moscow's leadership. Given the intense pressures of Latin American nationalism, plus their geographic isolation from the Soviet Union, communist governments in Latin America would doubtless be even more inclined (and have more freedom) to assume independent positions.

A third restraining factor, and one in a more theoretical vein, is that Moscow seems to recognize that the situation obtaining in Latin America cannot be compared with that in other Third World areas. Unlike the newly independent countries of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, most Latin American states have been politically independent for almost a century and a half. Their commitment to Western political philosophies and configurations is much deeper than that of the African or Asian countries — though it is not immune to erosion if the existing system cannot find solutions to economic and social problems. Moreover, while

[10]The Soviets waited over a year after Castro's 1961 announcement that Cuba was a Marxist-Leninist state before they themselves acknowledged this to be so.

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the Latin American proletariat is larger than that in the other areas and chances of socialist triumph are thus theoretically enhanced, the national bourgeoisie is also much larger and more firmly entrenched, thus constituting a formidable obstacle to socialist development. For these and other reasons, in the Soviet view, hemispheric soil has been particularly unreceptive to Marxist-Leninist penetration.[11] The Soviets clearly hope that the objective and subjective conditions for socialist revolution are improving. So far, however, their ideological formulations continue to reflect more caution than optimism, and disappointments such as the overthrow of the Torres Government in Bolivia in August 1971 serve to temper their expectations.

General Ideological Guidelines

Putting aside for the moment the question whether ideology or pragmatic political considerations play the primary role in Soviet decision-making, one can argue that ideological formulations are useful as reflections of Soviet assessments and views. For, whether such formulations represent ex post facto theoretical justifications for actions already decided upon, or guidelines carefully drawn from theory before any course of action is considered, the fact remains that they suggest the direction of Soviet thinking with respect to a given situation. Hence, theoretical constructs provide insights into objectives, tactics and estimates of success.

The central spar in the Soviet ideological framework for Latin America seems to be that the revolutionary process there is *not* socialist in character and content. For our purposes, it matters little whether this is a position dictated by the "universal and immutable laws of Marxism-Leninism," or, as seems more likely, a rather cautious minimum risk posture assumed by the Soviets in view of such factors as those mentioned above: costs, risks and chances of success. In either case it represents the official view, which they believe corresponds to the practical or ideological facts of life. It is the underlying assumption on which Soviet policy is based.

In defending this assumption recently, Viktor Volskiy, the astute director of Moscow's Latin American Institute, complained that the sharpening crisis of capitalism in Latin America was

[11]See, for example, I. Sheremetyev, "Latin America's Social and Economic Problems," *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1965, and A. Shulgovsky, "Latin America in the Modern World," *ibid.*, September 1966.

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leading some revolutionary forces to advocate direct transition to socialism. This, he said, was an incorrect view:

> Social-economic backwardness in these countries, plus the domination by latifundism and the presence of strong pre-capitalist relations in the countryside, oppression by foreign monopolies — all this testifies to the fact that the road to socialism on the continent lies basically *through a people's democratic revolution.*[12]

On the same theme, an article by Honduran communist Longino Becerra represents one of the most comprehensive statements of the Soviet-approved view available and should therefore be examined carefully.[13] Entitled "Character and Content of the Revolutionary Process in Latin America," it appeared in the December 1969 issue of *World Marxist Review,* the Prague-based organ for pro-Soviet international communist views. Its main thrust is against two positions put forward by left extremists in Latin America, namely, (1) that Latin America is an entity totally different from other areas of the world and that categories such as "national liberation" which have been used to describe the revolutionary process in other areas are not applicable; and (2) that inasmuch as the Latin American bourgeoisie have already achieved varying degrees of capitalism, the area is ready for immediate transition to socialism — hence, revolutionary movements there should be *socialist,* rather than democratic, in character and content. Explicit in the latter proposition is total rejection of the view held by orthodox communist parties that a democratic-liberation stage must precede transition to socialism.

Becerra flatly declares both points to be incorrect. With respect to the first, he admits that Latin America cannot be analyzed with the same set of hypotheses as other Third World areas. It *is* different, and has progressed farther down the path toward industrialization. Nonetheless, it has sufficient characteristics in common with other areas to render new categories and definitions unnecessary. Specifically, Becerra contends, U.S. economic domination places Latin America in a semicolonial status and gives the revolutionary process there an "anti-imperialist" character. Despite some qualitative differences the process fits the same general description as national liberation movements in other Third World areas. Its major objective is to liberate the hemisphere from U.S. economic imperialism.

[12] *Pravda,* June 27, 1970. (Emphasis added.)

[13] That Becerra is in favor and speaks with some authority is suggested by the fact that doctrinal essays authored by him have appeared in several recent editions of the *World Marxist Review,* for example, March, June and July 1970, and October 1971.

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Regarding the second point, Becerra admits that Latin America is at a higher stage of economic development than most of the countries of Africa, the Middle East or Asia. Capital has been accumulated and in given areas a rather high degree of industrialization has been achieved. However, the Latin American countries have by no means reached an *average* level of capitalist development sufficient to bear out the assertion that, categorically speaking, they have achieved capitalism. Thus, he concludes, "the revolutionary program elaborated by the Latin American Communist Parties . . . remains valid." The liberation process must be defined as "a democratic (or popular), agrarian (or anti-feudal), anti-imperialist movement."[14] It is *not* socialist. On the contrary, Becerra declares:

> The economic backwardness of our countries, their exploitation by foreign monopolies, and the existence of conciliatory or dictatorial regimes *proclaim the need for transitional stages which could prepare the economic and political groundwork for socialist reconstruction.* The basic objectives of this period include: achieving full national sovereignty, democracy in public life, encouraging political awareness among the masses and restoring the national resources to the people.[15]

The main themes of Becerra's article were seconded by another Latin American communist writing in the February 1970 edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (the Russian-language version of *World Marxist Review*). Julio Laborde, of the Colombian CP, in an article entitled "Lenin and the Party of the New Type," takes a somewhat different tack, however, in refuting left-wing insistence on immediate socialist construction. Such reasoning, Laborde asserts, is often based on the contention that Cuba launched directly into socialist construction and that other revolutions can follow her example. But this, he says, is not an accurate view of the Cuban revolution. It *was* democratic in character, and only became socialist after passing through preliminary stages. Hence, Cuba is not an exception to the general rule, which is that under present conditions the revolutionary process in Latin America must be "democratic, agrarian, and anti-imperialist" in

[14]It is interesting to note recent Soviet attention to the rural labor force in Latin America. Moscow and the orthodox parties earlier criticized the Cuban doctrine on guerrilla warfare for placing too much emphasis on the peasantry and too little on the urban proletariat. Both sides now seem to have modified their positions. Soviet formulations of late rarely fail to mention the importance of the "rural proletariat." Castro, on the other hand, to the extent that he still supports armed struggle in the hemisphere, seems to have developed something of a preference for urban terror groups.

[15]"Character and Content of the Revolutionary Process in Latin America," *op. cit.*, p. 46. (Emphasis added.)

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form.[16] Laborde stresses mass organizational activity as the primary communist undertaking in the hemisphere.

Stripping away the outer shell of ideological verbiage, the core arguments in these articles (and numerous others like them) [17] are quite clear and can be paraphrased as follows:

(1) Emphasis on the anti-imperialist tenor of the process and on regaining full national sovereignty underlines the fact that reduction of U.S. influence in the area is — in the Soviet view — the primary objective.

(2) Conditions are not ripe for communist victory in Latin America. To say that the revolutionary process at this time is "democratic" and not "socialist" in character and content, is to say that it is not yet, and should not be, communist dominated (at least not ostensibly so), though even in the present stage the communist parties should play a prominent role. Going one step further and asserting that even after revolutionary victory transitional stages will be required before a "socialist" phase can begin, is, in effect, saying that the establishment of communist parties in power is not a feasible objective. Communist parties do not preside over a nation's destiny until socialism has at least reached the initial stages of construction. Radical revolutionary governments, or, even better, leftist coalition governments in which the communist party participates, are more appropriate rulers during the periods of transition.[18] Becerra's list of basic ob-

[16]For a further discussion of various orthodox communist interpretations of the Cuban revolution, see D. Bruce Jackson, "Whose Men in Havana?," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1966, p. 1.

[17]An article appearing in the November 28, 1969 issue of *Pravda* is illustrative. Authored by N. Mostovets, it praised the orthodox parties for (1) correctly analyzing the communist parties' role as the vanguard of the masses and representatives of the working class, (2) realizing that they must "rally around them all progressive and democratic forces," and (3) defining in proper terms the forms of struggle as suited to the specific conditions in each country — though not necessarily rejecting armed struggle per se.

[18]Those who see the installation of a socialist-communist coalition in Chile as tantamount to the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist state will doubtless regard this as a refutation of the thesis that the Soviets do not aim at the creation of new communist states in the hemisphere under present conditions. The election of a Marxist to the presidency, however, is far from representing the birth of a Marxist-Leninist state. Allende is not stepping into a political vacuum (as did Castro). Democratic political institutions are intact and it seems safe to say that most Chileans would oppose their destruction. Even assuming that Allende's objective was the establishment of a full-fledged totalitarian Marxist-Leninist state (which is far from certain), he would face a difficult and protracted struggle. It seems even less likely that nationalist Allende would willingly enter into the same kind of client-state relationship with Moscow that characterizes Soviet-Cuban relations. Rather, the Allende victory makes possible precisely the kind of radical revolutionary government the Soviets would prefer to see at the reins during the called-for transitional stages. It will be anti-American, but is not likely to be communist for a long time to come. Thus, the Soviets gain only half a loaf but at minimum risk to themselves.

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jectives gives a hint about how long the transition period is likely to last and what must be accomplished before it can be ended. Among other things, U.S. economic domination must first be broken, the core areas of the economy nationalized, and the communist parties must develop a broader popular base.

(3) Significantly, too, Becerra reaches back to classical Marxist dialectics in relating the prospects for socialist construction to stages of economic growth. He does not flatly assert that Latin America must pass through a capitalist stage before transition to socialism can begin, but the inference is clear that a much higher stage of economic development than obtains today must first be reached.

(4) In terms of practical application, the popular-democratic nature of the process dictates the need for communist participation in popular front alliances with progressive bourgeois forces, concentration on mass organizational activity, and participation in the electoral process. In other words, since the "objective" conditions for socialist victory are not yet ripe, attention must be given to cultivating the proper "subjective" conditions through radicalization of the masses. The primary line of action must therefore be aimed at the creation of the broadest possible front of democratic and anti-imperialist forces.

Soviet Objectives: Unity of Theory and Reality

The picture suggested by Soviet-approved ideological constructs is one rather closely in line with the realities of the situation. There is slight possibility of any communist party in Latin America achieving sole power in the near future — whether one chooses to articulate that fact in ideological or pragmatic terms. Latin American governments and societies may adopt increasingly leftist, anti-American postures, but nationalism, rather than any extraneous force, clearly provides the major impetus to this radicalization process. Hence, for the most part the activities of the orthodox communist parties are likely to be irrelevant. (The Chilean Communist Party is one obvious exception.)

Rather than early "communization" of the area, maximum Soviet expectations for the foreseeable future seem to envisage the appearance of a series of radical revolutionary regimes with strong anti-American orientation. A more protracted transitional period along the noncapitalist path may well have been the kind of pattern the Soviets had in mind for Cuba. In its October 15, 1959 issue, *Kommunist,* the organ of the CPSU Central Committee,

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added Cuba to a list of newly-independent countries which were struggling for "full sovereignty."[19] Prominent on the list were Indonesia, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, the UAR and Iraq, all of which were subsequently designated by the Soviets to be "national democracies on the non-capitalist path to socialism."[20] Furthermore, it was well over a year after Castro's 1961 assertion that Cuba was a socialist country before the Soviets reluctantly acknowledged that they too considered it in this category. Even after Cuba had read itself into the socialist camp, the Soviets persisted in describing its major importance as being the advancement of the noncapitalist, rather than socialist, path in Latin America (though the former, of course, indirectly advances the latter). The Cuban experience, it was said, "stimulated the unity and cohesion of all the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal forces in Latin America." It had also, according to an article in the December 1963 edition of *International Affairs,* opened up new prospects before the national liberation movement and stimulated "a radical reappraisal of ways of solving Latin America's basic problems *through non-capitalist development.*"[21]

On the subject of the noncapitalist path, it is necessary to digress for a moment to point out that efforts are being made to align the ideological framework for this concept more closely with Moscow's view of Latin American realities. The Soviets have long taken the position that Latin America is considerably more advanced than the countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East, most of which are considered still to be in the pre-capitalist stage. Latin America, on the other hand, is said to stand midway between the advanced industrialized countries and the bloc of developing nations.[22] This being so, it now seems to have been recognized that the same noncapitalist way prescribed for other Third World areas may not be appropriate for Latin America. Recent formulations have, in effect, suggested a shortened time frame as a necessary accommodation to the area's higher order of development. Becerra

[19]M. Lavrichenko, "Economic Assistance of the USSR to the Underdeveloped Countries," p. 110.

[20]Moscow's most recent list of countries on the noncapitalist path includes Guinea, Algeria, the UAR, Syria, Tanzania, Sudan, Congo (Brazzaville) and Burma. For a useful discussion of the concept of the noncapitalist path see Charles B. McLane, "Russia and the Third World," in John G. Eriksen and Robert Farrell, editors, *The Development of Soviet Society* (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1970).

[21]S. Mikhailov, "The Cuban Revolution and Latin America," p. 45. (Emphasis added.)

[22]Sheremetyev, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

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was quoted by the June 1970 *World Marxist Review,* for example, as noting that Latin America's point of departure was on a higher plane (than the other Third World areas) and its economy capable of rapid growth and transformation. He therefore concluded that the noncapitalist path represented an "eclectic alternative rather than a cardinal solution," an alternative which implied a more protracted transition period than seemed necessary for the democratic-liberation revolution unfolding in Latin America.

"That is why," Becerra declared,

> we must view the non-capitalist way with caution and determine what can and what cannot be expected from it. The aforesaid shows that the non-capitalist way is out of step with the degree of general development in Latin America and that, therefore, the slogans of some Christian Democrats, referring to non-capitalist growth, are a typical expression of their demagogy and petty bourgeois ideology. The working class is quite fit for the role of hegemon even in the most backward of the Latin American countries, and the revolutionary aims it sets itself go farther than what we imply by the non-capitalist way.[23]

But while the noncapitalist process in its more customary configurations may be an inappropriate model for Latin American experience, the requirement for some transitional form remains, as suggested by Becerra himself in his earlier article calling for transitional stages between revolutionary victory and socialist construction. Such a formulation is in keeping with the Marxist concept of the inexorable advance of societies through a series of predetermined phases — i.e., from primitive communism to feudalism and then through capitalism to socialism and, eventually, to full communism.

Whether the Soviets wish it so or not, this happens also to suit their purposes in a more pragmatic sense. Proscribing socialist construction in the Latin American countries until a higher stage of industrialization and capital accumulation has been reached has the effect of postponing their entry, or even the possibility of their entry, into the socialist camp until such time as they are in a more or less viable position economically and therefore likely to impose few demands on Soviet resources. The slogan that immediately comes to mind —"to join the band, you must be able to foot the bill"— doubtless exaggerates the point. Nevertheless, it captures something of post-1965 Soviet disillusionment with the whole con-

[23]"Once More About the Non-Capitalist Way," *World Marxist Review*, June 1970, p. 44.

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cept of aid to developing countries, and, on a different level, with the transition of Third World states to socialism.[24]

Moreover, just as in this one instance it can be said that doctrine serves political ends, it can be asserted in a much wider context that Soviet policy in Latin America seems to have political objectives first and ideological goals as a poor, if much vocalized, second. This is hardly restricted to Latin America, of course, as illustrated by recent Soviet military support of the government of Ceylon in suppressing Marxist revolutionaries. Moscow's political stock in Colombo undoubtedly went up, but only the most devious argument could hold that the revolutionary dynamics of Marxism-Leninism were also furthered.

The commonly held view that Soviet policy in the hemisphere aims at the overthrow of existing governments and their replacement by communist regimes is clearly inadequate. It describes goals which were enunciated with conviction fifty years ago, but which, though still mouthed, have little relevance today. The Soviets are now far more hardheaded and realistic in assessing the situation. World revolution to bring about the communist utopia is not likely to begin in Latin America. Political upheaval that might at least discomfit the Americans, however, is quite another thing.

In writing off the "communization" of the hemisphere as a feasible near-term goal, the Soviets need not, and do not, abandon the concept of historical inevitability. They simply adopt an open-ended time frame. Latin America no less than the rest of the world will sooner or later advance through the various stages and arrive

[24]See, for example, N. A. Simoniya, "On the Character of National Liberation Revolutions," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6, 1966. On the question of Soviet attitudes vis-à-vis the idea of increased assistance to the developing countries, perhaps the most brutally frank Soviet comment to date was carried in the March 3, 1970 edition of *New Times*. Describing as "ideological subversion" all talk to the effect that the socialist countries must increase their material assistance "even if this were in some measure to affect the living standards of their own population," the article makes it crystal clear that the Soviet Union and its socialist allies come first: "Let it be said in this connection that to strengthen the economic might of their own country and raise the welfare of its working people is the supreme internationalist duty for communists in power. As for assistance to the Third World, it is rendered on such a scale as will not impede the progress of the socialist community."

The same article insisted that the socialist countries expect full and prompt repayment. Having indicated that trade between the socialist and developing countries is growing faster than world trade as a whole (a questionable assumption at best), it asserted that: "This being so, it is only natural that increasing attention is given to raising the efficacy of economic ties. This is achieved, among other things, by creating in the developing countries reliable sources of income *to ensure the timely repayment of the socialist countries' credits and other outlays.*" (Emphasis added.)

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at full communism. That is inevitable, so their ideological formulations insist.

Whether or not Soviet leaders seriously believe such formulations is open to question. But even if they do, the point becomes rather academic, for the arrival of most bourgeois countries at full communism is envisaged as taking place in the distant future — a future so distant that it has little to do with the practical policies which must be decided upon today. Meanwhile, in the game of great-power politics, when one side's intrinsic interest in a given area is slight and when conditions preclude incorporation of that area into its sphere of influence, reduction of the principal adversary's influence becomes a worthwhile goal in itself — though one always hopes to augment one's own position in the process.

In their efforts to reduce U.S. influence in Latin America the Soviets must feel that they have a great deal working in their favor. History and geography have made the United States the primary target of Latin American nationalism. "Anti-imperialism" and "anti-Americanism" are virtually synonymous. The Soviets therefore find it easy to identify with the more negative thrusts of nationalism. Their goals on narrow issues are at times in concert with those of the nationalists.[25] They may not thereby greatly expand their own influence, but they can hope that the erosion of the U.S. position eventually will result in increased opportunities for them.

Peru as a Model

The Soviets were pleased and encouraged by Allende's victory in Chile. They clearly hope his assumption of the presidency opens the way to the kind of radical coalition government recommended by their ideological formulae as the most appropriate instrument for the transitional period between revolutionary victory and the construction of socialism. They have great confidence in the Chilean Communist Party as the most disciplined and ideologically mature CP in the hemisphere. It can be relied upon (to the extent it will be able to exercise control) to move cautiously and avoid steps that might precipitate a strong reaction leading to the loss of everything the party has worked so painstakingly to win. By the same token, however, the Soviets appear to realize that it is not only the maturity of the Communist Party

[25]This only goes so far, however. Since nationalism by its very definition strives to free the nation state from all forms of foreign domination or limits on its sovereignty, it imposes limits on Soviet as well as on U.S. influence.

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that is unique in Chile. The same kind of political milieu exists in only one or two other countries of the hemisphere, and, even so, the socialist-communist electoral victory is not likely to be duplicated elsewhere for many years to come — though the *Frente Amplio* made a rather good showing in Uruguay in November 1971.

Events in Peru are something else again. Though initially skeptical, the Soviets eventually came to see in developments there what they hope to be the harbinger of things to come. The new military government's nationalization of the IPC and other efforts to regain the national patrimony served to strain seriously its relations with the United States. Yet these were all steps that virtually every Latin American country has already taken (e.g., Mexico, Cuba and Bolivia) or can be expected to emulate in the near future. More encouraging from Moscow's standpoint was the fact that military officers were behind these policies.

The Soviets had for some time been tempted to see the Latin American military class as a potentially progressive force.[26] The Peruvian case supported such an assessment and suggested that two current trends in Latin America might well converge in their favor: the trend toward economic nationalism and the trend toward military governments. Should the Latin American military, who are, after all, no less nationalist than their civilian counterparts, become fully committed to and involved in the process of reducing foreign ownership of the economy, they might be impelled to take an increasingly hostile stand vis-à-vis the chief foreign owner — the United States. In Peru this seemed to be happening, and Moscow doubtless hoped the Peruvian case would blaze the way for other Latin American military circles.

This hope was clearly reflected in an editorial, appropriately entitled "Peru Sets an Example," appearing in a Soviet weekly journal in October 1969. It asserted that "developments in Peru exert a tangible influence on the other Latin American countries too. Public opinion on this continent supports the new policy of the patriotically-minded Peruvian army officers." Even more pointedly, it went on to say that:

Peru's example has had an effect even on military circles in the Latin American countries where pro-American coups have been staged with the

[26]Not forgotten was the *tenente* movement in Brazil during the 1920's or the fact that Luis Carlos Prestes was a military man before turning revolutionary and eventually becoming head of the Brazilian Communist Party. The short-lived Socialist Republic instituted in Chile by radical military officers in 1932 was also part of the record.

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Pentagon's help. A number of influential officers were recently arrested in Argentina for openly sympathizing with Lima's measures. The new military-civilian government which came to power in Bolivia in September [1969] has frankly declared its solidarity with Peru's policy. The process of differentiation in the Latin American armies, touched off by progressive and patriotic feelings, is gaining momentum.[27]

None of this is to say the Soviets are likely to ensconce themselves in Peru — or elsewhere in Latin America — as they have been able to do in the UAR. The situations are quite different. Soviet influence and presence in the Middle East is directly related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If the Arabs had no need for Soviet arms, Moscow would have little leverage with them. Neither Peru nor any other hemispheric state is involved in a dispute as passionate or as intensely polarized. Nonetheless, on balance, the Soviets have some cause for satisfaction as they view the situation in Peru. Without question their image and influence in that country have been enhanced since 1968 while U.S. prestige has declined.

Soviet Tactics: Emphasis on State-to-State Relations

Because Soviet foreign policy has, generally speaking, become increasingly a function of Soviet state interests and less one of Marxist-Leninist ideology, emphasis on state-to-state relations is the norm in most Third World areas — and especially so in Latin America. It is interesting to note, for example, that in his speech to the June 1969 international meeting of communist parties, L. I. Brezhnev referred to national liberation movements in Asia and Africa which were "as a rule" waging armed struggle. With respect to Latin America, he said only that "we [the Soviet state] are extending our ties *with the states of Latin America.*"[28]

That Moscow has opted for diplomatic and trade relations, rather than Castro-type subversion and violence, as its principal policy instrumentalities in Latin America seems to reflect a rather sophisticated assumption: that radical regimes are more likely to emerge through traditional Latin American political processes (*cuartelazos* as well as elections) and, once in power, are likely to be far more susceptible to influence exerted through normal state-to-state channels than to aggressive subversive thrusts. As the Soviets appear to see things, they stand to gain a great deal more

[27] *New Times*, October 22, 1969, p. 6.
[28] See Brezhnev's speech as carried in *International Affairs*, July 1969, p. 20. (Emphasis added.)

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from dealing with and attempting to win influence with governments than from involving themselves in futile efforts to overthrow them. Peru is, again, a case in point. In a country where Castro-supported guerrillas were decisively defeated in 1965, Soviet tactics, in contrast, have paid off. The Soviets find themselves on the scene and able to play a role through their embassy in Lima. It is, to be sure, a limited role, but they can cogently argue that in the long run their efforts to "influence" the Peruvians should have more impact than the guerrillas had in attempting to force the issue at the point of a gun. (They could hardly have less.) Moscow can now also point to Chile, where the socialist-communist coalition came to power through elections, as confirmation of the efficacy of this "gradualist" approach.

The expulsion of five Soviet diplomats from Mexico in March 1971 for encouraging guerrilla activities involving Mexican students immediately raised a storm of protest over Soviet subversive activities in the hemisphere. While the Mexican government was perfectly correct in expelling the five diplomats to emphasize the gravity with which it would view even the most indirect assistance to subversive efforts against it, the incident hardly indicates a serious Soviet interest in subversion per se. The Soviets had refused to give the Mexican students guerrilla training while the latter were in Moscow. Apparently the only Soviet "complicity" consisted of granting transit visas so that the fledgling guerrillas could travel to and from North Korea. Even then, according to press reports, the visas were stamped in North Korean passports, suggesting Soviet reluctance to become involved. The Mexican incident was dramatic but cannot be taken as evidence of a Soviet policy change. Moscow appears still to prefer the *via pacifica*.

Soviet-Cuban Relations

It was precisely this Soviet preference for peaceful means of penetration that put Moscow at odds with Havana. Not that Moscow's line in Latin America had always been peaceful. Between 1928 and 1935 several communist parties in the hemisphere, in following the hard line dictated by the Comintern during that period, tried to seize power via armed uprisings.[29]

[29]In El Salvador in 1932, for example; also in Brazil in 1935 and in Mexico in 1929. In 1933 the communist paper in Cuba, *El Trabajador*, issued an open call for civil war against the short-lived government of Grau San Martin and for the establishment of soviets of workers, peasants and soldiers. Several soviets were set up and survived for a few months, in fact outlasting the Grau Government.

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From 1935 onward, however, Soviet advice was far more cautious. By and large, mass organizational activity and popular fronts, including cooperation with and participation in bourgeois governments, were stressed as the primary action line.

But in 1959 the wisdom of such tactics was challenged. Following the success of Castro's guerrilla campaign in Cuba, both Moscow and the orthodox Latin American parties were hard pressed to resist "armed struggle" as the principal tactical line for the hemisphere. The Soviets especially, as they became increasingly involved in their dispute with the Chinese, could not openly denigrate "revolutionary action" for fear of being outflanked on the left. In 1962, therefore, the Venezuelan Communist Party, doubtless with Soviet approval, went over to armed struggle. Several other parties followed suit. Even so, it was apparent that neither the Soviets nor the orthodox parties were keen on "making revolution through the barrel of a rifle." Both consistently urged that other approaches be implemented as well. At the November 1964 meeting of Latin American communist parties in Havana, for instance, they agreed that the *via armada* was the proper tactic in six countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Haiti, Paraguay, Honduras and Guatemala). In return, they extracted from Castro the commitment to work only through the orthodox communist parties in each country and to permit each party to decide for itself which tactics were best suited to local conditions.[30]

Little came of these agreements, however; both sides violated them almost from the beginning. By late 1965 they had become meaningless scraps of paper. The Soviets could look at Latin America — apart from Cuba — and see that guerrilla warfare had failed in every country in which it had been attempted. It seemed to lead only to the isolation of the parties from the mainstream of national life and to risk the very existence of the party apparatus in several countries. Accordingly, the Soviets and most of their Latin American communist protégés began de-emphasizing violent revolution and moving back to the *via pacifica.* The Venezuelan Communist Party, for example, shifted priorities to legal action in April 1965 and eventually abandoned armed struggle altogether.

At the Tri-Continent Congress called in Havana in January 1966 for the purpose of bringing Latin America into the Afro-

[30] *World Marxist Review*, March 1965 and September 1968. See also D. Bruce Jackson, *op. cit.*

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Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), the Soviets were prepared to do battle with the Chinese for control of the organization. They were ill-prepared for attacks from other quarters, however, and so were caught off guard by Castro, who wished to use the congress not as a tactical maneuver to advance Soviet positions but rather as a forum from which to call for guerrilla warfare. When they found that they were unable to tone down a wildly inflammatory communiqué calling for armed uprisings around the world and urging all conference participants, including the USSR, to support them with guns and ammunition, they quickly dissociated themselves from the whole affair by insisting that only "social" organizations had represented the USSR at the conference and by letting it be known that they had no intention of carrying out the communiqué's directives.[31]

From that point until August 1968, Soviet-Cuban relations went from bad to worse. In a speech on August 10, 1967, Castro reviled the leadership of the orthodox parties as a "Mafia of pseudo-revolutionaries." In January 1968 he openly linked the Soviets to a subversive "microfaction" of old-line communists who were purged from the Cuban party for disloyalty. He insisted that revolution could only be made by taking rifle in hand and strongly suggested that Moscow and those who followed its lead in Latin America were traitors to the cause for doubting this.

Moscow got in a few muted digs at Castro from time to time, but in the main chose to bide its time and wait for circumstances to bring its wayward ally to a more realistic view. Castro's August 1968 endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was taken as a first sign that patient Soviet diplomacy was paying off. Subsequently, the outlines of a rather warm Soviet-Cuban rapprochement have become clear. Castro may not have abandoned "export of revolution," but he has clearly swung in more closely behind the approach advocated by Moscow and the orthodox parties. Not that Soviet pressure was the only factor at play in the Cuban shift. Guevara's defeat in Bolivia and growing economic problems at home may also have helped to persuade Castro to cut off support to at least some of the guerrilla organizations he had formerly backed. By January 1970 FLN leader Douglas Bravo in Venezuela was denouncing Castro for his refusal to give further aid. Castro, said Bravo, was a pseudo-revolutionary. Further evidence of the Cuban leader's changed assessments was seen in a

[31]See the documents quoted by Stephen Clissold in *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918-1968* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 21.

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speech of July 19, 1969. Castro admitted that the Peruvian military seemed to be leading the country toward a true revolution,[32] thus implicitly recognizing that armed struggle might not, after all, be the only path to power. Needless to say, he was forced to this recognition again in the wake of the Chilean elections.[33]

In sum, Castro has moderated his tone, and, more importantly, has ceased his attacks against both the Soviets and the orthodox parties. Below the surface, the seeds of rivalry and discord between the Cubans and their Soviet mentors remain. Meanwhile, however, Moscow can take some satisfaction in the fact that while the New Left continues to fragment in Latin America, dissonances within the orthodox communist movement have been largely muted and the Cubans are more or less in line.

Economic Factors in Soviet-Latin American Relations

Within the general context of state-to-state relations, aid and trade represent the most effective Soviet catnip. Uncomfortable with their overdependence on U.S. markets, the Latin Americans are intensely interested in finding new buyers for their products and new sources of investment. The Soviets encourage such hopes and even suggest that economic relations with the socialist countries can be the determining factor in a nation's struggle for full economic sovereignty and development.[34] In the event, however, the Latin Americans have often found economic ties with the USSR to be disappointingly unproductive. As remarked above, the Soviet Union's trade turnover with Latin America now represents less than 5 per cent of its total trade with the developing countries and has shown little growth during the past few years. In 1970 it declined.

The problem is that there is slight basis for a really sizeable expansion of trade between the two areas. The USSR has scant need for Latin America's principal products and the Latin Americans can obtain better-quality industrial goods and heavy machinery in the United States and Western Europe. In an effort to move their products, the Soviets frequently offer credits on attractive terms.

[32]The Cuban relief effort to Peru during the summer of 1970 was a reflection of Cuba's desire to improve its image and establish contact with a government it considered to be acceptably progressive.

[33]See an interview appearing in *PURO Chile* (Santiago de Chile), August 4, 1970.

[34]Viktor Volskiy, editor, *SSSR i Latinskaya Amerika, 1917-1967* (*USSR and Latin America, 1917-1967*) (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1967), pp. 119, 122. See also the documents cited by Clissold, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

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Even then, Latin imports of Soviet goods remain limited. The Brazilian experience is perhaps representative. There, a Soviet credit of $100 million was extended in 1966 for the purchase of Soviet goods. According to the Brazilian press the terms of repayment were quite liberal — eight years at 4 per cent — and stipulated partial payment in Brazilian products. Trade increased little at all as a result, however, and when the credit came up for renewal in 1969, only some $4 million had been drawn.

If Soviet trade with Latin America is less than vigorous, aid in the real sense of the word is virtually nonexistent, being restricted almost entirely to trade credits, which have amounted to only a little over $200 million since 1954.[35] Grants and lines of credit for developmental purposes are rarely made available. The Peruvians, for example, had hoped to interest the Soviets in financing the $400-million-plus Olmos irrigation project. Despite their interest in Peru as a model that they hope will succeed and eventually move further to the left, the Soviets displayed no enthusiasm for the idea and instead advanced the usual trade credit for purchase of Soviet goods (on excellent terms — $30 million for ten years at 2.5 per cent interest).[36] Subsequently, this was expanded somewhat; under the agreement signed September 4, 1971, the Soviets will assist the Peruvians in building a fishing port.

Even in Chile, the Soviets have not rushed forward with offers of economic assistance. The joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Chilean Foreign Minister's May 1971 visit to Moscow called for increased technical and economic cooperation, but clearly nothing on a massive scale was contemplated. Apparently ways will be found to use the remainder of the $55 million credit extended in 1967. In the process, the Soviets have agreed to help build a fishing port and possibly a basic oils plant. Although at some point in the future they may increase their assistance, a high degree of caution is to be expected until such time as Moscow is certain of Allende's survivability and has a more precise notion of what it might stand to gain from aid commitments to him.

In short, the Soviet Union's actions in the field of trade and aid do not match its enthusiastic promises. Its commitments may well

[35]Including a $45 million credit to Argentina, $100 million to Brazil, $55 million to Chile, $20 million to Uruguay and $2 million to Colombia. See Department of State, *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1969, op. cit.*

[36]See the *New York Times*, August 26, 1970, and *El Peruano* (Lima), July 7, 1970.

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increase somewhat as its political interests and involvement expand; but Soviet resources are already strained, and Latin America is too peripheral to Soviet vital interests to warrant more than minimal expenditures. This places the Soviets on the horns of a dilemma, for while their natural inclinations would be to call for total expulsion of the U.S. economic presence, they are not in any position to offer to replace it. Accordingly, they have adopted a formula calling for an end to the *dominance* of foreign capital, but at the same time stressing that foreign capital is needed and has a definite role to play "under conditions more favorable to the national economy."[37]

The logic cannot be faulted; many Latin Americans, and North Americans as well, would probably agree with it. The motive behind the logic, however, would seem to smack of wishing to have one's cake and eat it too.

Concluding Observations

As a line of action designed to achieve realistic goals at minimum costs and risks, Soviet policy in Latin America must be given high marks. Rather than ideological objectives, Soviet aims more accurately reflect traditional great-power strivings for political advantage. Moscow does not seek to replace the existing governments with communist ones (at least in the near term). It aims to undercut the U.S. position and to increase its own political stock with the existing governments — almost irrespective of their particular persuasions. The Soviets might be somewhat more comfortable dealing with a leftist government in, say, Brazil, but they are not at all reluctant to woo the military government which in fact presides. Only as a tertiary goal do they pursue efforts to further the radicalization of Latin American societies. Frontal thrusts into the countries south of the Rio Grande are eschewed in favor of playing for the breaks.

To attain their aims, the Soviets clearly hope to take advantage of growing anti-Americanism and internal political turmoil. This may be an effective approach, but it is hardly a daring or aggressive one. Moreover, it carries with it the recognition that they can succeed only to the extent that the United States does not. This is a point that bears repeating. Only to the degree the United States is unable to come to terms and work out a new and viable relationship with Latin American nationalism will exploitable op-

[37] I. Nazarenko and T. Tkhorzhevskaya, "Capital Exports to Developing Countries: Economic Basis of Neo-Colonialism," *International Affairs*, April 1970, p. 50.

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portunities open to the Soviets. To ascribe the emergence of radical regimes and growing tensions in the area to Soviet presence (or conspiracies) is to see a complicating factor rather than the central causes. Social unrest may provide the Soviets and their native communist allies an entrée, but the unrest itself, by and large, is not of their making. It is a function of Latin America's desperate efforts to come of age, to achieve political maturity and economic well-being.

Whether or not it fully succeeds, Latin America is not likely to be content with the role of underdeveloped and loyal ally that for so many years characterized its relationship with the United States. It will seek its own way — and do so with passion. Such actions as the nationalization of U.S. companies and the establishment of diplomatic relations with communist states may in part represent ways to manifest stored-up resentments against the United States, but they are also perfectly understandable as a means of asserting full national sovereignty. In any event, there is little if any causal relationship between the intensification of economic nationalism and the expansion of the Soviet presence. The one would exist without the other, just as political tensions would have increased even if there were no Soviet embassies in Latin America. To attribute political disequilibrium in the hemisphere to Soviet manipulation is to give the Soviets credit for a great deal more influence than they have.

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THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: WILL IT BE EFFECTIVE?

by A. Glenn Mower, Jr.

THE effort to provide international protection of human rights within the Western Hemisphere entered a new phase with the adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights at the San Jose Conference in November 1969. The Convention, promulgated by an assemblage of representatives of nineteen American governments, members of the Organization of American States (OAS), climaxed years of attempts to provide an effective international program for the protection and promotion of respect for human rights in these countries.

A strong international human rights program has been felt to be necessary in this geographical area for a number of reasons: (1) to contribute to the integration of the area; (2) to deal more directly with problems and issues that are of particular significance to these countries; (3) to help meet a real need for a higher level of respect for human rights within the national societies involved; and (4) to encourage the development of, and provide support for, democratic institutions in these states. An additional reason, emerging in the post-World War II era, is the need to provide a regional complement to the UN's human rights endeavors, which, being nearly universal in scope, suffer from certain handicaps that can be minimized in a more homogeneous regional system.

The effort to meet these needs has followed two basic lines: the development of international definitions of basic rights and freedoms, and the creation of international machinery to foster respect for these standards. While there can be no question of the importance of formulating international norms, the discussion here centers on the critical question of implementation.[1] This is a

[1]The history of the formulation of human rights standards in the Americas is a long one. As the OAS Secretary-General noted in a 1968 report, "in the period of fifty-eight years, between the establishment of the International Union of American Republics in 1890 and the signing of the Charter of the Organization of American States in 1948, there were nine international conferences of representatives of the American nations, three Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and several conferences of subsidiary bodies, in all of which were taken up different topics related to the protection of human rights." *Report Submitted by the Organization of American States,* UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/L.10, January 22, 1968, p. 5.

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functional area in which little movement occurred until 1948, when the Charter of the OAS was adopted at Bogota. Article 13 created a legal obligation on the part of member states to undertake to respect human rights. This provision has been held to be responsible for much of the progress made, since it has afforded "the solid foundation for Inter-American agencies to carry out, with ever-increasing efficiency, and not infrequently with marked audacity, the function of promoting respect for and seeking protection of rights."[2]

While the idea of an inter-American court of human rights was discussed at various times between 1948 and 1969, and the preparation of draft statutes for such an institution several times authorized, no court was created.[3] The principal agency through which the inter-American system has tried to foster respect for human rights has therefore been the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The decision to set up an organ of this kind was made at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in 1959, and the task of organizing the Commission was assigned to the OAS Council. The Council fulfilled its responsibility by adopting the Statute of the Commission in 1960.

According to the Statute, the Commission was to be composed of seven members, nationals of OAS member states, elected in their personal capacity by the OAS Council from lists prepared by governments, with no two members from the same state. The term of office was set at four years, with re-election permitted. The Commission was authorized to develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America; to make recommendations to governments of the member states for the "adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights within the framework of their domestic laws and, in accordance with their constitutional precepts, appropriate measures to further the faithful observance of these rights"; to prepare studies and reports; to urge the governments of the member states to supply it with information on the measures they adopted, and to serve the OAS as an advisory body.

[2]The Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, *The Inter-American System: Its Development and Strengthening* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1966), p. 61.

[3]The pertinent sessions were the Ninth International Conference of American States in 1948, the Tenth Inter-American Conference (the name of such assemblies was changed by the OAS Charter of 1948), and the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. One result of these efforts was the approval, in 1959, by the Inter-American Council of Jurists, of a draft convention that included a provision for an inter-American court of human rights. Adoption of such a convention, however, was delayed until 1969.

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These limited powers have been expanded by the Commission's own interpretation of its Statute and by decisions of OAS organs. At its first session, in 1960, the Commission decided that it was competent to make recommendations to individual governments, rather than merely address such views to the OAS membership in general, implying its intention to take direct action on human rights situations within national societies. At the same session it declared its capacity to "take cognizance of communications it might receive" — an important procedural step, providing access by individuals to international human rights machinery. This decision was endorsed by the Second Special Inter-American Conference in 1965 and then elaborated on by the Commission in 1966, when it amended its Regulations in order to provide specific guidelines for handling claims sent to it by individuals, or groups of individuals, alleging violations of their rights.[4]

Early in its career the Commission also decided that its mandate to make recommendations to governments, together with its function of gathering information, empowered it to examine situations within particular countries and, if necessary, to request the consent of governments to on-the-spot investigations of possible departures from human rights standards.

Another indication of the aggressive attitude taken by this body toward its functions was its persistence regarding the Cuban question. When the Commission attempted to obtain information from the Castro regime concerning the human rights situation in Cuba, it was rebuffed on the grounds that, since Cuba had been suspended from OAS activities by the Organization, the Commission's efforts were inappropriate. Nothing daunted, it refused to accept this limitation of its efforts, asserted its continuing obligation to promote respect for human rights in all the OAS countries, and renewed its request for information from the Cuban government.

Again, in the case of the civil war in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Commission went beyond the normal expectations of its role by actively negotiating on behalf of individuals imprisoned during the course of the struggle. As a result of its efforts, "numerous" political prisoners were released, congested cell con-

[4]The major stipulations included in these revisions were that, if all domestic remedies had been exhausted and the six-month time limit for filing had not been exceeded, the Commission could proceed to request information from the government concerned and prepare a report with recommendations to the government; if the government failed to cooperate with these suggestions, the Commission could comment on the case to other OAS organs and, ultimately, publish its report.

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ditions were relieved, and other benefits were obtained for victims of the strife.

The activism of the Commission has been revealed as well in its approach to its program of studies and reports. Here, again, it has not been satisfied to be merely an "academy" or study group, but has decided that the study given to a particular topic could result in recommendations addressed to the member states of the OAS. This position has been taken even though the Commission's Regulations do not provide for initiatives of this type.

Thus, the Commission has been an active agency, operating basically along three lines: the consideration of communications and claims relating to alleged violations of rights, the examination of human rights situations in OAS countries, and the preparation of studies and reports. A 1969 report on its work disclosed that, between 1960 and 1967, a total of 1,525 communications had been received and processed; the situation regarding rights had been studied in eight countries; and the products of the study program included a draft convention on freedom of expression, information, and investigation, and reports on political refugees, the suffrage, representative democracy, the state of siege, economic/social conditions affecting rights, and the right of petition. The Commission has also tried to create a greater awareness of human rights through such projects as lecture series and seminars.[5]

All the threads of experience alluded to above, both as to the substance and the implementation of human rights, were woven into the Convention that came out of the San Jose Conference in 1969, which is now awaiting the eleven ratifications needed for it to become effective.

On the substantive side, the Convention's Chapter 2 (Articles 3-

[5]This discussion of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is based on the following sources: *The Inter-American System . . . , op. cit.*; *Report Submitted by the Organization of American States, op. cit.*; *Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Basic Documents,* OEA/Ser. L/V/1.4 Rev., August 26, 1963; *Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,* OEA/Ser. L/V/11.17, Doc. 26, May 2, 1967; *The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Its Powers, Functions, and Activities,* OEA/Ser. L/V/11.22, Doc. 9, August 11, 1969; *The General Work Program of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,* OEA/Ser. L/V/11.20, Doc. 8, December 2, 1968; *Report Regarding the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba,* OEA/Ser. L/V/11.17, Doc. 4, June 13, 1967; and various annual reports on its work. Attention is also directed to Anna P. Schreiber's *The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights* (Leyden, Netherlands: Sijthoff, 1970) and Jose A. Cabranes, "The Protection of Human Rights by the Organization of American States," *American Journal of International Law,* October 1968, p. 893ff., for discussions of the Commission and bibliographical references thereto.

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25) lists a series of civil/political rights that are to be protected, including such basic rights as those of assembly, due process of law, personal life and liberty, the integrity of the family, equal protection of the law, and freedoms of conscience, speech and movement. As far as economic, social and cultural rights are concerned, the Convention is limited to one article, Article 26, under which the states "undertake to adopt measures . . . [to achieve] . . . the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and scientific standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires." The catalog of these norms occupies three chapters, embracing twenty-two articles.

The implementation of these rights, as far as international machinery is concerned, is to be entrusted to a Commission on Human Rights and a Court of Human Rights.

Whether or not the human rights program embodied in the Convention will be able to meet the need for strong international safeguards, and make the kind of contribution suggested by its provisions, depends on a number of elements in the total picture. One of these determinants is the implementary machinery called for in the Convention; others are certain domestic factors characterizing the national life of the countries of the area.

The Implementary Machinery

Description

It is acknowledged that the main responsibility for protecting and promoting human rights rests with national governments; it is also clear, however, that no government is likely to reach such a level of perfection in its discharge of this responsibility as to eliminate the need for international machinery to give effect to the rights listed in the American Convention.

The Commission on Human Rights, as described in the Convention, is an embodiment of an organ already possessing years of experience as a functioning institution. It is to be composed of seven persons, elected by the OAS General Assembly from lists prepared by governments, who are to serve, in their personal capacity and not as representatives of governments, for four-year terms. No two members may be from the same state, and re-election is limited to one additional term. The body is empowered to prepare its own statute, for Assembly approval, and is to be served by a specialized unit of the OAS General Secretariat. (Articles 29-40, *passim.*)

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The Commission will continue to have the general responsibility of promoting respect for human rights within the OAS area. In terms of implementing the Convention's standards, its primary significance lies in its capacity to receive a complaint from an individual (or group of individuals) alleging a violation of his rights by his government, and then to take certain action on this complaint.

This action includes communicating the complaint to the government involved, investigating the situation cited, trying to effect a friendly settlement, and, if this fails, presenting a report to the government, together with recommendations on the issue. If the matter has not been successfully resolved by the government after three months, or taken to the Court by the Commission or the state concerned, the Commission may prepare a second report, giving its conclusion and recommendations concerning the problem and prescribing a time period within which the accused government is to take the steps necessary to remedy the situation. Should the government fail, in the Commission's judgment, to comply within this period of time, the Commission may then publish its report. (Articles 45, 48-51.)

The Commission may also receive a complaint from one state alleging an infringement of the Convention's standards on the part of another state, but in this case it can exercise its authority only if both states concerned have granted it the competence to act. (Article 45.) The right of individual petition to the Commission contains no such option, and this highly significant fact opens the way for an individual to appeal over the head of a government to an international authority.

The individual appeal is, of course, surrounded by certain safeguards, to prevent undue embarrassment of governments and to ensure that only legitimate use is made of the international machinery. Thus, a petition can be admitted by the Commission only after a number of conditions have been satisfied, the major qualification being that the remedies provided by domestic law must have been pursued and exhausted.[6]

[6]Other conditions are that the petition must (1) be lodged within six months after the plaintiff has received final judgment from a domestic court or other competent national authority; (2) cite a question not being dealt with by another international agency; (3) include the name, nationality, profession, residence and signature of the person or persons (or a designated legal representative thereof) entering the complaint (Article 46, Section 1); (4) state "facts that tend to establish a violation" of the rights guaranteed by the Convention; (5) not indicate that the complaint is "manifestly groundless or obviously out of order"; and (6) not be substantially the same as one previously considered by the Commission or another international agency (Article 47).

The requirements relating to domestic remedies are waived when (1) the legisla-

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The second organ created to help implement the Convention is the Court of Human Rights. Unlike the Commission, it has no predecessor in the pre-1969 era. The abortive efforts to provide a court, mentioned above, were based on the feeling expressed in the Ninth International Conference of American States in 1948, that "no right is genuinely assured unless safeguarded by a competent court: [therefore] where internationally recognized rights are concerned, juridical protection should emanate from an international organ."[7] But, as the Inter-American Juridical Committee pointed out in a 1950 report, a court cannot function in the absence of "positive substantive law."[8] This difficulty has been overcome in the Convention, which first enumerates the rights to be protected and then establishes the organs to implement them, including a court.

The Court is composed of seven persons, elected in the same manner as the Commission.[9] Access is limited to states and the Commission; individuals may not appear before it. (Article 61, Paragraph 1.)

The jurisdiction of the Court is optional, and may be accepted at any time by a state willing to grant it authority in regard to "all matters relating to the interpretation or application" of the Convention. This acceptance may be a blanket one, covering all cases that may arise, or it may require a special agreement for a given case; it may be unconditional or on the condition of reciprocity, and it may be for a specified period of time. (Article 62.)

Should the Court find that a violation has indeed occurred in a given instance, it "shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated." The Court's ruling also includes, when appropriate, an order that the "consequence of the . . . breach . . . [shall be] remedied and . . . fair compensation paid to the injured party." (Article 63, Paragraph 1.) The judgments of the Court are final, not subject to appeal, and

tion of the state concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights allegedly violated; (2) the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or (3) there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under domestic remedies. (Article 46, Section 2.)

[7] *Report Submitted by the Organization of American States, op. cit.*, p. 22.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 33. The report was made to the Inter-American Council of Jurists as pertaining to Resolution XXXI of the 1948 Bogota Conference.

[9] Articles 52-54. The term of office for a judge is six years, and re-election is permitted. The Court, like the Commission, is to draw up its own statute for General Assembly approval, and is to have the aid of a secretariat — in this case, though, not drawn from the OAS General Secretariat. (Articles 59, 60.) It should be noted that a judge may sit for a case involving his own state, and that any state appearing before the Court may appoint an *ad hoc* judge if none of the regular justices is a national of that state. (Article 55.)

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the states parties to the Convention agree to comply with these judgments in cases in which they are involved. (Articles 67, 68.)

The Court thus complements the Commission in the vital task of handling alleged violations of the Convention's rights. While there is a quasi-judicial aspect in the work of the Commission, its functions, as noted above, are primarily those of investigation and conciliation; if these efforts leave the problem still unresolved, and the case does not go to the Court, the only actions available to the Commission are recommendations to the government concerned and, possibly, publication of a report on the issue. The Court, on the other hand, performs a strictly judicial function, and is the only agency in the OAS structure authorized to make an explicit decision on the merits of a case — i.e., to make an official pronouncement of guilt or innocence in respect to a government.

The Court's functions also include the issuing of advisory opinions on request from an OAS member state or organ. Such opinions may deal with the interpretation of the Convention or of other treaties having to do with the protection of human rights in the American states; or, if a state asks the Court to do so, the latter may give its opinion as to the compatibility of any of that state's domestic laws with the Convention or other international agreements it has entered into which concern human rights. (Article 64.)

Evaluation of the Commission

On paper, the system established in the Convention to assist in the implementation of its standards appears to have both strong points and weaknesses.

One of the positive aspects to be found in the description of the Commission and its procedures and functions, and the most significant, has been mentioned: the authority to receive and act upon petitions from individuals and groups of individuals. There was some feeling at the San Jose Conference that the Commission's competence to receive such petitions should be made an option, with the states having the choice of granting or not granting this authority.[10] The predominant attitude, however, was that the Commission should continue to exercise the privilege of receiving petitions from individuals and groups, for to do anything less would be to take a step backward. By making the right of in-

[10]Argentina favored the optional nature of the right of petition, and it was joined by the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay in abstaining on the vote on the pertinent Article 44. For a discussion of the articles of the Convention, the reader is referred to *International Legal Materials,* July 1970, p. 710ff.

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dividual petition an integral part of the Convention, the OAS has gone a step farther than the pioneering regional human rights program, that of the Council of Europe, and the proposed UN Covenants; in both of these systems, governments are given the option of either granting this right to an international agency or withholding it.

In the process of receiving and considering complaints, the Commission has access to materials and to governments that offers it scope to exert political and moral leverage. This opportunity also exists in its mandate to make special and annual reports and studies on the status of human rights in the countries of the area, to ask governments to supply information on measures adopted by them relating to human rights, and to make recommendations to the governments "for the adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights within the framework of their domestic law and constitutional provisions as well as appropriate measures to further the observance of these rights."[11]

In addition to these positive powers, other provisions in the Convention lend strength to the Commission. One is Article 70, which grants to members of the Commission (and of the Court) the "immunities extended to diplomatic agents in accordance with international law," to be enjoyed throughout their term of office. This stipulation is a significant one, for it guarantees members protection against possible arrests or other actions, or politically motivated threats of such actions, that could lessen their independence and hence their effectiveness as servants of the international community. The Latin Americans at San Jose were particularly concerned that this protection be provided, even to the extent of rejecting a United States proposal that a Commission (or Court) member, "while present in his State of nationality or permanent residence . . . [should] enjoy only immunities from jurisdiction in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his functions."[12] Full immunity within their own countries was felt by Latin Americans to be necessary if Commission members were not to be exposed to governmental persecution for political reasons.

Article 71 makes membership on the Commission "incompatible with any other activity that might affect the independence or impartiality" of members. The responsibility for

[11]The functions, procedures and competence of the Commission are set forth in Sections 2-4 of the Convention.

[12]*International Legal Materials, op. cit.*

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defining this provision more precisely was left to the Commission, to be discharged when it prepares its statute, but the mere presence of this article in the Convention should enhance the character of the Commission as a true agency of the international community.

One other specific action taken at San Jose serves to strengthen this organ: the adoption of Resolution Number Two, recommending to the OAS General Assembly that, after the Convention enters into effect, the Commission's authority should extend even to nonratifying states. Under the terms of this resolution, the Commission would continue to carry out the functions bestowed upon it by the Second Special Inter-American Conference (November 1965) in respect to all OAS members, including the key mandate to receive complaints from individuals and groups alleging violations of their rights.

On the other hand, there are aspects of the Commission's work, as prescribed in the Convention, that could prevent it from being as effective an implementing mechanism as it might be. Its authority has been weakened by the provision that the state-versus-state complaint procedure is to be optional. While experience under the European Convention on Human Rights indicates that few charges are likely to be filed by one state against another,[13] and while the opportunity for individual petition may lessen the need for a complaint procedure on the interstate level, the latter is still a useful recourse to have in store. This is especially true in those rare but not improbable cases where individuals may be prevented by domestic circumstances from availing themselves of the petition procedure. In situations like this, violations of in-

[13]As of December 1968, seven such cases had been received by the European Commission of Human Rights, compared with almost four thousand individual complaints. (*Forward in Europe,* the bulletin published by the Council of Europe, February 1969, p. 10.) The European Convention became effective September 3, 1953.

In the American Convention the original draft of Article 45 had made the procedure for state vs. state complaints an integral part of the Convention. This, however, was opposed by Argentina, Mexico and the United States in the Working Group of Committee Two handling this question at the San Jose Conference, and failed by one vote to receive approval by the committee. Argentina, Mexico and Nicaragua voted against it in committee, while Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Paraguay and the United States abstained. The provision was thus modified, making it optional for states to grant authority to the Commission to receive state vs. state complaints. States may declare the Commission to be competent to do so either for an indefinite time, a specified period, or a specific case. It is expected that before filing a complaint a state will, in confidence and through diplomatic channels, find out if the state to be accused will accept the Commission's competence, if it has not already done so. *International Legal Materials, op. cit.*

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ternationally protected rights could be brought to the attention of the Commission through the intervention of another state; but if the Commission has not been authorized to entertain such a complaint by one state against another, this door to action is closed.

A second factor that could detract from the Commission's effectiveness is its lack of clear authority to inquire into the validity of derogations made by governments from their legal obligations under the Convention. A mandate of this sort is also absent from the European Convention on Human Rights, but the European Human Rights Commission quickly asserted its prerogative to conduct such an inquiry, rather than simply accepting a government's statement that a national emergency existed and a suspension of rights was therefore in order.[14] The European experience might well have suggested the wisdom of authorizing the American Commission to decide for itself whether a certain derogation is justified. Unless it does this, the people of a particular country may have some important rights abrogated through an arbitrary governmental decree, declaring that a national crisis exists.[15]

A third limitation imposed on the Commission by the Convention is the stipulation that its size be fixed at seven members. (Article 34.) There is reason to believe that a larger Commission is necessary if it is to be able to handle its workload, especially as the regional human rights program expands.[16] An effort was made at San Jose, in committee, to introduce some flexibility at this point by permitting the OAS General Assembly to change the number of Commission members should this seem desirable. The effort failed, leaving the membership set at seven unless the Convention is amended.

A fourth weakness in the Commission's functions is its restricted

[14]This was done while the Commission was considering the Cyprus case, a complaint brought by Greece against the United Kingdom. A. H. Robertson, *Human Rights in Europe* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1963), p. 115.

[15]Article 27 of the Convention does provide some safeguards against unreasonable action by governments, and unduly broad invasion of basic freedoms on the basis of "national crisis," by stipulating that certain rights may not be suspended even in a true national emergency. These "preferred" rights and freedoms include the right to a juridical personality, the right to life, the right to humane treatment, freedom from slavery, freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom of conscience and religion, the rights to a name, nationality, participation in government, and of the child and the family. Article 27 also forbids the suspension of the "judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights."

[16]The European Commission of Human Rights is composed of as many members as there are contracting parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. There are eighteen members of the Council of Europe, sixteen of which have ratified the Convention.

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role in economic and social matters. In Article 42, the Convention states that the parties shall provide the Commission with copies of their annual reports to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture. These reports are to deal with efforts of member states to meet the standards in these functional areas contained in the OAS Charter as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. The Commission, under the original draft of the Convention, was to have received the reports in order to "verify" the fulfilling of standards, and this version was approved by the First Committee of the San Jose Conference. Largely due to the efforts of the U.S. delegates, however, this provision was watered down in plenary session. "Watch over the promotion of" rights was substituted for "verify" the compliance of states with them.[17]

Ambiguity about whether or not the Commission must have the consent of a state before conducting an investigation in the latter's territory is a fifth weak point in the definition of its powers. The original draft of the Convention simply said that, "if necessary" in the process of handling complaints the Commission "shall carry out an investigation, for the effective conduct of which it shall request, and the states concerned shall furnish to it, all necessary facilities." (Article 48, Paragraph 1d).[18] Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador and the United States wanted to modify this by requiring the Commission to request permission from the state involved in a complaint before attempting to pursue an on-the-spot examination of the matter. Although this was not done, the Second Committee did add "and advisable" to the proposed text, so that the Commission's probing, in a state's territory, would be done "if necessary and advisable." Both Mexico and the United States subsequently issued statements containing their interpretation of this passage: that it left untouched the right of a state to refuse consent to such activity by the Commission.

The presence of the word "advisable" in the text of Article 48 suggests that the Commission, when considering the possibility of entering a state to inquire into the merits of a complaint, would have to decide whether or not to press for entry in view of the government's known adverse attitude toward such an investigation. This implied restriction on its freedom to pursue an

[17] *International Legal Materials, op. cit.*

[18] "Investigation" could suggest many types of proceedings. With reference to Article 48, however, the term's accepted connotation is an inquiry in the territory of an accused state.

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issue appears to be a direct denial of the legal obligation placed on the state by the same article: "to furnish [the Commission] with all necessary facilities" for investigations undertaken.

What the Convention is saying about the capacity of the Commission to hold an inquiry within a state seems to be that (1) it is entitled to hold member states to their obligation to facilitate this proceeding, but (2) as a practical matter it may not be able to carry on as it would prefer because of the negative attitude of a particular government. In such a situation both the Commission and the government in question could cite the Convention in support of their respective positions. But in any conflict between a vaguely-stated legal right of an international agency to discharge its responsibilities and the opposition of a government to its doing so, the latter is almost certain to prevail, especially when the locus of the proposed agency action is the territory of the uncooperative government. The implications of this are unfavorable for any really effective work by the Commission; it could find itself compelled to make judgments in important cases without benefit of personal investigation in the countries where the problems arose. A clear authorization for the Commission to make on-the-spot inquiries, accepted by states ratifying the Convention, would at least make it harder for a government to justify opposition to an investigation.[19]

Evaluation of the Court

There are likewise elements of strength and weakness in the Court of Human Rights as described in the Convention. On the positive side, the possibilities for a truly independent international tribunal are enhanced by such provisions as the guarantee of full diplomatic immunity for judges (Article 70), the statement that the position of judge is incompatible with any other activity which might affect the independence or impartiality of a member of the Court (Article 71), and the grant to the Court of the privilege of drawing up its own budget (Article 72). The budget prepared is to reflect "due regard for the importance and independence" of the Court, and may not be altered by the General Assembly of the OAS.

[19]Article 48, Paragraph 2, permits the Commission to proceed with an investigation in "serious and urgent cases" without going through any of the usual preliminary steps other than satisfying itself that a petition meets all the formal requirements of admissibility. At the same time it states that the investigation is to be with "the prior consent" of the state in whose territory the violation is said to have occurred.

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The functions of the Court also suggest that it could be an effective means of implementing the Convention. As noted previously, it may decree that a person whose rights have been violated is to be ensured the enjoyment of these rights, that the "consequences of the measures or situation that constituted the breach" are to be remedied, and that "fair compensation" is to be paid to the victim. (Article 63.) In addition, it may adopt provisional measures in matters it has under consideration when such action is felt to be necessary in order to "avoid irreparable damage to persons." (Article 63.)

The Court's judgments may receive added sanction through action by the OAS Assembly. Under Article 65, the Court is obligated to submit an annual report on its work to the Assembly, specifying cases in which a state has not complied with a Court ruling and making "pertinent recommendations." This article was made part of the Convention as a result of Guatemala's proposal to allow the Permanent Council of the OAS to take cognizance of a state's refusal to comply with a Court judgment. While agreeing that the Court should have the support of another OAS agency, the delegations to the San Jose Conference felt that the Council's competence did not include such action; hence the General Assembly was designated as the body to receive reports and recommendations from the Court as a further means of exerting international pressure on a recalcitrant state.[20]

Nevertheless, the Court, like the Commission, will undoubtedly be handicapped by the limitations of power imposed by the Convention system. Above all, its jurisdiction is optional; no government can be involved in a case before it without that government's consent, given either in a previous declaration accepting the authority of the Court or in an *ad hoc* agreement relating to a specific case. The unwillingness of states to endow the Court with compulsory jurisdiction over all pertinent cases is consistent with the attitude generally taken toward international tribunals of various kinds. While this is an understandable position, given the determination of governments to retain some control over issues that affect the national interest, it is a serious barrier to a more active and effective court.

Another restriction stemming from the traditional determina-

[20]It must be recognized, though, that the Assembly's authority to ensure state compliance with Court rulings exists only by implication from its position as the supreme organ of the OAS and its competence to receive and consider reports from the organs of the OAS. (Article 52 of the amended OAS Charter.)

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tion of states to keep international legal institutions safely within their control is the exclusion of individuals from the Court's proceedings. Only states which are parties to the Convention, and the Commission, may bring a case to the Court. (Article 61.) If another proposal made at San Jose had been accepted, states would have greater access to the Court than they now have. This suggestion would have enabled a state to submit a case to the Court if the Commission declared the case inadmissible or found that no violation had occurred. The Court would thus have enjoyed some additional status as an appeal tribunal.[21]

In sum, the effectiveness of the Commission and the Court will depend both on their "constitutional mandate" and on what these organs do with the powers granted to them. Despite the limitations and weaknesses built into the system for implementing the Convention through international mechanisms, the prescriptions are sufficiently broad and confer enough basic authority on the two mechanisms to open the door to a significant role for them — if they are inclined to take advantage of the opportunities they have been given.

The Commission: Activism or Restraint?

The most critical variable in appraising the possible effectiveness of the Convention system is the Commission. As the experience of the European human rights program shows, this organ is the key element in any attempt to give international reinforcement to human rights. It is the Commission that decides whether or not a complaint will be given a hearing; if a petition is admitted, it is the Commission that proceeds to investigate the case; and if a friendly settlement is not achieved, it is the Commission's prerogative to arrive at conclusions and prepare recommendations that, in effect, constitute judgments on the merits of the case.

The Convention's description of how the Commission is to proceed leaves much to its discretion. If it is so minded, it can maximize its allotted powers and thus expand the role of the OAS as an international protector of human rights; or it can take a minimal approach to its duties and thereby lessen the impact of the OAS on rights problems in the area.

[21]This proposal was presented by the United States but was not pressed because of the feeling among delegations that it would lead to prolonged proceedings. There were also some doubts expressed about the concept contained in the proposal: that the Commission's findings were not final. *International Legal Materials, op. cit.*

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The authority to declare petitions admissible is an example of this gray area of powers. While the Convention stipulates the grounds for such a declaration (Articles 46-47), the terms used to define these grounds are sufficiently vague to give the Commission opportunity to practice either self-restraint or aggressiveness. This is seen in the principal criterion, namely, that domestic remedies must have been exhausted. While this appears to be a clear test of a petition, it is qualified by the provisions that it does not apply (1) if "the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated," or (2) if "the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or prevented from exhausting them," or (3) if "there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies." (Article 46, Paragraph 2.)

The Commission obviously has room for judgment in deciding whether or not any of these provisions apply in a given case. It also has the opportunity to exercise discretion in weighing other criteria for admissibility, such as the "manifestly groundless" nature of a complaint, for what is "manifestly groundless" to one observer may appear differently to another. The experience of the Council of Europe's human rights program bears on this point. "Manifestly ill-founded" has been the most common basis on which the Council's Commission of Human Rights has rejected petitions, although its critics argue that no case can reasonably be ruled out on this ground when, as frequently happens, there has been extensive pleading, pro and con, and when there have been hearings before the Commission during its consideration of admissibility.

In the matter of admissibility of petitions, the American Commission will therefore face situations that call for interpretation and judgment, and this means that opportunities exist for it to enlarge or restrict the scope of its activities on behalf of the American human rights program. We cannot overemphasize the central place of this question of admissibility in determining the relevance of the human rights program for the people of the area. In the European movement, for example, while the Council of Europe's efforts have much to commend them, they have, nevertheless, suffered from the restrictive approach taken by the European Commission to complaints addressed to it. Inspired by an understandable desire to gain the confidence of governments

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and encourage their active cooperation with the Council's human rights system, the Commission deliberately adopted a policy of protecting governments from a steady stream of complaints. As a result, petitions from individuals have been subjected to a rigorous screening procedure -- so rigorous that as of December 1968 only fifty-one out of 3,895 individual petitions had been declared admissible.[22]

The long-range interests of the European human rights program may well justify this preference for high standards of admissibility; on the other hand, such a low percentage of acceptances could suggest that many Europeans have been unduly denied the benefit of international procedures because the Commission has chosen to take a cautious, rather than aggressive, approach to the question of admissibility.

There are other functional areas where the American Commission can be either expansive or self-limiting in its approach to human rights problems. One such area is the development of its own jurisprudence: the determination to decide certain matters for itself rather than simply to accept the findings or judgments of national organs, and the adoption of its own standards by which to reach an independent decision. It could, for example, follow the pattern of its Council of Europe counterpart in relation to two important questions: what constitutes a fair trial, and whether a government's derogation from Convention-protected rights has been justified.

The easy path for the American Commission to follow, in both of these issues, would be to accept the pertinent national opinion or ruling. Thus, if a national court said that a petitioner had received a fair trial, the Commission would accept this, and rule the petition inadmissible. The European Commission has rejected this approach, choosing instead to adopt criteria of its own for this purpose, including the concept of equality of arms: the procedural parity of accuser and accused.

Again, if a government said that the suspension of certain rights was necessary because of a national emergency, the American Commission, if it took the path of least resistance, would decide that the government concerned was in the best position to say whether or not a crisis existed, and hence would refuse to receive a complaint against it. The European Commission has responded by asserting its right to decide for itself whether or not a government

[22] *Forward in Europe*, February 1970, p. x.

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faces an emergency of such dimensions as to require the suspension of a number of rights.[23]

Some idea of how the American Commission is likely to interpret its mandate may be gained from noting its performance to date. The record since its creation in 1960 reveals some caution, as one might expect. It has, for example, tended to apply the test of exhaustion of domestic remedies strictly in determining whether or not to consider a communication alleging a violation of rights. On the whole, however, considering its work since 1960, there seems to be more reason to feel that it will bring an aggressive attitude to its functions.

Domestic Factors

The Concept of Nonintervention

If the American Convention on Human Rights is to provide effective protection of basic rights and freedoms through its implementary machinery, it will be necessary for the governments and peoples of the area to overcome a traditional fear of intervention in their internal affairs, for by its very nature international enforcement of rights calls for no little intrusion into domestic matters.

Hostility to intervention is deeply ingrained in the Latin American mentality and is given formal expression in Article 18 of the OAS Charter as now in force:

> No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.

The present Charter is a revision of the original document promulgated at Bogota in 1948, but the two instruments agree in their affirmation of the principle of nonintervention. This concept, as the Inter-American Juridical Committee has pointed out, is one of the basic elements in the inter-American community[24]

[23]This stand was taken early in the life of the European Commission when, in 1958, it visited Cyprus to see for itself whether the situation there warranted the suspension of certain rights by the British government, then in control of the island. While the European Commission has shown these evidences of judicial activism, it has also operated at times on a contrary principle — margin of appreciation — giving the benefit of doubt to national governments on the assumption that they were fulfilling their responsibility to maintain domestic order.

[24]The Committee was addressing itself to the question whether or not the inter-American system provides any basis for "collective action in the defense of or for the restoration of democracy. . . ." (*Study on the Juridical Relationship Between*

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and one of the major obstacles to collective action within this community.

Those individuals and governments who hold most tenaciously to the doctrine of nonintervention would interpret Article 18 of the Charter literally, opposing any kind of interference in their internal affairs. This attitude was reflected at San Jose in insistence that the Convention provision permitting one state to enter a complaint against another be put on an optional basis, to be accepted or not on the discretion of each government.[25] Some governments apparently saw the complaint procedure as opening the door to intrusion by some states in the affairs of others through the medium of the Convention system; hence their feeling that governments should have the privilege of accepting or rejecting it.

Fortunately, for the sake of collective enterprises such as the human rights program, the traditional Latin American addiction to the concept of nonintervention seems to be yielding to an attitude more favorable to some modification of this idea. It is the opinion of a number of observers of the scene that the principle of nonintervention is not as strong a factor now as it had been,[26] and that the "level of sovereignty" is lower now, in a day when so much emphasis is being put on international cooperation.

This judgment seems to be supported by the increasing willingness of governments to submit to procedures that constitute a certain degree of intrusion into domestic matters. An example of this trend has been cited by the Secretary-General of the OAS, Galo Plaza, in referring to the annual country surveys made by the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress (CIAP). These reviews, as Plaza has described them, "are objective, penetrating analyses of economic and social progress and external assistance requirements"; as such, they would have been "rejected as recently as a decade ago by the member states as excessive meddling into their internal affairs."[27]

Dr. Durward V. Sandifer also notes this more realistic attitude toward intervention. After remarking that "no attempt to enforce respect for human rights can be effective without compromising

Respect for Human Rights and the Exercise of Democracy, submitted to the Second Special Inter-American Conference, May-June 1965, as Doc. 12, March 15, 1965, p. 8.) The Committee answered the question in the negative.

[25]One state, Mexico, opposed state-versus-state complaints on *any* basis, optional or compulsory.

[26]This observation is based on a number of personal talks I had with OAS and Latin American governmental officials in the summer of 1970.

[27]The quotation is from an address delivered in London, May 21, 1969, to the Hispanic and Luso-Brazilian Councils; reported in *Chronicle of the OAS,* April-June 1969, p. 37f.

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the principle of non-intervention to a certain extent," he observes that "the American states understand and are agreeable to subjecting their freedom of action in this respect to international principles." He sees evidence of this stance in "small but explicit actions," including the "delegating of authority to intergovernmental agencies such as the Inter-American Peace Commission to investigate domestic abuses of human rights both in the Dominican Republic and in Cuba."[28]

A more liberal view that would accommodate the concept of nonintervention to the international program called for in the American Convention on Human Rights thus seems to be coming into prominence. The underlying philosophy insists that rights are universal; because of this, an international organization should have competence to deal with human rights situations, and this requires a just limitation on national sovereignty. The existence of this viewpoint augurs well for the effective functioning of the American human rights program; it suggests that the principle of nonintervention has been altered to the point where "the fear of intervention is not now a major obstacle."[29]

The Will and Capacity of National Governments to Protect Human Rights

A second domestic factor that will affect the success of the program is the character of the governments of the area. Their will and capacity to protect human rights is a critical consideration, for, while international implementary machinery is important, the principal responsibility for the safeguarding of basic freedoms rests with national governments. The relatively low status of human rights in Latin American areas, coupled with the existence of national constitutions proclaiming elaborate statements of rights, suggests that some governments either do not wish to put their constitutions' ideals into practice or lack the ability to do so.

Obviously a government hostile to the concept of human rights would render international programs and machinery virtually impotent in regard to its territory and people. Few American governments, fortunately, belong in this category. Even the military regimes so common to Latin America, and so frequently stereotyped as repressive, are not necessarily antagonistic to basic

[28]*The Relationship Between the Respect for Human Rights and the Effective Exercise of Representative Democracy*, OEA/Ser. L/V/11.4, Doc. 21, April 23, 1962, p. 61. Dr. Sandifer speaks from his experience as a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

[29]The comment is that of a high OAS official with whom I conversed.

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freedoms. Some are credited with being concerned for the economic-social progress of their people, possessed of a sense of responsibility, interested in more than naked power, and cooperative with the OAS Commission on Human Rights. Others are paid the somewhat doubtful compliment of being less repressive than the civilian governments they succeeded, and looking "liberal" in comparison. If any generalization is valid, it would seem to be that human rights do not necessarily suffer because a military regime has assumed power, and that repressive practices have emanated from civilian as well as military governments. Furthermore, Latin American military regimes are frequently of the caretaker type, rather than permanent political fixtures, so that any damage done to human rights by this type of leadership could be temporary.

It is also fairly safe to say that Latin American governments could impede an effective international human rights program more because of their weakness than because of any open hostility to basic freedoms. This weakness may be in the governmental structure itself; one member of the American Commission on Human Rights has attributed some governments' slowness to respond to Commission initiatives to "poor organization and lack of manpower and resources." The answer to this problem apparently rests in the continued development of Latin American countries along all fronts: social, economic and political. Although at present this development is not as rapid as might be desired, in time it can be expected to provide the human and financial resources necessary for a more effective governmental performance.

Another alleged weakness in the Latin American governmental structure is a judiciary lacking real independence. This is a highly critical consideration, since it is to the courts that residents of a given country must turn if they are to have redress for the violation of rights — especially rights a government officially undertakes to safeguard through participation in an international agreement.

In international human rights programs it is standard procedure to insist that domestic remedies must be exhausted before a case can be accepted for consideration by an international agency. If a national political system is weak at the point of its judicial institutions and processes, at least three undesirable results can follow: (1) individual citizens will fail to find judicial protection for the rights guaranteed them in their national con-

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stitutions and in the relevant international covenants; (2) international agencies will be unduly burdened with a multitude of complaints from individuals who contend that their courts have not dealt justly with their cases; and (3) when courts are endowed with formal independence and yet are prevented by political power realities from acting independently, an agency like the American Human Rights Commission is placed in the unenviable position of sitting in judgment on the acceptability of court decisions — of going, in other words, beyond procedural due process in applying the domestic remedies rule.

Latin American judicial systems seem to be peculiarly vulnerable to the criticism of inadequacy in the performance of their functions, and the charge most commonly directed against them is the one discussed here: their lack of independence. The courts, it is alleged, are too subservient to the political side of their governments to be in a position to deal with cases purely on their merits.[30] It was this kind of thinking that led the U.S. delegation to the San Jose Conference to submit a proposal concerning Article 46 of the draft Convention on Human Rights, on the admissibility of petitions. Paragraph 1 of this article listed the requirements to be met if a petition before the Commission was to be considered admissible, and Paragraph 2 stated the circumstances under which these criteria would not apply. The United States suggested that one such circumstance should be a situation where "an attempt by the petitioner to exhaust domestic remedies would be manifestly futile" — as in the absence, in a given country, of an independent judiciary.[31]

[30]Thus Helen Clagett: "The history of the Latin American countries clearly demonstrates the tireless, though often frustrated, pursuit of an independent and unbiased judicial power. North Americans, more fortunate in their judicial inheritance and in the stability of their political institutions, often fail to appreciate the tremendous struggle in which their neighbors to the south have been engaged for many years in an effort to create a judicial power that would be a truly unfettered branch of their government." In Peter S. Snow, editor, *Government and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 215.

[31]The United States did not insist on a vote on this proposal, since members of the working group dealing with this part of the draft felt that "this was too delicate a matter to include in the Convention, involving, as it did, a Commission judgment on the internal political character of a State Party to the Convention." (*International Legal Materials, op. cit.*) As noted in the preceding discussion, however, the absence of a provision like this from the Convention does not necessarily remove the possibility that the Commission may be forced to make a judgment on the quality of a nation's judicial processes while determining the admissibility of petitions. A liberal interpretation of its mandate to admit petitions when domestic remedies have been exhausted could lead it to do, in practice, what the U.S. proposal formally embodied: apply the yardstick of judicial independence.

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Technically, Latin American courts in all countries except Cuba enjoy the independence that follows from a constitutional separation of powers among the three main branches of government, and there are other aspects of the judiciary that contribute to its freedom: judges are not simply appointed by the chief executive but are chosen either by joint presidential-congressional action or elected by congress alone, and in ten countries judges enjoy tenure ranging from ten years to life.

The independence of the judiciary, however, is seriously jeopardized by the nature of the political systems of the area. While these systems are presidential, the power of the chief executive is so great that there is little resemblance to the presidential type of government found in the United States. The authority of the executive reaches across constitutional lines of demarcation. According to J. Lloyd Mecham, the judiciary is "subordinate to the executive" to the point where "freedom and equality of the courts [vis-à-vis the executive] is a fiction," and the courts are "even less effective than Congress in limiting a strong president."[32] A dominating president can nullify some of the factors that should produce an independent judiciary. Even life tenure does not eliminate executive influence, since a president who is so minded can effect the removal of a judge from his position.[33]

Latin American supreme courts seem little inclined to challenge the actions of the political side of government, or to venture into any issue that could be construed as political in nature. "Thus," says Jacques Lambert,

> they find in such a case that it is not for them to judge the constitutionality of the legislator's action, and they hesitate to acknowledge that a president is acting unconstitutionally. They tend to find that his action is based on his discretionary power. . . . they tolerate very broad interpretations of the president's ordinance power . . . . in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil the courts have been very accommodating in suspending constitutional guarantees.

[32]J. Lloyd Mecham, "Latin American Constitutions," in Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 153. Mecham observes that although a number of Latin American constitutions give the courts the power of judicial review, "rare, indeed, are the judges who will tempt fate by invalidating acts of Congress (who are generally presidential rubber stamps) or presidential decree laws. It simply is not good form or good sense."

[33]Jacques Lambert, who notes this presidential power over judicial tenure, acknowledges that this is one reason why "many observers allege that the 'independence' of Latin American judges is an empty phrase." He contends, however, that the picture of a subservient judiciary is overdrawn: "The fact that the only way to subjugate judges is to remove them proves that the judges are traditionally independent," and "if we consider the number of inhabitants in the largest countries, not the number of countries, there does exist a tradition of a truly independent judiciary." *Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 294f.

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Someone familiar with judicial procedure in the United States could conclude from all this "that Latin American courts are timid in dealing with the political power and [therefore] not truly independent."[34]

The negative implications of a weak judiciary are particularly relevant to the civil/political rights set forth in Latin American constitutions and in the American Convention on Human Rights, since the main threats to these rights tend to emanate from the political side of government and society. If courts are not in a position to challenge executive and legislative actions that appear to infringe on civil and political rights, or are not inclined to do so, the implementation of international human rights standards through national procedures will suffer, and international machinery will be frequently called upon to try to remedy the wrongs suffered by individuals. But if ruling political elements whose behavior has curtailed rights and led individuals to seek redress are the kind who will discourage their national courts from granting redress, there is little prospect that they will cooperate, on the national level, with the findings of international agencies.

Weak governments can have a negative impact on both types of human rights, civil-political and economic-social, but governmental incapacity is likely to be more critical as it affects the attempt to lift the level of the latter. The civil-political category of freedoms tends to call for restraining an overactive government from encroaching on the basic liberties of speech, assembly, association, and due process of law in criminal cases. The major threats to the enjoyment of economic-social rights, however, come from other directions: (1) the private (nongovernmental) sector of society, i.e., educational systems, economic institutions and practices, and social groups and customs, and (2) the unwillingness or inability of governing elites to mobilize resources and practices so as to improve the opportunities and quality of life in keeping with enlightened modern standards.

Both the nature of the threats to economic-social rights and the kind of action needed to give effect to them can be inferred from the objectives sought in this area. Although these objectives are not stated explicitly in the American Human Rights Convention, in Article 26 the parties agree to adopt measures "to achieve the full realization" of the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural standards set forth in the amended OAS Charter. The aims established in the Charter are wide-ranging, including such

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 288.

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goals as increased per capita national product, equitable distribution of national income, modernization of rural life and reform of land tenure systems, eradication of illiteracy, expansion of educational opportunities, adequate housing, and efficient social security policies.[35] Realization of the human rights embodied in these standards obviously calls for a positive government role; governments must be active and capable of intervening effectively in the economic-social affairs of their national societies if these freedoms are to be promoted.[36]

The general impression created by Latin American governments, however, is not one of political systems capable of vigorous, decisive and sustained action against those aspects of society that threaten to deny the people the full enjoyment of economic-social rights. This may be due either to their character or to the milieu in which they operate, or to a combination of the two. In connection with the total environmental factor, Lambert refers to areas of weakened governmental action: parts of countries where central authority is difficult to maintain. It is his contention that direct governmental action can prevail only in the developed (modernized) sections of Latin American countries; elsewhere, local power centers and archaic economic-social structures inhibit any effective administrative efforts. The struggle today, therefore, "is not aimed at freeing Latin America from overly centralized administration, but at compelling unruly groups to integrate into the nation." The dual societies, composed of developed and undeveloped areas, offer a peculiar kind of resistance to economic-social progress; with many communities "outside the law in many respects," governmental authority is undermined and governmental action is "distorted or paralyzed."[37] A condition such as this clearly poses a serious barrier even to a government determined to promote economic-social rights.

[35]Chapters 7-9 of the amended OAS Charter. All members ratifying the Charter and the Protocol of Buenos Aires thereby accepted these economic-social standards as national and international policy objectives.

[36]Those who believe in twentieth-century versions of the laissez-faire philosophy would contend that the enjoyment of economic-social rights is a by-product of total national development, achieved through the operation of private enterprise, enlightened practices by the appropriate economic and social institutions, and other efforts by the private sector of society. How relevant this philosophy is for developing countries is a matter of opinion. It is questionable whether dependence on the efforts of the private sector will be adequate if the legitimate demands of the people for economic and social advancement are to be met before complete disillusionment — and worse — sets in.

[37]*Op. cit.*, p. 132ff. According to Lambert, "the largest group [of Latin American countries], as to population and territory, exhibits this dual structure phenomenon, in which the population is almost equally divided between archaic and developed forms of social organization." *Ibid.*, p. 24.

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For the successful implementation of the Convention on Human Rights much depends on the individual government: on its will to protect and advance both civil-political and economic-social rights, and its effectiveness as a controller and organizer of national forces and resources. While Latin American governments, as they are now constituted, are not likely to provide as effective support for a regional human rights program as could be desired, this handicap is not necessarily a permanent one. Both the character of political systems and the strength of negative economic-social forces within societies are to no small degree products of the total economic, social and political environment of the area. This environment is bound to improve as Latin American countries feel the effects of the constructive efforts being put forth for their advancement by international programs and domestic elements, including the governments themselves.

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ARCTIC PASSAGE – LEGAL HEAVY WEATHER*

by Donald E. Milsten

IN September 1969 the *S. S. Manhattan*, a specially equipped icebreaking oil tanker, successfully navigated the Arctic ice pack through the Northwest Passage. While not the first transit of this passage, the *Manhattan's* voyage raised the possibility of commercial use of those waters, a prospect of considerable consequence for public and private developers who have already invested heavily in the Arctic. The voyage also opened up old questions about the sovereignty and politics of the region. While most legal scholars and statesmen would agree that sovereignty over Arctic lands is not in question, the exercise of political control over certain Arctic waters has been challenged.

Estimates of Arctic wealth are rendered in superlatives.[1] The most publicized example to date is the tremendous oil find at Prudhoe Bay in northern Alaska which inspired the *Manhattan's* trip. Other minerals known to exist in the Arctic include iron, lead, zinc, natural gas and sulphur. Thus, although Arctic waterways will not be fully utilized for some time to come, public and private investment in the area is likely to increase.

Along with economic development will come commercial exploitation, which raises the potential for political challenge and competition. The Arctic Ocean can be seen as a vast resource of direct importance to both Canada and the United States, not to mention other interested nations such as Denmark, Norway and the Soviet Union. Inhering in the politics of the region are questions of overall Arctic development and the use of the common resource – the ocean.

The use of the world's oceans is an aspect of international relations that has occasioned considerable conflict in the past. Because of the political and legal questions at issue a great deal of deliberation has attended efforts to formalize usage procedures. In the late

*The author wishes to acknowledge the counsel of Dale C. Thomson and to thank James R. Kurth and Lucius C. Caflisch for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

[1]See, for example, "The Accessible Arctic" and "The North Has Changed," by the National Film Board of Canada, Montreal, and "Alaska's $50 Billion Boom," *Forbes*, November 15, 1969, pp. 30-46.

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1960's, nations began to express a new range of interests in the oceans relating to the exploitation of the seabed, and the United Nations General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.[2] Recently scholars have raised the issue of international lawmaking with regard to the width of the continental shelf and the use of the superadjacent sea,[3] and the International Court of Justice has ruled on matters pertaining to the boundaries of the North Sea Continental Shelf.[4] While exploration of the Arctic seabed is not under consideration, the use of the Arctic Ocean to facilitate the economic development of the Arctic region has become part of the broader question of the use of ocean space. The problem is threefold.

The first concern is the use of certain waterways as access routes for rapidly expanding developmental situations. As exemplified by the use and abuse of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, conflicting interests arise over geographically restricted waterways which may be considered territorial rather than international in their legal character and which are critical for moving cargo to and from a market place. However, the Arctic Ocean is a restricted waterway due to ice conditions, and it will acquire commercial significance only as the ability to use it increases.

Second, ocean areas themselves are subject to development efforts, as indicated by the growing importance of continental shelf resources and fishing, and they and the Arctic land mass have several common characteristics. For all intents and purposes, both are unoccupied — the ocean supports travelers on and beneath its surface, while the Arctic supports widely scattered nomadic peoples as well as a number of military installations and small coastal settlements — and both present costly technical obstacles to economic exploitation. Developmental efforts in the Arctic may thus furnish an example for cases of development in the seabed and other technically challenging unpopulated areas.

[2]United Nations, General Assembly Res. 2340 (XXII), December 18, 1967. A thorough list of citations may be found in V. P. Nanda, "Some Legal Questions on the Peaceful Uses of Ocean Space," *Virginia Journal of International Law,* May 1969, pp. 343-407.

[3]Louis Henkin, "International Law and 'the Interests': the Law of the Seabed," *American Journal of International Law,* July 1969, pp. 504-510, and Luke W. Finlay, "The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Rejoinder to Professor Louis Henkin," *ibid.,* January 1970, pp. 61-72.

[4]Wolfgang Friedman, "The North Sea Continental Shelf Crisis — A Critique," *ibid.,* April 1970, pp. 229-240, and Etienne Grisel, "The Lateral Boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases," *ibid.,* July 1970, pp. 562-593.

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Third, the question of pollution in the seas is a growing concern for many nations. Development of Arctic resources will bring with it the possibility of ecological damage to both Arctic lands and the Arctic Ocean. Efforts to control this are part of Arctic politics and may apply in similar situations elsewhere.

Current political differences in the Arctic stem from an apparent clash of national interests regarding the risk of investing in the area. The Arctic case is not closed, but an examination of it at its present stage will clarify the issues as well as the positions of involved nations. Questions about the use of ocean space and the Arctic must, in the long run, be answered by the agreements worked out among interested nations.

The principals in conflict over the use of North American Arctic waters are the United States and Canada. Both nations have commercial interests in the Arctic, but the region seems to take on greater importance in Canadian than American eyes. In addition, Canada has a direct interest in protecting the ecology of an area which drains over 940,000 square miles of its mainland. In order to protect these interests, Canadian leaders introduced legislation in 1970 designed to prevent pollution in the Arctic Ocean.[5] Notwithstanding Ottawa's assurances and self-imposed limitations on the nature of the legislated restrictions, the United States has raised serious objections to Canada's action.[6]

This study focuses on the legal arguments relevant to any political agreement over the use of Arctic waters. Although the crux of the present conflict is the pollution issue, the apparent political implications extend beyond pollution to questions of national power and economic development.

The Canadian Action

In June 1970 two measures were enacted by the Canadian government. The first extended Canada's territorial sea to twelve miles and the second asserted control over Arctic waters up to 100 miles from the mainland for the purpose of preventing oil pollution. According to Prime Minister Elliott Trudeau, these laws are designed to protect the Arctic from pollution dangers that are

[5]Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 28th Parliament, 2nd Session, 114 (April 8, 1970), p. 5626, Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, June 17, 1970, 18-19 Eliz. 2 c. 17, and the Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, June 26, 1970, 18-19 Eliz. 2 c. 68 (Canada, 1970). The June 17 Act has not been formally proclaimed.

[6]"U.S. Press Release on Canada's Claim to Jurisdiction over Arctic Pollution and Territorial Sea Limits," in House of Commons, *Debates, op. cit.*, Appendix A (April 15, 1970), p. 5923.

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not prevented under present international law. Canada's legislation establishes standards of performance and safety for vessels transiting Arctic waters and sets stringent guidelines for liability in case of a spill.[7] The Canadian government also informed the Secretary General of the United Nations that it would not accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on matters pertaining to the pollution control law, although it would go to court if its extension of territorial waters was challenged. The rationale behind this move is that Canada believes the latter to be adjudicative under international law while the former is subject to regulations which are "biased in favor of shipping in the high seas. . . ."[8]

The United States government has rejected the Canadian position, holding that a three-mile territorial limit is the maximum recognized in international law except for a trend toward twelve-mile contiguous zones aimed at fishery protection.[9] The Canadian action is viewed as an unacceptable unilateral approach to a problem which U.S. officials believe should be worked out through "cooperative international action."[10]

Areas of Inquiry

To date the resources of the Arctic have not been subjected to massive industrial exposure. Extraction of minerals and various forms of processing, transport and marketing have been limited by severe geographic and climatic barriers. Because large-scale development is still in the future, conflicts over the regulation of commercial transport and other matters remain primarily legal questions. The lack of immediacy mitigates the political conflict. To the extent that the legal issues reflect the political conflict, however, the political issues are treated as well.

Three areas of legal inquiry stand out in the Arctic dispute. First is the question of sovereignty over Arctic lands. Who owns what determines who sets and guards the limits of territorial seas, who imposes regulations over contiguous zones, and who may stand to benefit or lose the most in the process of development along a particular coastline.

The second important question is that of the territorial sea.

[7]Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.
[8]Canadian Embassy, Washington, Information Office, "Transcript of Prime Minister Trudeau's remarks to the press following the introduction of legislation on Arctic pollution," Press Release, April 9, 1970.
[9]United States, *Department of State Bulletin*, March 16, 1970, p. 340.
[10]*New York Times*, April 10, 1970.

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Coastal states exercise jurisdiction over territorial seas. This jurisdiction, however, is subject to reservations regarding the right of innocent passage, and there is no universal agreement on the maximum territorial limits states may rightfully claim.

Third is the question of the prevention and control of pollution of the sea. Mineral extraction, industrial activity and oceangoing transportation are all potential sources of environmental pollution, and this is the area on which Canada's legislation has focused. Rights of sovereignty over territorial waters (including questions of innocent passage and the use of straits) remain academic until challenged. While various explorers have ranged over much of the Arctic area, and while military arrangements between the United States and Canada have been achieved with a minimum of friction, the 1969 voyage of the *S. S. Manhattan* raises questions of serious commercial involvement that can bring stress to the best of international friendships and intentions. Western nations have found that their strongest disagreements arise over commercial questions relating to the width of territorial seas, the nature of contiguous zones, and the use and abuse of continental shelves. Fishing has been the primary issue to date, but mineral extraction from the seas may run a close second when technology catches up with the desire and need to exploit untouched resources.

Sovereignty in the Arctic

Canada's authority in the Arctic begins with claims to sovereignty over territory and waters. Canada received formal title to its Arctic territory through a British Imperial Order in Council in 1880, but the extent and validity of the transfer were hampered by an inexact knowledge of the Arctic and by the insubstantiality of the original British claims. These claims were based largely on discovery and exploration and so provided a weak basis for title. Discovery and exploration can, at best, provide inchoate title which then allows the nation concerned to assert permanent title by exercising effective authority within "a reasonable period of time."[11] While the general practice has been for nations to establish sovereignty through a continuous exercise of authority,[12]

[11]Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, "The Island of Palmas Case, Award of the Tribunal, April 14, 1928," United Nations, *Reports of International Arbitral Awards*, II (United Nations, 1949), pp. 831-871.

[12]Great Britain, *British and Foreign State Papers*, "General Act of the Conference of Berlin," February 26, 1885, 76 (London, 1892), pp. 4-20. This act, concerned primarily with the status of the Congo and obliging signatory powers to maintain sufficient authority in claimed areas to protect persons and property,

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international jurists have recognized exceptions to this practice in cases of remote areas, holding that continuous occupation or exercise of authority may then be mitigated.[13]

There are other means of establishing inchoate title over territory. Claims have been based on the notion that occupation of a coastal area indicates an extension of sovereignty to offshore islands. This is called contiguity and has been rejected as a basis for firm title in the Island of Palmas arbitration (see footnote 11). Another means of claiming sovereignty is the sector principle, which has found a mixed reception in international law. In 1907 a Canadian senator suggested that Canada claim all the territory and waters north of its mainland Arctic coast in a sector encompassed between meridian lines 141 and 60 degrees west longitude up to the North Pole.[14] Subsequent Canadian claims made on the sector basis were explicitly rejected in 1956.[15] The principle has not received support from international jurists. Gustav Smedal has pointed out that it violates accepted conventions of sovereignty.[16] The Soviet Union, however, gave credence to the sector principle in a 1930 decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee claiming Russian sovereignty over any island or land yet undiscovered within the Soviet sector.[17]

Canada's claim to Arctic territories on the Canadian mainland, and to islands north of that mainland, has been based on evidence of continuous use, occupation and exercise of authority. Mounted police patrol the territory, natives are accorded full citizenship and in turn join in governing and policing the territory, the government in Ottawa encourages exploration for natural resources and has extensive investments in various industries, and Canadian towns have taken root as far north as Eureka and Alert on the northern edges of Ellesmere Island. On this basis, Canadian claims to a share in Arctic sovereignty appear sound. The exercise

amounted to an assertion that effective occupation and claims to sovereignty depend on the ability of a nation making a claim to provide the services of a sovereign. See also Permanent Court of International Justice, *Legal Status of Eastern Greenland*, Ser. A/B No. 53 (The Hague, April 5, 1933).

[13]Gustav Smedal, *Acquisition of Sovereignty over Polar Areas* (Oslo, 1931), p. 35, and "Arbitral Award of His Majesty the King of Italy on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the Sovereignty over Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico), January 28, 1931," *American Journal of International Law,* 26 (1932), p. 390.

[14]Smedal, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-56.

[15]House of Commons, *Debates*, 22nd Parliament, 2nd Session, 98 (August 3, 1956), p. 6955.

[16]Smedal, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[17]*Ibid.*, pp. 58-59. The Soviet sector would be from approximately 32 degrees east longitude to 169 degrees west longitude. See also Patrick D. Baird, *The Polar World* (New York: Wiley, 1964), p. 172.

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of Canadian sovereignty over territorial waters adjacent to Canadian territory follows as a matter of course.[18]

Territorial Sea and Innocent Passage

The territorial sea concept is not disputed in international law. Most writers begin a discussion of this sea by citing the opinion of the eighteenth-century Dutch jurist, Cornelius Bynkershoek, who reckoned that a state's authority over waters next to its coast should not exceed the distance of three nautical miles — the range of contemporary cannon shot. The purpose of a territorial sea is to provide a measure of protection to the shore from attack by sea as well as to regulate such waters for commercial and safety purposes. Historically, nations have tried to maintain this area for these and other reasons justified in their national interest. At the same time large maritime nations have always had a stake in unhindered navigation of the high seas, and while the concept of the three-mile limit helped to define the narrow area of the territorial sea, it also establishes the broader area of the high seas.[19] Conflicts about territorial seas in the twentieth century revolve around questions of breadth. Larger seagoing nations have generally held out for a narrow territorial sea and maximum freedom of the high seas. Some smaller nations have taken an opposite stand. No international agreement exists which defines the breadth of the territorial seas to the satisfaction of every member of the international community. Territorial claims at present range from three to 200 miles and assert special privileges with regard to fishing and use of the continental shelf.

Attempts to reach a universal definition of the breadth of the territorial sea failed at the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea and at a subsequent Geneva Conference in 1960. A synoptical table published by the United Nations in conjunction with the 1960 conference reveals that only twenty-one of seventy-one states represented on the chart claim three-mile limits. Five nations vaguely base their claim "in accordance with international law," twelve have no claim at all, and the remainder make claims greater than three miles.[20] The United States does not recognize the legality of a territorial sea greater than three miles but has ac-

[18]For background on Canadian activity in the Arctic see R. St.J. Macdonald, editor, *The Arctic Frontier* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1966).

[19]C. C. Hyde, *International Law*, I (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), pp. 751-753.

[20]United Nations, *Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea*, "Synoptical table concerning the breadth and juridical status of the territorial sea and adjacent zones" (A/Conf. 19/4, February 8, 1960 and A/Conf. 19/8, Annexes), pp. 157-163.

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cepted the principle of a contiguous zone up to twelve miles from shore as applying to the protection of fisheries, "in view of the overwhelming practice of states."[21]

States have the right in international law to control passage, anchorage, and the use of territorial waters in accordance with conventions governing innocent passage. Article 14 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone sets general limitations, for example, on passage that is "prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State," and passage that fails to conform to "such laws and regulations as the coastal State may make and publish" regarding fishing in its territorial waters.[22] Innocent passage is defined as that passage which is necessary for entering and leaving internal waters or passing to and from various areas of the high seas via the territorial sea. Under the 1958 Convention, stopping is also permitted as necessary for passage or emergency.

Related to the question of territorial waters, and especially relevant for the Arctic, is the use of straits. Generally, nations have accepted the idea that ships may transit straits as necessary for safe navigation of the high seas, moving to and from one area of the high seas to another, or into or out of internal waters, as the situation demands. Article 16 of the 1958 Convention states that a nation may suspend, without regard to the registry or nationality of the ship involved, "the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security."

The controversy over the use of the Straits of Tiran illustrates the sort of complexities innocent passage through such waters can provoke. Israel maintains its right of innocent passage through this strait on the basis of the customary right of innocent passage as well as UN Security Council action and the support of such countries as the United States.[23] Egypt objects to Israel's claim with a counterclaim that the Gulf of Aqaba is not international waters but historically internal waters, that the status of belligerence between Israel and Egypt allows Egypt to deny its use to an enemy, and that Israel can claim no littoral rights to the gulf because it illegally occupies territory at the gulf's north end.[24] The

[21] *Department of State Bulletin, op. cit.*, p. 340.

[22] United Nations, *Document* (A/Conf. 13/L.52, April 29, 1958).

[23] For a statement of Israel's position see UN, *Document* (A/PV.666, March 1, 1957), pp. 1275-1276; for the Security Council stand see United Nations, *Security Council Official Records*, 558th Meeting, Res. S/2322, September 1, 1951; the U.S. position is found in *Department of State Bulletin*, March 11, 1957, p. 404.

[24] United Nations, *Security Council Official Records*, 22nd Session (S/PV.1343, May 29, 1967).

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classic case in this area is that of the Corfu Channel, in which the International Court of Justice held that innocent passage through straits cannot be denied in times of peace. The Court ruled out all manner of exceptions, including restrictions based on the nature of the ship, the destination and volume of traffic, the entry of warships without prior authorization, and the maneuvers of ships while making transit.[25] The key factor governing the use of straits is the geographic fact of their location between two parts of the high seas or between high seas and territorial waters. The International Court acted, in this case, to remove straits from the arena of political conflict. Given the strategic importance nations necessarily attach to these restricted waterways, this is difficult to do, as the continuing controversy over the Straits of Tiran proves.

Transit of Arctic straits has not evoked the strong political overtones apparent in the Middle East. Canada has cooperated with U.S. efforts in the Northwest Passage and although the Soviet Union has denied the United States transit in part of the Northeast Passage no serious conflict has arisen. The Soviet action occurred in December 1967 when U.S. Coast Guard vessels were denied transit through the Vilkitsky Straits between Bolshevik Island and the Taymyr Peninsula on the Siberian coast.[26] Objecting that the U.S. ships were warships, the Soviets requested a thirty-day notice from the Americans. While the United States protested on the right of innocent passage (and even though the Soviet action apparently ran counter to the Corfu decision), no further issue was made of the incident. The refusal may have been part of the political conflict of the Cold War, or, as Donat Pharand suggests, the Soviets may have been reserving a waterway they have developed and therefore consider to be a special national waterway.[27] On the other hand, the USSR does not recognize the right of foreign warships to pass through its territorial waters without prior authorization from the Soviet government.[28]

[25]International Court of Justice, "The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of April 9, 1949," short report, *Yearbook 1948-1949* (The Hague, 1949), pp. 57-65.

[26]Donat Pharand, "Soviet Union Warns United States Against Use of Northeast Passage," *American Journal of International Law*, October 1968, pp. 927-935. For a concise overview of Soviet legal practice relating to the Northeast Passage, see William E. Butler, "Soviet Arctic and the Northeast Passage," Nautilus Papers, *Ocean Science News and World Ecology 2000*, June 1971.

[27]Donat Pharand, "Innocent Passage in the Arctic," *Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, 6 (Vancouver, 1968), p. 17.

[28]*Statute on the Protection of the State Border of the USSR*, Article 16, cited in *ibid.*, p. 31.

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The Soviet denial of American passage and the Canadian anti-pollution legislation raise questions about the use of straits which may require special navigational assistance for safe transit, since certain governments may have invested considerable developmental resources to provide this assistance. International law recognizes the right of coastal states to levy charges for "specific services rendered to the ship," but they may not charge ships for simply passing through territorial waters.[29] The intent of this convention is to affirm the right of innocent passage and to deny coastal states the prerogative of charging for its exercise. It has been held by some jurists that states may not levy duty for the development of coastal navigational aids, notwithstanding cost.[30] This is opinion and commentary, however, not a part of the 1958 Convention.

Neither Canada nor the USSR has sought to levy charges for use of the northern passages. But the question can be considered from another angle. Can transit be accomplished through Arctic waters without their assistance? If they do not charge for the use of Arctic straits per se, can they simply refuse to help and thus effectively deny passage? International law says little about such assistance. The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone sums up existing law on the duties of coastal states toward ships transiting territorial waters: states "must not hamper innocent passage," and they are "required to give appropriate publicity to any dangers to navigation" of which they are aware. While states normally build and maintain navigational aids, they are not required to do so. Most states supply pilots (at a cost) for guidance within inland waterways, and the pilots' work is governed by local rules. Masters of ships are required to render assistance to persons and vessels in danger of being lost at sea, and coastal states must set up and maintain an effective search and rescue system.[31] Beyond this it would appear that the coastal state can do much as it pleases. In time, of course, non-Arctic maritime states may develop the necessary skills for safe Arctic transit. At such a point, conflict concerning Arctic passage might become acute if prior agreements on use have not been reached.

[29]United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone* (Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.52), Article 18.

[30]For various views see Marjorie M. Whiteman, editor, *Digest of International Law*, 4 (Washington: Department of State, 1965), pp. 398-399.

[31]United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Geneva Convention on the High Seas* (Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.53), Article 12.

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Contiguous Zones and Oil Pollution at Sea

The current legal disagreement between the United States and Canada centers on oil pollution control in the Arctic. Two aspects of international law are especially relevant here and an examination of them suggests the political reasons behind the controversy. We will thus first review international practice with regard to contiguous zones and follow this by discussing existing agreements on the control of oil pollution at sea.

While jurists have long recognized the high seas as *res communes* (owned by no one, open to use by all), nations have nevertheless asserted control over portions of the high seas adjacent to their territorial waters when they felt it was in their national interest to do so. These areas are called contiguous zones. The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone reflects the general practice with respect to the assertion of authority over waters adjacent to the territorial sea: in Article 24 nations adhering to the Convention affirmed that there was no validity to claims beyond twelve miles. The 1958 Convention acknowledges that within such a zone states may exercise control over violations of their customs, laws, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations. They may also levy punishment on offenders, but these punishments are not specified.

The most common use of the contiguous zone concept has been to protect national fishing interests. A 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas[32] sets out general rules for cooperation and settlement of disputes over fishing matters. In this convention a coastal state is acknowledged to have a "special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources of any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea." At a European Fisheries Conference held in 1964, participants agreed to a twelve-mile limit for the protection of national fishing rights; however, several countries exempted themselves or their territories from various provisions of this agreement, thus insuring a continuing controversy over it.[33] This problem is aggravated by several nations that exercise control well beyond twelve miles — in some cases up to 200 miles. At Geneva in 1960 both Canada and the United States tried to obtain international endorsement for a combined territorial sea and contiguous zones width of twelve miles. In 1963 Canada declared a

[32]*Ibid.* (Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.54).
[33]Great Britain, Cmd. 2355, "Final Act of the European Fisheries Conference," Misc. No. 11 (1964).

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twelve-mile fishing zone, and its most recent action has been to extend the territorial sea to this distance also. The United States has now declared its willingness to work for a full twelve-mile territorial sea, given the apparent desire of nations to establish territorial seas wider than three miles.

Control over fisheries involves questions of both commercial and political interest. Morton Kaplan and Nicholas Katzenbach suggest that small coastal states may seek to reserve valuable fish preserves for their own nationals in order to protect a weak domestic fishing industry from the superior extractive capabilities of large, technologically advanced fishing nations.[34] In such cases, legal controls may serve as a first line of defense. Politically they may give regimes additional prestige at home and perhaps abroad as well. If the illegal fishers are from regional nations with similar backgrounds, such controls may produce animosity; however, self-assertive actions against larger nations have often been taken by smaller powers in this nuclear world with the assurance that the provocation would not lead to a confrontation. The boldness of seizing a large power's fishing vessel may be worth the gamble, for it may generate increased prestige — and hence influence — for the coastal state.

Canada has taken the stance of a disadvantaged coastal nation with regard to oil pollution control. Prime Minister Trudeau has justified its pollution control legislation partly on the contention that existing international agreements favor large maritime states (with their built-in interest in the fiscal economy of unhindered use of the high seas) at the expense of smaller coastal states.[35] Canada asserts that international law has been used as a political instrument designed to protect large shippers from bearing the high cost of pollution prevention and cleanup in the case of a spill. Unlike some Latin American governments, the government in Ottawa may not have gained much domestic prestige for its act. There were pressures in Parliament to declare formal sovereignty over the entire Canadian Arctic.[36] This was not done and Canada makes no claim to sovereignty over waters beyond a twelve-mile limit. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the Canadians were hoping to increase their prestige in the international com-

[34]Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law* (New York: Wiley, 1961), p. 150.

[35]Canadian Embassy, *op. cit.*

[36]House of Commons, *Debates*, 28th Parliament, 1st Session, 113 (February 28, 1969), p. 6057; (March 7, 1969), p. 6336; (May 15, 1969), p. 8721; 2nd Session, 114 (January 22, 1970), p. 2681.

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munity by staking a claim to which the United States had not agreed and by taking the lead in trying to solve the growing environmental problem facing the planet.

Another aspect of contiguous zones bearing on the Canadian action relates to the protection of the continental shelf. Canada has cited the U.S. proclamation concerning protection of the continental shelf as precedent for its own legislation.[37] Kaplan and Katzenbach have warned that this proclamation amounts to the opening of a Pandora's Box because so many nations have cited it in their efforts to extend national influence beyond the territorial sea.[38] The concept of the continental shelf is given status in international law in the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958.[39] According to this document, nations may exercise "sovereign rights" over areas "adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit," as far as it is possible to exploit natural resources. Both the U.S. proclamation and the Geneva Convention explicitly exclude any claims to formal sovereignty over the waters above the continental shelf. This distinction insures the open status of high seas and prohibits states from exercising "any unjustifiable interference with navigation" through these seas. Canada has specifically denied any assertion of sovereignty over waters beyond twelve miles. Its anti-pollution regulations do mean, however, that Canada will interfere with the navigation of oil pollution violators as defined in Canadian law.

Lacking technical expertise for large-scale offshore exploration and extraction and the requisite risk capital, Canadians are also concerned about resource development on the continental shelves. They therefore want an international legal regime which is "equitable both to developing and developed states."[40]

In preparation for the Law of the Sea Conference to be held in Geneva in 1973, the United States has proposed the idea of a continental shelf trusteeship zone that would give coastal states "substantial but carefully defined rights . . . with regard to the

[37]Canadian Embassy, *op. cit.*, and United States, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945*, Proclamation No. 2667, "Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and the Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf," September 28, 1945 (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 352-353.

[38]Kaplan and Katzenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

[39]United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.55).

[40]Statement by J. A. Beesley, Representative of Canada, Plenary Debate, Enlarged United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Geneva, March 24, 1971.

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licensing of exploration and exploitation" in offshore areas. This idea has been opposed by several countries and the United States has indicated its willingness to modify the proposal.[41]

Oil Pollution Conventions

Efforts to curb oil pollution of the seas are comparatively recent. The United States enacted a River and Harbor Act in 1899 and an Oil Pollution Act in 1924.[42] The latter law forbids the dumping of oil and water mixtures into navigable waters and provides for fines, seizure and imprisonment of offenders. In 1926 the United States called for an international conference on the question of pollution. Nothing came of this. In 1930 Great Britain unsuccessfully espoused efforts to curb oil pollution through the League of Nations. During the periods immediately before and after World War II the most that could be achieved was a "gentlemen's agreement" through which interested nations encouraged ships bearing their flags to curb pollution.[43] Eventually a conference was convened in London in 1954 and forty-two nations signed the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil.[44] The United States did not adhere to this convention until 1961 and then only with certain reservations.[45]

The 1954 London Convention provides standards for permissible levels of oil and oily mixture discharge and specifies the types of oil that are not to be discharged. Of special interest is the establishment of a fifty-mile control zone for the prevention of oil pollution which could damage a coastline. No objection to this fifty-mile zone concept was raised by the United States when it adhered to the Convention in 1961.

Formal responsibility for overseeing the 1954 Convention was placed in the hands of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. This organization had been set up in 1948 but did not become effective until twenty-one countries ratified its convention by 1957. An IMCO assembly met for the first time in

[41]United States Information Service, Press Release, Statement by Hon. John R. Stevenson, United States Representative, Enlarged United Nations Committee. . . , Geneva, March 25, 1971.

[42]*U.S. Statutes at Large*, 30, pp. 1121, 1152, and *ibid.*, 43, p. 604.

[43]Whiteman, *op. cit.*, p. 694.

[44]*U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, 12, Part 3 (1961), § 4900, pp. 2989-3027.

[45]*U.S. Statutes*, 75, pp. 402-407. These reservations were about requirements to build special cleaning and oil disposal facilities in major U.S. ports and the right to legislate with regard to oil pollution in U.S. territorial waters, as well as a call for the establishment of universal enforcement procedures. For current U.S. law on oil pollution see *U.S. Code Annotated*, Title 33, Chapter 20, §§ 1001-1015.

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London in 1959; under its auspices additional pollution conferences were convened in 1962 and 1969. The London Conference of 1962 tightened restrictions on allowable oil spillage and called for complete avoidance of the discharge of heavy oils into the ocean.[46] The delegates also approved an extension of the prohibited zone from fifty to 100 miles for nations adhering to the convention.

Further anti-pollution conventions were drawn up through IMCO in 1969. One, entitled the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Case of Oil Pollution Casualties, provides a limited legal basis for intervention at sea to "prevent, mitigate, or eliminate grave and imminent danger . . . following upon a maritime casualty."[47] Remedial action provided in the convention depends upon a series of consultations and notifications. Primary responsibility for enforcement appears to remain with the flag state. On the other hand, the coastal state may be held liable if measures it takes to arrest an offending ship are deemed excessive. A second convention completed at the same time is the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. This extends the amount of financial liability for damage resulting from an oil spill and imposes this liability without proof of fault. Insurance is made mandatory for ships carrying over 2,000 tons of oil, but liability is limited to a set amount for any one incident. The United States was among the signers of these 1969 conventions. Canada and several other nations (including Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, Liberia, Greece and the Scandinavian countries) did not sign.[48]

Canada and the United States obviously differ in their estimation of the effectiveness of these provisions. At the least, the United States has indicated its willingness to live with the IMCO conventions and Canada has not.

Canada's Position

The Canadian Minister of Transport, reporting to the House of Commons on participation in the 1969 IMCO Conference, pointed out that Canada had tried to obtain an agreement which

[46]United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1962* (New York, 1964), pp. 640-643.

[47]*Keesings Contemporary Archives*, 17 (London, 1970), pp. 23708-23709.

[48]The United States Senate ratified the Convention Relating to Intervention and the 1969 amendments to the IMCO conventions. It has yet to ratify the Civil Liability Convention pending the completion of supplementary agreements being worked out in the State Department. See *Congressional Record*, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, September 20, 1971, p. S 14607.

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clearly defined both responsibility for the prevention of oil pollution at sea and liability in case of spillage. In this connection Canadians held that "innocent third parties" or states should not bear the burden or cost of the commercial movement of potentially dangerous cargoes such as crude oil. In the case of a spill, the innocent coastal state and private citizens should not have to bear the cost of cleanup. Responsibility should lie with the carrier and those associated with him.[49]

Canada refused to sign the 1969 conventions in the belief that the conference achieved no real agreement on the important aspects of pollution prevention. Canadian delegates received the impression that several attending countries were interested only in determining limits of liability in the event of another spill of *Torrey Canyon* magnitude. Canadians felt that special interests of large shipping companies — especially from nations with limited coastlines — were served and that consequent convention controls on oil pollution were severely watered down.

Prime Minister Trudeau has expressed his dissatisfaction with the enforcement apparatus provided by the IMCO conventions.[50] Neither the 1954 Convention nor the IMCO conventions of 1962 and 1969 authorize a coastal state to take punitive action against oil polluters on the high seas adjacent to territorial waters. Canada contends that its Arctic environment will be threatened by increased shipping traffic in the Arctic and believes that international conventions have worked to protect shippers and large maritime states with inherent interests in the unlimited use of the high seas.

The United States View

After Washington failed in its effort to obtain international agreements on the control of oil pollution in 1926, the United States position stressed voluntary regulation. U.S. officials pointed up the importance of educating shippers and nations to the dangers of oil pollution and relied on the fifty-mile no-dumping zone established by the "gentlemen's agreement" mentioned above. This emphasis on voluntary compliance was underscored in a 1955 reply by an Assistant Secretary of State to a U.S. Senator: the Assistant Secretary said that in the event of an oil spill adjacent to the U.S. coast, but on the high seas, "the Department of State could, if requested, send a note to the country under whose

[49]House of Commons, *Debates*, 28th Parliament, 2nd Session, 114 (January 22, 1970), p. 2698. See also Statement by J. A. Beesley, Enlarged United Nations Committee. . . , *op. cit.*

[50]Canadian Embassy, *op. cit.*

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laws the vessel is registered."[51] The indication was that the government would take no initiative in order to enforce pollution control on the high seas.

In 1961 the United States moved closer to the notion of compulsory enforcement by adhering to the 1954 Convention, and recently the Senate has ratified two sections of the 1969 IMCO conventions. Additions to U.S. law have also strengthened the U.S. stand against oil pollution. In 1970 President Nixon issued an Executive Order for the Prevention, Control and Abatement of Air and Water Pollution of Federal Facilities,[52] and Congress passed an amended version of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act which prohibits oil discharges into navigable waters within the three-mile limit and up to and including the contiguous zone. In another action, consistent with earlier efforts encouraging voluntary control, the President has called upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for assistance in examining the oil pollution question. The present United States position with regard to the open seas is that the government favors adequate pollution controls provided they are achieved through international agreement.[53]

Conclusions

Canada's position has been called nationalistic.[54] Feelings of nationalism vis-à-vis the influence of U.S. economic, cultural and political preponderance on the North American continent have haunted Canadians for many years. In reaction to the transit of the *S. S. Manhattan* through the Northwest Passage, many Canadian legislators began to press their government for an outright declaration of sovereignty over all Arctic land and waters within the Arctic archipelago. The government has rejected the idea of expressing Canadian interests in this way, preferring instead to identify them with a global interest in avoiding the consequences of large-scale oil pollution.

United States concern apparently rests on two considerations. The first, publicly stated, is the fear that unilateral action by Canada will encourage other nations to take unilateral actions — not necessarily to control pollution — which might restrict commercial and naval mobility on the high seas. The second point

[51]Ms., Department of State, file 711.022/6-855 of June 17, 1955, cited in Whiteman, *op. cit.*, pp. 688-689.
[52]Executive Order 11507, February 4, 1970.
[53]"U.S. Press Release on Canada's Claim. . . ," in House of Commons, *Debates*, *op. cit.*
[54]*New York Times*, April 18, 1970.

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may be an outgrowth of the first. If Canada, acting as a smaller power protecting its natural resources, can restrict Arctic passage for pollution control, it might also at some time find it opportune to expand the scope of this protection to hamper U.S. shipping interests in the Northwest Passage or to exclude them from it entirely. There is no overt basis for such a view because Canada denies that it intends to restrict any ship from exercising innocent passage. But pollution legislation means that Canada will define innocent passage in this waterway, and it appears that U.S. officials are not content with Canadian assurances. The Canadian government's unilateral action to extend national jurisdiction over a part of the high seas — no matter how well circumscribed in intent — bears with it the precedent for future action. This reduces U.S. options and tightens the political situation at the very time that U.S. decision-makers are seeking flexible solutions to such questions of international law.

Most nations using the high seas tend to abide by international law in this area of their behavior. However, the use of international law to enhance national political goals is an integral part of the affairs of nations. International law is not universal law, nor is it enforced by some central authority. It presents legal scholars and statesmen with a variety of instruments, functions, authorities and degrees of acceptance and enforcement. In a real sense, each nation which seeks to support, change or invent rules that relate to international conduct participates in an ongoing process of international lawmaking. In proclaiming Canada's jurisdiction over Arctic waters on matters pertaining to pollution, Canadian officials appear to be conscious participators in this process. They are, to be sure, protecting their national interest as they see it, but they also aspire to set new precedents for anti-pollution legislation in international law.

Canada's claim to sovereignty over Arctic territories is apparently secure. In spite of the concern expressed by various members of Parliament, it has been established by occupation and administration in accordance with accepted practices and rulings in international law. To the extent that other nations will accept notice of a twelve-mile limit, Canada's claim over waters to that distance is also secure. The United States does not accept such a limit but has not challenged it in the International Court. Canadians realize that the extension may be challenged and the Prime Minister has said that the jurisdiction of the International Court will be accepted on this matter.

Most tenuous, perhaps, is Canada's unilateral assertion of

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jurisdiction over waters up to 100 miles from Canadian territory for the purpose of preventing pollution in the Arctic.[55] Yet there is precedent for this type of action in the United States' own declaration protecting the resources of the continental shelf as well as in the declarations of several Latin American nations extending their control over waters to 200 miles. Of even greater significance are IMCO provisions giving signatory states the right to control up to 100 miles from the coastline for anti-pollution purposes. Contrary to statements made by the U.S. Department of State (see footnote 6), there appears to be precedent in international law for the action Canada has taken.

Canada has encouraged greater international consideration of this problem. When discussing the 1969 IMCO Conference in the House of Commons, the Minister of Transport made it clear that the government was urging continued examination of the pollution problem and looked forward to further conferences on the subject. The Canadian representative to the UN discussions in the spring of 1971 put forth extensive suggestions relating not only to pollution control but also to the entire question of the use of the continental shelf and adjacent seabed. Canada has also made overtures to the Soviet Union concerning the control of the Arctic, but to date the USSR has shown little interest in the type of international cooperation the Canadians seek.

Arctic development and problems of transportation are intimately related. Political conflict over the control of ocean transport in the Arctic will remain academic until technology produces an efficient means of using the Arctic Ocean. However, the press of events in other parts of the world may encourage more rapid development in the area. For example, political difficulties connected with oil production in the Middle East may spur the development of Arctic oil resources. The voyage of the *Manhattan* demonstrated the possibility of using oil tankers in the Arctic, and Canada continues to invest heavily in the territory on the assumption that solutions to technical problems will be forthcoming in the near future.

Still, political and legal conflicts over the rules regulating the

[55]Two scholars have argued that Canada's action was a poor way to change international law. Louis Henkin ("Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make — or Break — International Law?," Editorial Comment, *American Journal of International Law*, January 1971, pp. 131-136) criticized Canada for setting a precedent that might lead to further unilateral expansion by coastal states. Richard B. Bilder ("The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea," *Michigan Law Review*, November 1970, pp. 1-54) has said that Canada could have made a better case by establishing its action simply upon a twelve-mile claim or its archipelagic authority.

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use of Arctic waters might hinder development if these differences are not resolved by the time technical problems have been surmounted. The same arguments might apply to the use of the ocean floor. Oil production and fishing come to mind, but the future may bring exploration and use of a far wider scope, attended by a host of new problems. Nations subject to rules must calculate the expense of obedience in relation to their investments. This question is particularly relevant with regard to the control of pollution at sea. The cost factor weighs heavily in guarding against the possibility that a spill might occur and in assuring cleanup in case of a spill. Up to the present, most nations have been reluctant to argue with international shippers who claim that the cost of pollution prevention is too high in relation to profits. Canada's action would undoubtedly raise the cost of shipping in the Arctic by imposing standards that require expensive equipment and training. It might also serve as a precedent for the creation of expense-producing unilateral regulations by other coastal states. On the other hand, ecologists argue that the effects of pollution will be far more costly than the outlay needed for prevention. Canada has taken the side of the ecologists and in doing so has apparently shifted the anti-pollution initiative from commercial to coastal state hands.

While pollution is a salient issue in itself, it may also be a wedge. It has economic and political overtones which extend beyond the immediate need to protect the environment. A coastal state — particularly a small one — can utilize this morally appealing issue to support economic and political demands for control of superadjacent waters. It is clear from recent UN conference statements that Canada wants protection from "multinational and state-owned corporations" as well as an international agreement that will strike a pragmatic balance between the demands of shipping states for unhampered free trade and the rights of coastal states for self-protection and profit in and under adjacent and superadjacent waters.[56] Where such waters are restricted by geographic obstacles, efforts to limit their use can produce severe international tensions. Coastal nations can seize on restrictions as a means of obtaining a greater share of their economic benefits. Control over passage may go hand in hand with resource protection — both as a means of protecting resources from damage by pollution and because access to resources must be obtained by passage.

[56]Statement by J. A. Beesley, Enlarged United Nations Committee. . . , *op. cit.*

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Canada's interest in the Arctic involves heavy national investment in resource development as well as consideration of the water route as a resource. The government has recently increased its financial commitment to Panarctic Oils Limited in order to maintain the nation's 45 per cent interest in the consortium's Arctic oil operations.[57] As for the sea route, even if safe oil pipelines are developed and built, bulky items such as ores will require seagoing transport if they are to be utilized profitably.

The political process of making international law must take into account both public and private interests. To this end the moral appeal of preventing pollution, supported by scientific evidence of the practical danger, is especially useful in the conflict between Canada and the United States because there are many U.S. citizens who support the environmentalist position. The government of the United States has indicated its willingness to cooperate in anti-pollution efforts[58] but has been slow to challenge private shipping and petroleum interests which have found pollution control too expensive, inconvenient, or both.

Whatever the legal differences are now, there is every reason to believe that a satisfactory accommodation can be negotiated. There is no rush to line the Arctic coasts with tankers, and recently the Humble Oil Company announced its preference for pipelines, given the present estimated expense of shipping.[59] The United States recognizes the problem of pollution and Canada has acted well in advance of strong commercial pressures on the Northwest Passage. Beyond this, U.S. officials are not likely to condone unilateral acts that seek to assert control over ocean areas, no matter how sympathetic they may be to the pollution issue. Such acts have commercial and strategic implications that extend beyond pollution. Before the Arctic "gold rush" booms, nations should have sufficient time to write international law regulating pollution at sea, while simultaneously achieving satisfactory solutions to their economic and political differences over the use of ocean space.

[57]Panarctic Oil of Canada had over 270 million acres of Arctic island territory under oil and gas permit in 1970. Canada will increase its investment in Panarctic by $13.5 million over the next few years. See Hon. Jean Cretien, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, "The Challenge of Northern Technology," address at Laval University, Quebec, February 22, 1970, and Joseph A. Kornfeld, "Gas, Oil Discoveries Boost Canadian Hopes," *World Oil,* March 1970, p. 96.

[58]A U.S. Coast Guard team recently experimented with methods for cleaning up Arctic oil spills. See Lt. Cmdr. George P. Vance, "Control of Arctic Oil Spills," *Ocean Industry,* January 1971, pp. 14-17.

[59]*Baltimore Sun,* October 22, 1970.

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MARXISM AND PEOPLE'S WARS

by Donald E. Davis

PEOPLE'S wars — wars of national liberation — are depicted by Marxists and some non-Marxists as the wave of the present and perhaps of the future. Such ordeals, we are told, may determine world events for several decades. The struggle in Viet Nam, riding the crest of the current wave, and the possibility of liberation movements swirling elsewhere raise the question whether conventional warfare has already been replaced by this new form of conflict.

It is of considerable interest that contemporary Marxists hold some un-Marxian notions about this newest product of the great god Mars. Often these Marxists define war as political conflict between states or classes. Wars, they say, are inevitable because their origin lies both in the spasmodic growth of capitalism and its proclivity toward overseas expansion. Marxist writers now see three kinds of warfare: world wars (between opposing ideological camps), imperialist wars (colonial wars among the great powers), and people's wars (the struggle of colonial peoples for national liberation from the great powers). They consider the third kind of war peculiar to the present era because the first will destroy the world and the second will escalate into a nuclear exchange.[1] Thus they have taken interest in people's wars. Their doctrines are congenial with an ideology attracted to revolutionary contexts. But these doctrines are not in the mainstream of nineteenth-century Marxism and surely reflect the problems, concerns and confusions of Marxian dogma in the twentieth century.

I

Carl von Clausewitz, not Marx or Engels, was the catalyst for Marxian thought about people's wars. The purpose of military theory, so the celebrated German general once related, was to investigate the subjects constituting war and to separate them into categories by explaining their properties and effects. War, he told us, lay within the province of politics; as he declared in his most

[1]Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, editor, *Military Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 178, 183; also T. W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), Chapters 6, 18; or H. S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1962), Chapters 1, 2.

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famous dictum, war continued politics by other means.[2] Marx and Engels simply amended his remarks. In Clausewitz they found support for their position that war mirrored the essentially violent relation between economic classes. They differed from him in believing that not political violence alone but violence as a direct result of the bourgeois economic process would destroy capitalism.[3]

Lenin drew upon Clausewitz's catechism and the exegesis of Marx and Engels. For Marxists, he once commented, war continued the politics of particular governments representing definite classes. According to Lenin, the First World War was caused by the expansion of capitalism into backward areas through the export of money rather than commodities; the resulting scramble for colonies led to the partition of the world into imperial and colonial states. Imperialism strove toward annexation, giving rise to acute territorial rivalries. This was the superstructure of moribund capitalism, which Lenin characterized as the extreme concentration of production and capital into financial oligarchies.[4]

Toward the close of his career Lenin inched his way toward a new formulation. While he considered the politics of his day only as the outward manifestation of an economic structure whose parts were corporations and their investments abroad, he now extended occidental class politics to Eastern colonialism by showing that the Western proletariat was stratified because capitalists bought its upper sections, the "labor aristocracy," with crumbs from the super-profits gathered out of colonial exploitation. These strata remained revolutionarily inactive, he contended, until the false prosperity resulting from imperialism disappeared. For him the world was a single industrial system, united by the high-profit pull of backward colonies and the low-profit push of advanced countries. The center of his examination into colonialism was his characterization of war as the result of widely unequal rates of develop-

[2]Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (3 volumes) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), I, xiii, 122-136; III, 121-130. For a brief but excellent discussion see A. Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 181-185.

[3]The classic Marxist expression is the famous preface of *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1904), p. 11; the military implications are evaluated by P. Paret, "Clausewitz and the Nineteenth Century," in M. Howard, editor, *The Theory and Practice of War* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 31-32, and S. T. Possony, *A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolution* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), pp. 3-11, 20-23.

[4]V. I. Lenin, *The Collapse of the Second International* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), pp. 25-26; and *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenie* (*Complete Collected Works*), fifth Russian edition, 55 volumes (Moscow: Gosizdat., 1963-1965), XVII, 187-188 — henceforth cited as *P. Sob. Soch.*

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ment between empires, between metropolitan powers and far-flung colonies.[5]

Other Marxists followed Lenin, and out of their polemics came the current Marxian credo about people's wars. According to Ho Chi Minh, Lenin was the first to recognize the supreme role of the colonial question in the world revolution: that not only were the colonials sucked into the revolutionary whirlpool but the very victory of the Western proletariat depended on colonial revolution. Colonial freedom in the East would bring fulfillment of Marx's prophecy in the West with its revolutionary consequences.[6] It was Lenin who, though not quoted directly, inspired the now well-known adage that the road to Paris lies through Peking. World revolution would conquer the West, but the freeway for the wretched traveler lay through the East. M. N. Roy, Indian delegate to the Comintern in 1920, was putting the case when he observed that the West was incapable of anything until the colonial masses emancipated themselves by shattering the power of imperialism. Likewise, the Muslim Bolshevik, Sultan Galiev, affirmed that the West was a burnt-out revolutionary hearth, and anything that burned therein would have to come from the colonial world.[7]

The most prominent Marxist of the East, Mao Tse-tung, adopted the Peking Road doctrine and carried it to a logical extreme. Like Lenin, he maintained that frictions in class societies sparked revolutions, and that capitalism's uneven growth should illuminate strategy and tactics for a revolutionary party. When imperialist nations sent armed forces to aid colonial reactionaries, colonial masses had to unite. In such a case foreign imperialism and domestic reaction would be at one pole and the colonial peoples at the other. This contradiction would be resolved, Mao indicated, through a people's war. The task of the Chinese revolution was to overthrow the rule of the foreigners and their warlord tools. Mao felt that people's wars were protracted affairs because of the backwardness of colonial societies, their lack of political consciousness and industrial resources, and the initial superiority of

[5]V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1939). See particularly Chapter VII.

[6]Ho Chi Minh, *On Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 27-28, 40-42, 55-56, 58.

[7]L. Fischer, *The Life of Lenin* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 667-668, and S. Schram, editor and translator, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 72. See also the discussion in S. W. Page, *Lenin and World Revolution* (New York: New York University Press, 1959), pp. 143-146, and A. Meyer, *Leninism* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 266-270.

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the imperial powers and their puppets. He regarded China's war with Japan from 1931 to 1945 as a struggle against imperialism. Chinese communists precipitated a revolutionary war against the Kuomintang as a continued phase in the tangle with world imperialism and its local agents.[8]

Mao insisted that it was not necessary to start world revolution in the Western centers of proletarian power, the cities, but rather in the colonies. One first occupied the countryside, the most regressive place, far from the forces of oppression. He thereby enunciated a corollary to the Peking Road doctrine: whoever controlled the countryside strangled world imperialism by choking off its raw materials and markets.[9] This idea applied to the entire Third World movement against imperialism.

Comrade Lin Piao echoed his master's voice. Victory of the Chinese people's war, he declared, "breached the imperialist front in the east," changing the world balance of forces by accelerating people's wars elsewhere. Lin praised Mao for founding the strategy of people's wars on "establishment of rural base areas and the use of the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture them,"[10] and thereby gave graphic expression to Mao's corollary of the Peking Road doctrine:

> Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world." . . . In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population.[11]

Other Marxists of our time have faced these concerns. For the late Ché Guevara a people's war was fought in the countryside because the masses were there and the repressive forces were not. Rural people organized by guerrillas became a nucleus around which to build a people's army. As inhabitants of an operational zone, the guerrillas had perfect knowledge of the terrain. Mobilizing the countryside and consolidating base areas, they initiated long wars which generated conditions for victory against urban-

[8]Mao Tse-tung, *On Contradictions* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), pp. 17, 23, 29, 32-34, 40, 44-45, 47, 50-51.

[9]Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p. 270.

[10]Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War!," in Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, *Peking and People's Wars: An Analysis of Statements by Official Spokesmen of the Chinese Communist Party on the Subject of Revolutionary Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 53, 60-61.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 95.

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based armies. The prowess of the countryside was its remoteness, impenetrability, backwardness — all of which offered obstacles to mechanized armies. For Ché a strategic victory was attained by smashing the enemy's army deep in the countryside and proceeding to the cities. With help from the urban proletariat, guerrillas then would dismantle the enemy's institutions, eliminate the latifundia, end the profits of foreign monopolies, and link with other colonies for a world Armageddon.[12]

Marxian theory about people's wars thus originated in Clausewitz's dictum, became focused via Marx and Engels on war as an extension of economic relations, received an elaboration through Lenin who asserted that the colonial side of that association was imperialism, and ended with Mao's adjuration that one must concentrate on the rural areas and Lin's and Ché's embroidery upon that declaration.

This evolution of thinking was more than a series of dialectical twists; it was a repudiation of Marxism. Neither Lenin nor Mao could justify the Peking Road doctrine and its corollary by citing Marx's remark that the future of Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century required another Peasants' War.[13] Lenin proclaimed that proletarian revolution in Russia, combined with the insurgency of the peasant masses, presented a new possibility for the seizure of power. Marxism, he said, did not preclude such peculiarities as a Peasants' War.[14] As early as 1927, Ho Chi Minh wrote that in rural and semi-rural areas the "decisive ally of the proletariat will be the peasant population." Lin Piao underlined this fact: "It was essential to rely mainly on the peasants if the people's war was to be won."[15] But to accept this idiosyncrasy Lenin and his followers had changed an expedient into substance. The father of Bolshevism advised desperate wars in the jungles of what his successors would describe as the Third World. The Peking approach of Lenin and Mao clearly forsook what Marx had preached — building proletarian parties in the West which would make revolution when conditions matured, and not prematurely.

[12]Ché Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), pp. 15-18, 23-28, 112-113, 118.

[13]K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), p. 92.

[14]*P. Sob. Soch.*, XVII, 388-389; XXXVIII, 306.

[15]Ho Chi Minh, "The Party's Work Among the Peasants: Revolutionary Guerrilla Methods," in A. Neuberg (E. Wollenberg), editor, *Armed Insurrection* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), p. 255; Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

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II

This implicit refutation of Marxism by Lenin and Mao brings us to another oddity of present-day Marxian theory: the substitution of military for political means. Clausewitz considered guerrillas as ancillary to standard fighting units, never the reverse. His prescription called for guerrillas to conduct operations in the interior or countryside, utilizing difficult terrain and relying on popular support. Guerrilla warfare was tactically offensive and strategically defensive.[16] Marx and Engels also recommended these irregular methods for weaker groups to overcome stronger ones. In Lenin's mind guerrilla warfare had two additional objects: assassinating obnoxious officials and confiscating stores. Lenin foresaw these measures as diversions calculated to arouse the countryside between major battles in a protracted war. Further, he agreed with Clausewitz that any decisive military act on the part of guerrillas required offensive determination under a single vigorous leadership. This argument was not entirely new from a Marxian standpoint.[17] Even so, the essential characteristic of guerrilla warfare was the increasing prevalence of military over political decision-making.

Lenin's singular contribution to supplanting military for political methods was to think of the party cell as a spear hurled at the enemy. The cell bore close similarity to a guerrilla unit. The party cell constituted a shock troop bringing political consciousness to the masses and organizing additional squads from them.[18] (Régis Debray, popular French export to Latin America, more recently stated that the party was the mother cell from which germ-carrying cells detached themselves.) [19] Lenin and Trotsky inoculated the Red Army with party cells in order to construct a fighting political organism. The new kind of army that emerged from that organizational scheme was more than a Clausewitzian tool of politics; it was politics incarnate. Hence, the idea that the army was the bearer of revolution. Anything not associated with

[16]Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, II, 343.

[17]K. Marx and F. Engels, *The First Indian War of Independence, 1857-1859* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.), pp. 34, 39, 94, 105ff.; Lenin, *P. Sob. Soch.*, X, 246-250; XIV, 1-12; XXXIV, 383-384. Here Lenin quotes with approval from the writings of Marx and Engels on the Spanish Revolution and also the Revolution of 1848. See K. Marx, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952), pp. 119-121.

[18]V. I. Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?* (New York: International Publishers, 1969), especially sections B and C of Chapter IV, pp. 103, 108, 116, 121.

[19]R. Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution?* (New York: Grove Press, 1967), p. 80.

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the people's army was superfluous. The people's army, erected from guerrilla foundations, formed the ramparts of the revolutionary fortress.

Lenin was aware of this possible theoretical shift from the party cell leading the masses to the guerrilla nucleus commanding the people's army. Marxists labeled the shift as *technicism*: "To take the popular army for the party would be to take the instrument for the goal, the means for the end: a confusion proper to technocracy — hence the terms 'technicism' and 'militarism' given to this deviation."[20]

Trotsky repudiated this drift in thinking. While insisting on the use of military specialists, skilled personnel from the old czarist army, he also argued against a unique Marxist military doctrine until the economic and cultural structure of socialism was laid. He opposed using the people's army as the instrument of revolution; insurrection remained the master-weapon.[21] His view was orthodox, but unfortunately for him Lenin's outlook prevailed.

Chairman Mao also proved cautious in accepting this function of the army as the standard-bearer of revolution. Lenin's Eastern successor contended that the party must command the gun, that the gun must never command the party. According to Mao, military affairs aided rather than opposed politics. The Chinese People's Army propagandized the masses, organized and armed them, helped them establish revolutionary hegemony. But if the military dominated, the result would be estrangement of the masses, departure from proletarian leadership, and control of the government by the army.[22] This idea may have been an effort to push the theory of people's wars back into the basket of acceptable Marxist doctrines. Perhaps Mao in his voluminous theoretical writings devoted so much space and, one must add, originality to military questions because it was within his own experience as a soldier that he conceived of politics. Yet he acknowledged that the people's army was a working force that could take over and administer civilian affairs — and this was a considerable admission.

One wonders how effective this precautionary advice proved in

[20]*Ibid.*, pp. 95-96 (the quotation is from p. 96). See Lenin, *P. Sob. Soch.*, XL, 104-105, for a poignant awareness of "technicism" and what to do about it. Also check the question of the Military Opposition and the fear of military specialists in L. Schapiro, *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy* (New York: Praeger, 1965), Chapter 13.

[21]L. Trotsky, *My Life* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), p. 447, and *Military Writings* (New York: Merit Publishers, 1969), pp. 105, 144-145. For a learned comment on Trotsky's views see Possony, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-105.

[22]Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings*, pp. 54, 393-395.

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China for a party increasingly devoted to military supremacy. Lin Piao called the people's army a "fighting force, a political work force, and a production corps."[23] In base areas the people's army set up organs of state power, initiated mass organizations and engaged in "industry and agriculture and operated cultural, educational, and all other undertakings necessary for the independent existence of a separate region. Our base areas were in fact a state in miniature."[24] If base areas were miniature garrison states, then all of China was a castle behind the great wall.

Debray abandoned such theoretical caution by recognizing the people's army for what people's wars proved it to be: the wielder of power for its own sake. Whoever held this power dictated respect or fear. Debray insisted that within the people's army there could be no double order in which political leadership controlled the army from the outside. The people's army could not run the risk of domination by an urban-based party. Those individuals who were really serious about revolution had the right and duty to constitute themselves as a military vanguard. Armies and parties were never anything but instruments of class struggle.[25] Lenin's and Trotsky's Red Army, Mao's and Lin's Chinese People's Army, Ché's and Debray's guerrillas — all properly bore responsibility for civil tasks.

Debray reasoned that if the armed struggle was decisive, everything else would be secondary. To him guerrillas composed the heart of the people's army and the future state apparatus. They usurped the role of Lenin's party cell by identifying themselves with it. To smash an oppressor's army it was essential to have a liberator's army. No amount of agitation could prevail over the people's army, for if military pressure eased even momentarily, political leverage would lack focus. Because political fronts were often deliberative and rarely assumed leadership, usually only an army gave historical meaning and effect to a political front.[26] Lenin once tagged this kind of contention, now made by Debray, "Bonapartism"; Mao christened it "guerrillaism."[27] Debray asserted that the question was not whether military professionals or party leaders ruled, for the army became the organic fusion of both. Were not the best revolutionaries at one and the same time

[23]Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
[24]*Ibid.*, p. 74.
[25]Debray, *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 88, 98, 106.
[26]*Ibid.*, pp. 35, 85-86.
[27]Lenin, *P. Sob. Soch., XXXIV*, 49. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings*, p. 139.

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party members and guerrilla fighters?[28] The Peking Road strategy of East over West and countryside over city raised the people's army to the chief instrument in revolutionary struggle and reduced the party to subservience.

Debray, and Lin for that matter, might well have added that the people's army was the starting point of garrison states. The only prudence left in Debray's discourse was his picture of the unique conditions of Latin America. In this respect he resembled Lenin and Mao. Each threw open the door of revolutionary expediency and militarism marched in. With naïveté they resolved the problem of whether party functionaries or military specialists controlled the people's army and hence the revolution. For them the people's army became the party, but in uniform.

III

In Ho Chi Minh's opinion it was Lenin who first had sounded the theme made popular by Mao's slogan that power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Only power fashioned the socialist order. Ho considered the October Revolution in Russia as the first move in the fight for socialism because the thundering of Bolshevik guns made the Soviet Union a reality.[29] "The road of the October Revolution," said Lin Piao, "is the common road for all people's revolutions."[30]

It was not difficult to sense Lenin's jugular instinct. With the First World War's gunsmoke in his nostrils he confidently, even happily, predicted a century of wars and revolutions and the violence that is their common denominator: "War is not only a continuation of politics, it is the summation of politics."[31] The World War of 1914-1918 constituted the highest form of strife against capitalism, and Lenin repeatedly pointed out the fissures which that war made in the foundations of capitalism.[32] From such logic and observations it was a short way to Maoist rhetoric about war's omnipotence, power bursting from cannon, guns transform-

[28]Debray, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105.

[29]Ho Chi Minh, *On Revolution*. See the two important articles, "Leninism and the Liberation of Oppressed Peoples," pp. 281-286, and "The October Revolution and Liberation of the Peoples of the East," pp. 323-335. For the Mao statement see his *Selected Military Writings*, p. 274.

[30]Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[31]*P. Sob. Soch.*, XXXIX, 406; see also Hannah Arendt's observation in *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), p. 3.

[32]*P. Sob. Soch.*, XXI, 215, 243-244; XXXII, 366. Also, V. I. Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), p. 108.

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ing the world — even Mao's expectation that the Chinese people would survive a nuclear holocaust.[33]

This military dialectic of power came to be the kernel of Mao's Marxism. He stressed that the Russian revolution served as a model for colonial struggles. The task of the Chinese revolution consisted in overturning foreign imperialism by uprooting its warlord base; the critical element in this conflict was power. Whoever commanded an army possessed power, and the strength of the people's army decided everything. Wherever there was innocence on this question, nothing could be achieved. Mao entitled this concept the omnipotence of war: "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war is the central task and highest form of revolution."[34]

A variant of this Maoist deviation appeared in Frantz Fanon's eloquent essay on violence, wherein people's wars were eulogized as the "fiercest stone crusher in history."[35] Imperialism could only end with its extermination. Once the ruling power instituted a policy of sheer force, the people's army adopted a similar procedure for the sake of survival.

According to Fanon, colonization and decolonization were questions of power, instruments of violence. One side yielded only when confronted by greater amounts of each. To work for national liberation meant to fight by means of the stone crusher of history. Each peasant formed a link in the great chain of violence: "Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organized and educated by its leaders makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them."[36] Such violence, produced by the people's army, led to that great duel for power between colonist and colonial. "The art of politics is simply transformed into the art of war; the political militant is the rebel. To fight the war and to take part in politics: the two things become one and the same thing."[37] With Fanon, as with Debray, Mao's injunction about gun barrels extended to the eradication of opposition. The people's army became the people's party, for only it possessed the weapons of annihilation.

[33]Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings*, p. 275. Cf. the strenuous Chinese attack on coexistence "Russian style" in *Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963).

[34]Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings*, pp. 269, 274-275.

[35]Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 50. Although Fanon was not strictly a Marxist, Jean-Paul Sartre's introductory essay to this volume shows its significance to certain Marxists.

[36]*Ibid.*, p. 147.

[37]*Ibid.*, p. 132.

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In forging the doctrine of the omnipotence of war, latter-day Marxists replaced the old Clausewitzian formula. First, people's politics became a continuation of people's wars and, second, people's wars provided the technique for initiating and consolidating power. Colonial radicals of the twentieth century advocated people's wars as a vehicle for "socialist" revolutions. But these revolutions were, in fact, agrarian transformations built on radical land reforms, engineered by military means. Thus people's wars were the essence of a new Marxian view which Marx might well have rejected. The sheer violence of people's wars and their omnipotence dissolved social contradictions and substituted the power of the gun for that of the class. Within the frame of this doctrine war became its own social system and created whatever secondary modes of organization it needed. Clausewitz's original admonition was given a fateful turn when even peace, by this logic, became an extension of people's wars by other means.[38]

Parenthetically, land reform also fitted into this dialectic of power. The politics of the gun could command mountains to move, and grant whatever reforms were sure to please those who wielded guns. In this instance, nothing was wrong with land reform, but it had been the farthest thing from Marx's mind when that nineteenth-century philosopher wrote about the expropriation of the expropriators. Victorious people's wars allowed people's armies to proceed with an agrarian revolution that extinguished feudalism. Agrarian reform strengthened the popularity of people's wars. For the success of the Chinese people's war, and to eject imperialism and demolish the compradors, it was necessary to complete the redistribution of land.

Mao saw this direct relation between China's people's war and China's people's politics: only by launching the socio-economic phases of revolutionary struggle did the people's war surge throughout the countryside.[39] Vo Nguyen Giap proclaimed that the politics of agrarian revolution fueled the people's war. To build the people's army, to erect the basis of power, the party in uniform guaranteed the peasantry dominion over the earth. Only

[38]Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 9; V. I. Lenin, "Vypiski i Zamechaniia na Knigu Klausevitsa 'O Voine i Vedenii Voin'" ("Excerpts and Remarks on Clausewitz's Book, 'On War and the Conduct of War'"), *Leninskii Sbornik* (*Lenin Miscellany*) (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat., 1931), Volume XII, p. 436. The citation Lenin takes from Clausewitz is to the point: "The subordination of the political viewpoint to the military would be absurd because politics created war. Politics is the brain, war merely the instrument and not vice versa. Therefore, only the subordination of the military viewpoint to the political remains possible."

[39]Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings*, pp. 11-12, 35-38, 46.

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complete and irreversible land reform put the masses in revolutionary motion and kept them moving.[40] Since the people's army came from the peasantry, Ché, also, paid close attention to this promise of land in his contacts with that class. The people's army, beginning in its base areas, issued land laws and established an administrative and judicial apparatus which preserved that deepest source of emotion of the soil's cultivator, his own plot of land.[41] Power thus derived from a peasant's simple faith in the hope of agrarian egalitarianism.

A survey of contemporary "socialist" lands, arisen like phoenixes from the ashes of people's wars — the USSR, China, North Viet Nam, Cuba, perhaps Algeria — discloses varieties of garrison states, even though their socialism was not imposed from outside on bayonet tips. Is it any wonder that in China the Red Guard brought about the cultural revolution or that General Lin Piao once was heir apparent? A military-revolutionary junta crystallized in each case to form the ruling elite, an elite consumed with military mystique and symbols, uniforms and fatigues, parades and pomp.

People's wars, one might conclude, have to be understood in the language of Marxian analysis whether or not such an examination bears clear correlation to classical Marxism. Whereas Marx and Engels perceived war to be a continuation of an economic process more than a Clausewitzian political progression, they also emphasized that revolutionary warfare could be looked for in the industrial capitals of the world. Lenin and Mao exploited the potential for agrarian insurrection in less developed areas. Lenin embodied this view in the Peking Road doctrine and Mao extended it to the countrysides of the earth. Furthermore, revolutionary guerrillas became the party in uniform. As a consequence of this technicism, the caissons of the people's army bore not only ammunition but politics.

[40]General Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 27-29, 31, 41-48, 51.
[41]Guevara, *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 48-49, 62, 74, 79-80, 83-86, 104.

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PRESIDENT NIXON'S CHINA INITIATIVE: A CONFERENCE REPORT

THIS report summarizes the discussion at the Conference on the Impact of President Nixon's Planned Visit to Peking, held in Philadelphia on October 2, 1971, and sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.* The discussion centered on the President's China initiative and its impact on five related foreign policy issues. The topics are: (1) ramifications of the Peking visit and prospects for substantive results; (2) Japan's future role and U.S. relations with Asian allies; (3) the Sino-Soviet conflict; (4) the balance of power in Asia; (5) the domestic political situation in the People's Republic of China; and (6) implications for U.S. strategy in the Pacific.

Ramifications of the President's Visit to Peking and Prospects for Substantive Results

At the outset it was observed that recent Sino-American diplomatic contacts were part of a larger process in which postwar economic and political developments have been changing international power relationships. Today any U.S. President would have to take into account a number of new factors bearing on foreign policy decisions, including the diminishing American power to influence events, the dynamic and sometimes competitive economic growth of West European nations and Japan, and the ongoing Sino-Soviet conflict. U.S. overtures to Peking thus become part of a more general reappraisal of the American position as a system of limited multipolarity emerges in the world.

Most participants expressed mixed feelings concerning the President's announcement of his intention to visit Communist China. Substantively, it was generally but not unanimously agreed that the President's initiative was inevitable if not welcome, given the present situation of adversely changing in-

*Editor's Note: Although the President's visit to China took place in late February, this Conference Report is published here because it contains insights into basic problems arising from the new U.S. policy toward China. A draft report on the conference was submitted to the participants, many of whom suggested editorial and substantive revisions. The final report fairly reflects the general trend of the discussion, including the consensus reached on some topics and the differences of opinion expressed on others. A list of the participants appears at the end of this report.

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ternational attitudes and power relationships. But the timing and manner of the announcement were open to serious criticism. The elements of secrecy and surprise accompanying the move had alarmed our friends in Asia, particularly Japan.

Those conferees who emphasized the positive aspects of the Nixon initiative noted that although the move was a gamble from the U.S. viewpoint, it was a relative rarity in U.S. foreign policy for Washington to take the initiative rather than react to events. As such it gave the President some momentum and an initial advantage. The new Sino-American contacts promise at the same time to open the way to more effective bilateral communication than takes place at the ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw.

In this view Sino-American contacts have already yielded some dividends. The contacts have probably speeded Soviet concessions on Berlin, and they have already perceptibly worsened Sino-Soviet relations, although some conferees emphasizing the negative aspects of the President's initiative demurred on both points.

Another possible dividend of the rapprochement is that if a struggle for succession ensues when Mao disappears from the scene, a U.S. presence in China might enable us to exert some modest leverage on its outcome.

In American domestic politics, President Nixon's startling initiative was regarded by some as a political coup, undercutting his potential Democratic opponents in the 1972 election. It was pointed out that with one exception all the apparent Democratic candidates for the Presidency had, before the President's announcement, applied for visas to China. By defusing the Viet Nam issue, moreover, the initiative will spur both political parties to move in a more centrist direction.

On the other hand, the view was expressed that what may seem like a domestic political coup for the President may only throw his supporters into confusion while nevertheless failing to win over his critics.

The list of debits and dangers in the new initiative appeared to outweigh potential U.S. gains, in the view of other participants. The secrecy with which the visit was arranged has upset our Asian allies, particularly Japan, which has generally followed the American lead in Asian politics. A high-level U.S. mission, sent to explain the initiative to Prime Minister Sato immediately after the announcement, might have moderated adverse Japanese reaction. Although the secrecy of the Kissinger mission has been blamed exclusively on the White House, Peking most likely had

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an interest in concealing news of the visit from some of its allies, notably North Viet Nam.

Some Japanese have termed the Sino-American contacts a "Pearl Harbor in reverse." This exaggerated reaction illustrates the scope of the problem of restoring Japanese-American relations. It appears that the Chinese have already achieved one of the objectives they hoped to accomplish only as the ultimate result of their rapprochement with the United States — throwing U.S.-Japanese relations into disarray.

Because of the high popular expectations they arouse, summit meetings can be dangerous, particularly if they have not been adequately prepared. Given the unresolvable policy conflicts between the United States and the People's Republic, it would be well for the press not to exaggerate the importance of the visit. We cannot expect to establish full diplomatic relations so long as the Taiwan issue remains outstanding.

Removal of U.S. forces from Taiwan as part of a Sino-American deal would be regarded throughout Asia as an American defeat. It is unrealistic to expect that the Chinese will assist the United States in winding down the Viet Nam war. Nor does Washington have substantial leverage with respect to other issues. We cannot foresee the results of playing China off against the USSR, and once Sino-Soviet interaction begins, there is no way we can control it.

In sum, one must recognize that quite possibly the United States will not gain greatly from the Peking visit. The real gainers in the move toward rapprochement are the Chinese and the real losers are the Soviets. For the United States the initiative is an extremely chancy operation from which it will be difficult to extract substantive gains.

Japan's Future Role and U.S. Relations with Asian Allies

Most participants agreed that American-Japanese relations had suffered a setback from the secretive manner in which the Nixon visit to Peking was arranged. This setback can be seen as part of a larger trend, in which our relations with Japan have become increasingly strained. The result now is that Washington must devote careful attention to repairing the damage done to those relations, which are crucial to peace in Asia in the 1970's.

Perhaps one beneficial consequence of the adverse Japanese reaction is that a new element of realism surrounds U.S.-Japanese ties. Unwarranted euphoria had arisen after the Okinawa

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reversion agreement was concluded. Many assumed at that time that we would have no serious differences with the Japanese in the foreseeable future. Later, when competition from imported Japanese goods — textiles, electronics and autos — caused problems for the American economy, the tendency was to believe that our differences were strictly economic. Today, however, it is clear that important political disagreements underlie the U.S.-Japan relationship, and it is time to set out to solve some of these problems whose existence we have ignored until now. It may be indicative of their scope that some Japanese consider American policy to be directed against Japan because U.S. officials are fearful that Japan may be on the road to domination in Asia. While they deny such aspirations, they ask whether the United States does not, in any event, perceive a difference between Japan's role in Asia and the prospect of Chinese communist domination of the region.

Conference participants were generally agreed that Japan would draw from the President's initiative toward the Chinese the lesson that the only way to attract U.S. attention is to be independent and somewhat troublesome.

One area in which Japan may choose to become more independent of the United States is in defense and national security policy, particularly with respect to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Japanese view the Nixon approach to a nuclear China as evidence that the Chinese have "shot" their way into the United Nations Security Council while they themselves have failed to "buy" a seat on the Council. Nuclear weapons will probably be increasingly desired by some elements of Japanese public opinion for their political, as opposed to military, utility. Whether Japan goes nuclear in the next five to ten years depends on many factors — constitutional, political, psychological — and one critical factor will be what the United States does. If the United States is perceived as abandoning Asia or reneging on its defense commitments, the Japanese will have a far greater incentive to acquire nuclear power and draw away from the U.S. security tie. Our China initiative's secrecy has taught them that a militarily powerless Japan can be ignored despite its economic power, and they are likely to reach the same conclusion regarding the United States if we surrender our positions of power in Asia. A crucial point may be whether the United States decides to maintain a military presence beyond the mid-Pacific in such allied countries as South Korea.

A number of participants challenged the view that Japan will

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almost inevitably take the nuclear road in the near future. The Japanese realize that a second-strike capability makes no sense for them since they have no land mass to trade in a nuclear exchange and they cannot match Soviet strategic power. To go nuclear in a serious way, the Japanese will have to build nuclear submarines, and here there is a technology gap. Further, until the arrival of fast breeder reactors in the 1980's, Japan, which now receives enriched uranium from the United States, will lack sufficient fissionable material to develop a modern nuclear force. The question of going nuclear cannot, of course, be divorced from domestic Japanese politics. Some important figures in Sato's ruling Liberal Democratic Party have not foreclosed the nuclear option. Despite the popular aversion to such weapons, Japan might seek a *limited* offensive nuclear capability sufficient to deter a first strike. Another option is to build a basically defensive nuclear force centered around an ABM program. Again, much will depend on how the Japanese perceive U.S. actions and how they gauge the credibility of our nuclear umbrella.

Raised in a broader framework was the possibility of a viable substitute for Japan going nuclear. A multilateral Pacific and Indian Ocean Defense Agreement with political, economic and defense components might be that instrument, but it would require a Washington decision signifying that the United States was one among equals rather than first among equals.

The participants acknowledged that the bipolar world has ended and that a dynamic Japan qualifies as one of the evolving new power centers. If the United States were to follow a policy of tacitly supporting Japan and Western Europe as the fourth and fifth superpowers, this might make it impossible for China or the USSR to engage in expansionist policies. For this reason there may be some grounds for optimism about the future.

Regarding U.S. relations with allies elsewhere in Asia, which have also been damaged by the new American initiative, one participant expressed the view that there was greater need to attend to the offended feelings of smaller Asian nations than to Japanese anxieties. For while the Nixon visit presents short-term problems for the Sato Government, over the long run the new U.S. policy toward China accords with Japanese policy aimed at improving Sino-American relations. Moreover, Japan has long sought greater independence from the United States in determining its own China policy. The risk in the U.S. initiative is greatest for the smaller states of the Far East which have long been

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dependent on the United States. The rug has been pulled out from under many of them, and they may fear a Sino-American "Yalta" sacrificing their interests.

The Sino-Soviet Conflict

Two schools of thought were represented in considering the likelihood of a future Sino-Soviet reconciliation. One view stressed the areas of conflict between China and the USSR and noted a series of factors militating against a Sino-Soviet rapprochement:

(1) *A profound ideological cleavage* aggravates modest disagreements and elevates them to the level of disputes in principle. It is always easier for the orthodox to unite with pagans than with heretics.

(2) *A geopolitical cleavage* strains relations between a Soviet Union that would like to be strong in the Far East but cannot be, and the People's Republic, which may aspire to the land and food-producing capability of Mongolia and the USSR.

(3) *Russian racial antagonism* deeply offends Chinese sensibilities. The Chinese know that Soviet hostility is in part racially motivated.

(4) *China's weakness vis-à-vis the USSR* stalls reconciliation. The Chinese are unlikely to seek a rapprochement until their nuclear capability is enhanced so as to avoid having to bargain from weakness with the Soviet leaders. Their aspiration to gain great-power status thwarts a reconciliation on the model of Soviet-Hungarian relations after 1956. They will not accept a subordinate role and so will wait until they have some leverage against the Soviets before opening serious talks.

(5) *The impact of past disputes* rankles in Peking. The Chinese will long remember the events of 1960, when the Soviets removed both their specialists and their blueprints from Chinese factories they were helping to build.

(6) *The forty Soviet divisions on the Chinese border* are a constant threat. As long as they are there, the Sino-Soviet conflict will continue.

These considerations do not preclude a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, but they make it highly improbable. In the event of improved relations, what we should expect is not a reversion to the extensive collaboration of the pre-1957 period but a new and more limited relationship. Conflicting national interests provide no basis for an actual alliance. The question, after all, is whether the two states will achieve a significant degree of cooperation. Over the next few years as the four Asian powers (the United States, the USSR, Japan and China) maneuver for position in an unstable balance of power, it is likely that there will be some moving together *and* some moving apart. In this fluid situation much

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of what happens in Sino-Soviet relations will depend on the United States. President Nixon's initiative toward China makes a Sino-Soviet reconciliation less likely since China now has an alternative to drawing closer to the Soviet Union. It can instead improve relations with the United States, which is now in a position to have better relations with both Moscow and Peking than either have with each other.

A second view, emphasizing the possibility — if not the probability — of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation focused on several areas of common interest between the Soviets and the Chinese:

(1) *The basic congruity of policy* between the USSR and China is evident as both seek to reduce American influence around the world and even to expel the United States from regions where they wish to extend their control. This underlying parallelism of policy confronts us with an even more difficult challenge under some circumstances than a renewed Sino-Soviet alliance. Each will be trying to snatch victory from the jaws of our defeat.

(2) *There is no objective need on China's part for expansion into the USSR* to gain additional land for agriculture and settlement. China's vast unsettled areas are largely inhospitable, yet most of Soviet Central Asia and the Far East is also inhospitable and agriculturally unproductive.

(3) *Neither racial nor geographic factors are absolutely vital.* More permanent self-interests are likely to dominate. Both countries have an excess of land.

(4) *The Sino-Soviet ideological conflict is not profound.* Rather, their attacks on each other are *ad hominem* and amount to little more than name-calling.

(5) *The aging leadership* of both China and the Soviet Union (Mao is now seventy-eight, Brezhnev sixty-six) will soon disappear from the scene. Then new leaders may seek to heal relations rather than argue over who is "first among equals." A Chinese ruling constellation including the PLA and the party might be acceptable to the men then at the top in the Kremlin.

This viewpoint notes that the Chinese softened their position toward the USSR in the wake of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the Soviet military buildup on China's northern border. Despite some points of conflict, Sino-Soviet cooperation could grow if the party-army structure emerging from the Cultural Revolution is acceptable to Moscow. Moreover, the next generation of leaders in both countries, but especially in China, may not feel as strongly that they have their personal prestige at stake in the dispute. The possibility of leaders who are less anti-Soviet emerging in Peking is pointed up by Soviet propaganda efforts to embolden elements of

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the PLA thought sympathetic to Moscow. The Kremlin apparently believes there is some opportunity in that quarter.

Further, as time goes on and the Chinese achieve a modern strategic nuclear arsenal and missile delivery systems, they may acquire the self-confidence based on strength to negotiate closer relations with Moscow. A SALT agreement freezing the strategic capabilities of the superpowers but not the Chinese could conceivably hasten this day. The President's plan to visit Peking, while it may have sharpened the Sino-Soviet conflict, may also have triggered an as yet unannounced Kremlin decision to try to win China back. Because of these considerations, it was asserted, the argument that a reconciliation is impossible bears the substantial burden of proof.

The Balance of Power in Asia

There was agreement among the participants that Nixon's China initiatives opened new possibilities for balance of power politics, and that international relationships would reflect the changes brought about by the emergence of new power centers. Debate was focused on the positions of the five major actors and their respective roles in a balance of power system. While it was recognized that an era of greater fluidity and flexibility in international affairs had arrived, doubts were expressed as to the ability of the United States to operate successfully in this changed environment.

The new China policy may be regarded as a response to awareness of the declining U.S. power position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Increased Soviet offensive weapons deployment and maritime penetration, combined with uncertainties over détente, have led the United States to seek a balance in Asia comparable to that provided by NATO in Europe. Earlier American conceptions of global policy have been found lacking: the Atlantic Community foundered on the rocks of Gaullism and strategic doctrine; nation-building fared poorly in its most crucial test in Viet Nam. Reliance is now to be placed on the Nixon Doctrine.

Japan was seen as the most uncertain quantity in the emerging pentagonal system. The disparity between Japanese economic strength and military weakness was viewed as an unstable condition. In the discussion of a possible nuclear capability for Japan, no consensus was reached. It was pointed out that although the efficacy of Japan's reliance on the American nuclear guarantee is

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now being questioned in view of a reduced American role in Asia, the current economic crisis, and the China rapprochement, Japanese options are constrained by a number of factors. Of greatest importance is the domestic political constraint, imposed by the constitution and public opinion. Perhaps this obstacle can be overcome only if the Japanese population develops a serious sense of threat, resulting from Sino-Soviet actions and/or lack of U.S. response.

Second, there is the international constraint: the Japanese would be reluctant to undertake a nuclear program that might lead to a major break with the United States including possible loss of the U.S. nuclear guarantee; they would also be reluctant to risk damage to their relations with other noncommunist Asian nations, which would view a nuclear-armed Japan with alarm.

Third, geographic factors make it extremely difficult for Japan to attain a second-strike capability, especially in view of the advantage possessed by the huge continental nuclear powers. Japanese interests would be in sea-based systems or in ABM's with consequent technological problems. Lastly, the United States remains the source of fissionable material until the further development of fast breeder reactor technology. This gives Washington considerable influence over the Japanese nuclear program.

On the other side of the issue, it was argued that the diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons extends far beyond their military importance. This is essentially the Gaullist thesis which, in retrospect, has done much to enhance the international position of France. Japan may feel that the only way to make its weight felt in the world arena, and especially in the United States, is to acquire its own force. The Nixon Administration's handling of the Presidential visit to Peking strengthened this argument. Second, what some called the "demise" of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the greater fluidity of the international system may encourage other nations such as Sweden, Israel and India to opt (publicly) for nuclear status. This would put additional pressure on the Japanese to embark on a nuclear program, even if these nations were of no threat to Japan. Third, the threat to Japan from a nuclear-armed China remains an unknown quantity in the coming decade. The Chinese have intensified their propaganda attack on Japan while the Soviets have undertaken new overtures to Tokyo. It was suggested that China may become a leading but covert advocate of the Japanese-American security treaty as a means of preventing a rearmed Japan.

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The Soviet Union was generally viewed as the primary target of President Nixon's China initiative. In the context of a balance of power, it should be the United States' goal to achieve better relations with both the Soviet Union and China than each has with the other. The short-run impact of the new China diplomacy on the Kremlin is difficult to assess. The delayed Soviet reaction suggested extensive high-level debate in Moscow. Whether Nixon's bold move in East Asia had a mediating effect on the Berlin settlement or the ongoing problems of the Middle East and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks was the subject of disagreement among the participants. A pragmatic Soviet policy would seem to dictate a strategy of caution or condominium with regard to Europe at least, but it would be dangerous to assume that such a strategy would be more than a temporary expedient. The implications of the American initiative with respect to the Sino-Soviet conflict have already been mentioned. Suffice it to say here that the continuation of the split must be presumed in assessing the balance of power.

Whatever the outcome of the President's talks with Chinese leaders, the Soviet Union must be regarded as the primary threat to the security of the United States. In spite of the emerging multipolar system, elements of the old bipolar clash remain, and the Soviet Union will continue through the present decade to be the only power capable of inflicting major damage on the United States.

Europe, a prospective pole in the emerging system, must make progress toward integration, particularly in the military and political spheres, in order to achieve its full power potential. This may occur toward the end of the 1970's. The result could be a pentagonal configuration in which the United States would have the tacit support of Europe and Japan against the Soviet Union and China, a not undesirable posture from the U.S. perspective.

The American initiative has had the effect of elevating China's position in the world arena, yet the nature of the Chinese entity, based on population, ideology and nuclear-club membership, makes the People's Republic a somewhat strange member of the pentagonal system. One is led to comparisons of China and Japan as they would fit into a balance of power system and to questions concerning how the United States is to establish modest relations with the former while retaining close relations with the latter.

Whereas it was agreed that the international system was moving toward a balance of power model, several caveats were sounded as

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to the new dangers this might entail. First, in order to provide stability in the new system, American power would have to be enhanced or at least maintained, including forces stationed in Asia. The United States would have to assume the role played by Britain in the nineteenth century and possess both the capability and will to carry out this assignment effectively. Second, the balance of power system may work reasonably well if all players accept the principle that none of the other competitors may be eliminated from the game, and that the desired end is the stability of the system, but in the case of the Chinese and Soviets, this is doubtful. Third, the successful functioning of the system requires that the actors evidence a reasonable degree of internal stability, a dubious proposition for China and even for the United States.

The ability of the United States to conduct a successful foreign policy in the new context was questioned on two counts: (1) While the present leadership may well understand the pragmatic nature of the courses to be pursued, this is a doubtful assumption about their successors. (2) For domestic reasons it will be more difficult for the United States to maintain foreign relations in a balance of power world than in the bipolar one. We have lost the basic consensus on foreign policy which supported our role prior to the mid-1960's. Professionals in foreign policy will not find it easy to take necessary and often unpopular actions and explain them to our democratic constituency.

The Domestic Political Situation in the People's Republic of China

There was agreement that the potential for instability in the Chinese communist regime was high. Some participants stressed the shorter-term problems of Maoism and the party-army relationship, while others emphasized the longer-term problems that could arise when Mao and Chou En-lai pass from the scene.

Considerable factionalism remains in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, and the power struggle continues. The army has assumed a position of far greater influence than previously, with higher proportions of membership in the Central Committee, the Politburo and provincial governments. The succession problem will, in large measure, be determined by the unity of the army: if it is seriously split, the country may be split also.

It was suggested that Maoism may be in decline and that the cult will not survive the leader except as a unifying symbol and source of ideological guidance subject to varying interpretations.

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Disagreement was voiced over whether the present is a good time for American diplomatic overtures in view of the advanced age of the Chinese principals. On the one hand, there may be advantages to even a minor U.S. presence in China during the post-Mao succession, and particularly so if the Soviets find it possible to intervene. On the other, any agreements that emerge from the present initiative may be of short duration. This would militate against any major U.S. concessions to the Mao-Chou regime.

Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Pacific

The Pacific Ocean and the Asian land mass are critical areas in the international system. Economically, the Pacific is the fastest growing trade area in the world. Politically, it is a region where four great or near-great powers confront each other. Militarily, the United States has fought three wars there in the last thirty years. Participants agreed that a new situation of fluidity in Asia faces the United States as a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the re-emergence of Japan, and the American overture to Peking.

Japanese-American relations, which have contributed importantly to political stability in Asia for the past twenty-five years, can provide the basis for Asian stability and peace through the 1970's — if a realistic effort is made to solve the political and economic differences between the two countries. Accordingly, most conferees concluded, U.S.-Japanese relations merit top priority attention in both Tokyo and Washington to assure that short-term problems do not overshadow greater common interests over the long run.

Elsewhere in Asia, a prime problem for the United States is the outcome of the Viet Nam war and its ramifications. One participant observed that although the United States has not suffered an absolute defeat in South Viet Nam — the communist attempt to seize power has been thwarted — many Asians see our predicament as amounting to a defeat. Failure to maintain a significant U.S. military presence in Asia will cause a sharp decline in American influence and lead to instability. The alternative to pulling back to a mid-Pacific defense line is for the United States to keep sizeable forces in Korea and Thailand and reaffirm our guarantee to Taiwan. Any accommodation with Peking should be based on a clear Chinese understanding of these U.S. policies.

Some expressed the view that the American policy of a low profile in Asia has been executed in a dilettantish fashion, thus caus-

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ing a decline in U.S. influence. While American commitments in Asia are diminishing, the Soviet naval presence in the Pacific and Indian oceans has expanded considerably. The USSR has negotiated naval rights with the Indians comparable to those extended to other naval powers. Divergent views were expressed as to whether the Soviet Union has negotiated or is negotiating more extensive naval rights with India, but no one questioned the fact that Moscow has made important political gains in New Delhi. While avoiding the mistake of trying to dominate Asian countries, the United States must devise a policy congruent with Asian interests and capabilities.

Sino-American contacts, it was noted, had dealt a final blow to the dream of a Soviet-American condominium in Asia. There was general agreement among conferees that defense of the territorial integrity of China — against Soviet attack or dismemberment — was in the U.S. interest. One individual warned that, given the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the United States should have the power required to deter both nations.

It was generally agreed, aside from specifics, that the basis of American policy must be strength, not weakness. This strength must embrace a wide range of social, economic, political, military and morale factors. At home, the United States is showing signs of the "defeated nation syndrome." Americans distrust other Americans and many distrust their own government. As a consequence we are overextended in relation to our national will.

Some expressed the view that the best way to assure *some* future U.S. role in world affairs may be to avoid the overcommitments that have led to the present impasse. Once policymakers and the public recognize that a five-power international system is emerging, overcommitments may be avoided. But others warned that growing isolationism may make *any* meaningful U.S. role impossible in the future.

It was unanimously agreed that American institutions need to be reinvigorated if the United States is to be an effective international actor. Revitalizing the U.S. Army could serve as a starting point. Such an undertaking is essential, for without a strong army American policy in Asia and elsewhere will inevitably proceed from weakness.

A regeneration of the American spirit is also needed so that our people can be united in support of a new foreign policy responsive to the changing international order. This will be a formidable challenge to American leadership since the clear-cut relationships

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of the bipolar Soviet-American era no longer provide the basis for building a foreign policy consensus. The cyclical nature of morale in America, however, may produce an upturn in national spirit in the not-too-distant future.

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Reviews

Political Forces in Allende's Chile*

by Arthur P. Whitaker

A new era in the history of Latin America and its relations with the United States seems to have been opened by Salvador Allende's victory in the presidential election of September 1970 in Chile. For as the candidate of a Socialist-Communist coalition and himself a Socialist, he is the head of the first Marxist regime ever brought to power in Latin America by an election, and he is an open, even ostentatious, admirer of Fidel Castro and his Cuban socialist state. Now, eighteen months after the election, Allende's government is apparently well entrenched. The armed forces are said to dislike it but have made no move against it, and like Castro's in the early 1960's, though on a smaller scale, it is being strengthened by the emigration of its opponents.

Allende is moving right on with his program of revolutionary, "structural" change at the expense of foreign "imperialists," chief among which are the big U.S. copper mining companies, and their "corrupt allies" among the Chilean upper classes. Acceleration of the rate of change is likely. So far, the new regime has proceeded legally, as promised, and has been hampered by the fact that it has not yet gained full control of Congress. But the President's powers are extensive and Congressional opposition can be overcome by an innovation Allende obtained at the time of his inauguration: if defeated in Congress, he can appeal to the people at large by plebiscite. The odds favor his winning since he is courting the masses by lavish wage increases and otherwise, and in any case such an appeal would presumably be made only in favor of popular measures.

Where this will all end, nobody knows, but a great store of information on the forces that brought it about and are still at work is provided by Ben Burnett's book, *Political Groups in Chile: The Dialogue between Order and Change*. Burnett's study is based on field work in Chile, including interviews with political, labor and business leaders, and on an extensive bibliography in Spanish and English. Its focus on political groups is appropriate, for the Chilean situation is the result of a determined drive to achieve social and economic ends by political means, foremost among which have long been the political parties representing, however imperfectly, Chile's main interest groups. In the decade with which the book is mainly concerned, the 1960's, a

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dramatic swing from political right to left took place. One after the other, all three of the country's largest political groups held power: first, until 1964, the moderately conservative coalition of old-line Liberals and Conservatives, headed by Jorge Alessandri and formally united in 1965 as the National Party; then, from 1964 to 1970, the moderately radical Christian Democratic administration of Eduardo Frei Montalva, who called for a "revolution in freedom"; and finally, the more radical, ultra-nationalist Popular Unity coalition of Socialists and Communists brought to power under the leadership of Salvador Allende Gossens, a Socialist, in the election of September 4, 1970.

The results of that election were received as Burnett's book was going to press. It was a cliffhanger. The unofficial returns gave Allende 36.3 per cent of the popular vote to 35.9 per cent for Jorge Alessandri (National Party) and 27.8 per cent for Radomiro Tomic (Christian Democrat). Congress then had to choose between the first two and followed precedent by electing Allende. Commenting briefly (p. 288), Burnett notes that Allende had "promised to convert Chile into a socialist society along the lines of Cuba"; that this meant "the nationalization of all large industrial, commercial, and financial institutions, the socialization of educational curricula, and the replacement of Congress with a unicameral People's Assembly"; but that "Chile's long history of factionalized political parties—and in Allende's case, an exceptionally contentious gathering — offered no guarantee that rhetoric could be translated into accomplishment."

Although Burnett does not say so, he must have been surprised by Allende's victory. He had some reason to be. Allende had already made three unsuccessful bids for the presidency, in 1952, 1958 and 1964, and was now pushing seventy. He had come close to winning only in 1958; in 1964 he had suffered a rout; and in the 1970 campaign his Popular Unity coalition was rent by dissension not only between Socialists and Communists but within each party. Among the Communists, these dissensions arrayed the relatively moderate majority, which followed the Moscow line in advocating revolution by peaceful means (*vía pacífica*), against hard-line extremists of the Maoist and other persuasions. The Socialists have been more radical than the Communist Party on a number of issues, but they too suffer from internecine conflict between the moderate majority (to which Allende belongs) and extremist factions.

If Burnett had expected the Popular Unity coalition to win in 1970, he would surely have given the reader a fuller account of Allende — the man, his career, his ideas and policies — than these pages contain. Not until page 249, in the concluding chapter, do we get even a brief close-up of him. Here we learn that in the 1958 campaign he was fifty-six and the oldest of the candidates; that, "though a Marxist, [he] came from

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the professional upper class" (he was a physician but practiced politics rather than medicine) and was considered by some "rather foppish, an image he sought to dispel by shaving off his moustache . . ."; but that "his followers prized him as one of their own, a man of means with a social conscience."

The limelight in this book, as in most other accounts of Chile written between 1964 and 1970, is reserved for Eduardo Frei and his Christian Democrats, who are described with loving care. This is not vouchsafed by Burnett to the groups on Frei's right any more than to those farther to the left than he. In the now conventional way of American academics, Burnett wastes no sympathy on conservatives. Symptomatic is his use of the term "resurrects" in stating that the National Party nominated Alessandri for the presidency in 1970. At that time only six years had passed since the end of Alessandri's previous presidential term and there had been no sign that he was politically dead. But if he was, his party succeeded remarkably well in "resurrecting" him, for in this 1970 election he missed defeating Allende by less than one-half of one per cent of the popular vote and got a much larger share of it than the only other serious contender, Christian Democrat Tomic.

Despite his bias in favor of the Christian Democrats, Burnett makes it understandable why, after a phenomenal rise culminating in their electoral victories in 1964 and 1965, they suffered a crushing defeat in the next presidential election, 1970. For one thing, their victories had not given them control of the Senate, the upper house of a legislature that Burnett describes as "probably the most powerful . . . in Latin America" (p. 284); and Senate opposition turned out to be a major factor in frustrating Frei's efforts at reform and thereby weakening his party's prestige and popular support. Furthermore, while Frei's personal prestige remained high, the constitution barred his immediate re-election, and the party's new standard-bearer, Radomiro Tomic, commanded less confidence and a smaller following, partly because of his long absences from Chile until 1968 as Ambassador to the United States. An additional handicap to the party in 1970 was the internal struggle that had developed among its three factions: the majority group of *oficialistas* headed by Frei, and two factions to the left of it, some of whose members went over to Allende.

Yet it seems clear that the basic reason why the Christian Democrats lost in 1970 was that they were unable to retain the support of the right-wing groups which had made possible their victories of 1964-1965. Instead, these groups, united as the National Party, offered the rival ticket headed by Alessandri. If the collaboration of 1964-1965 could have been repeated, the rout of Allende and his Socialist-Communist coalition would have been complete, for if the votes of the Christian Democratic Party and the National Party had been combined, they would

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have made up 63.7 per cent of the popular vote as against Allende's 36.3 per cent.

That the two did not unite again to counter the dire threat from the Socialist-Communist alliance may seem suicidal folly to outsiders, but one explanation is suggested by passages to which Burnett might have given greater prominence. Before 1964, he tells us, management associations had played a "preeminent role" in the formation and execution of government policy (p. 267), but thereafter Frei brought his own experts into government, to the practical exclusion of the business community, and thereby "inflamed more than one conservative to vow that they would never again be able to vote for the Christian Democrats in this century." (p. 268.) That, of course, is only part of the explanation, for, conversely, the desertion of Christian Democrats to Allende in 1970 would have been even greater than it was if their party had offered a candidate and program acceptable to the conservative party. As Burnett says in concluding his "Postscript" on the election of 1970, again as in 1964 "a sizable majority of voters—whether for Allende or Tomic —expressed their preference for a regime committed to deep societal change." (p. 288.)

Societal change is a theme that runs through a large part of this book. The theme is constantly related to politics, but of the six chapters, only one, Chapter 5, is devoted entirely to political parties. Chapter 1, "Political Foundations," deals with the land and the people. Chapter 2, "Communications and Politics," stresses communications. The next two chapters discuss interest groups, and the concluding chapter is on "The Dialogue between Order and Change."

No part of the book, it seems to me, is likely to be of more enduring value than the two chapters on Chile's five main interest groups: "Military, Clergy, and Students" (Chapter 3) and "Management and Labor" (Chapter 4). It will be noted that large landowners, once regarded as Chile's governing class, are not accorded separate treatment here, although land reform measures at their expense are duly noted. Instead, their principal organization, the venerable National Society of Agriculture (founded in 1838), is discussed under "Management" along with similar "employers' groups" in the fields of commerce, manufacturing and mining.

As described by Burnett, the present political significance of these interest groups varies widely from one to another. The clergy, though still potentially a contender to be reckoned with, has retired into the background, and management has recently been forced into it. The students' "over-all impact" on politics, we are told, is "difficult to evaluate." It is greatest in times of crisis but has often been unavailing, probably because there are "a number of competing interest groups" and "a highly stratified social system." (pp. 89, 90.)

That would seem to leave the military and labor as the only two interest groups that now remain

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constant major factors in the political system of Chile. Even the military, though professionalized since the 1880's, is an uncertain factor. It has not only a tradition but an almost unbroken record, since 1891, of nonintervention in politics (the major exceptions were in the 1920's). Yet it has a potential for intervention like that of the clergy, only much greater. This potential was recognized by the leading presidential candidates in 1964, Frei and Allende, both of whom "catered" to the armed forces by promising them pay increases and other amenities (p. 53). Again in 1970 Allende was fearful of their intervention.

Burnett seems to be of two minds about the prospect of a military coup in Chile. After noting that most of the officers were "sympathetic toward the United States on international matters," anti-communist, and anti-Castro, he says it is "a moot question" what the armed forces would have done had Allende won the 1964 election (p. 55). Yet in the next paragraph he asserts that so long as they are "granted their autonomy," only "some cataclysmic event, such as a severe economic reversal," would be at all likely to make them "break [their] customary professional and nonpolitical tradition."

So far, subsequent events have confirmed the latter proposition in the sense that since Allende took office there has been no move by the military against his Socialist-Communist regime. Yet speculation that one may come has been activated by the recent military coup that upset a similar left-wing regime in neighboring Bolivia. Contagions spread rapidly in Latin America. Military regimes already control other neighboring or nearby countries — Peru, Argentina, Brazil. Can Chile withstand the infection? Even under the more moderate Frei administration it was rent by what Burnett calls "anomic violence," and this can hardly be expected to vanish while Allende socializes the country. It may be true, as we have long been told, that this kind of situation is made to order for communists, but in Latin America it is certainly made to order for take-overs by the military. Whether Chile will prove an exception in this respect remains to be seen.

Labor's emergence since the 1930's as one of Chile's major interest groups appears from Burnett's account to have been mainly due to the increasing geographical concentration of the workers in an increasingly urban society (70 per cent urban by 1965); to the spread of popular participation in the political process (8.7 per cent of the total population voted in 1946, 31.8 per cent in 1964); and to the fact that for the most part organized labor in Chile has been not job-oriented but politics-oriented and has been given greater unity under political leadership than the labor organizations themselves have ever been able to achieve.

Burnett is emphatic on the point just mentioned, characterizing the history of Chile's central labor organizations, which began in 1917, as marked by disruption and chaos

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(p. 107). The largest of them today is the Single Central Organization of Chilean Workers (CUT). Formed in 1952 and dominated by left-wing elements, CUT has time and again been torn by dissension among Socialists, Communists and other political groups and attacked by rival labor organizations. It has survived all these trials, but its total membership, by Burnett's estimate (p. 108), is "under a third of a million," which is only one-third of what it claims and one-ninth of Chile's total working population of nearly three million. Since it seems to have no serious rival, present or prospective, among Chilean labor organizations, these can hardly be given the credit for making labor one of Chile's major interest groups. Instead, the credit must go to political leaders such as Dr. Allende.

Frequent comparisons with other Latin American countries give this book perspective and depth. It tells us, for example, that Chile stands near the top in literacy, educational facilities, and the social heterogeneity of its university student body; that it is probably the least Catholic of all those countries and has the most liberal Catholic clergy; that it shows a higher regard for legality than any of the others; that its political leadership is as good as or better than theirs; and that it is as close as any of them to approximating the model of a highly developed society. Burnett also cites without cavil the assertion of the head of the Chilean Communist Party, Luis Corvalán, to the effect that "Chile is one of those nations of the world most apt to achieve a socialist revolution peacefully. . . ." (p. 191.) There are occasional references to Europe as well, pointing out the influence of the numerous foreign priests in the country, the "hypnotic effect of European slogans" irrelevant to Chile (p. 174), and the resemblance of Chile's multiparty system and political fragmentation to that of Western Europe, particularly France under the Fourth Republic.

Further comparisons could have been made with profit, especially of Chile with Argentina and Uruguay. This trio of southernmost South American states has much in common that sets them apart from the rest of Latin America, although they differ from each other in important respects. Chile and Uruguay, for example, were Latin American pioneers in social welfare, with great and lasting political consequences in both countries; but Uruguay is not mentioned in any connection, and social welfare even in Chile is mentioned only briefly and occasionally, as in the statement (p. 235) that Chile was the first Latin American country to institute compulsory health insurance for workers.

Altogether, however, Burnett has provided a highly informative introduction to the intricacies of the political situation in Chile from which the present Socialist-Communist regime under Salvador Allende emerged and with which he and his fractious coalition now have to cope. The sequel is not

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likely to be a "second Cuba," if only because Allende is decidedly not a second Castro. But whatever else the sequel may be, it promises to have a powerful effect on Chile and on the relations of the United States not only with Chile but with Latin America at large, where Allende's Chile is already casting a longer shadow than Castro's Cuba.

Malaise in Argentina: An Age of Lead*

by Marvin Goldwert

The terms "malaise" and "age of lead" are drawn from H. S. Ferns' superb book *Argentina*. Although the purpose of his book is "to provide for those having little or no knowledge of Argentina an introduction to a fascinating and troubled community," its audience should include all Latin Americanists as well as social scientists from every discipline. For Ferns, himself a political scientist, has not only written a stimulating history, he has delivered a provocative interpretation of the Argentine past and its impact on the present.

In the introductory chapters, Ferns deals with such historical topics as "The Spanish Colony," "The Birth of the Argentine Nation," "From Revolution to Rosas," and "The Economics of a Laissez Faire Community." Despite their brevity, each of these chapters is filled with useful generalizations, especially in the economic realm.

On page 121 he declares that the object of the remainder of the book is to determine why in Argentina "a golden age has been succeeded by an age of lead; and further whether there is any reason to suppose that the age of lead is drawing to a close and that a more glowing age can be expected." By "a golden age," Ferns means the span of years from 1861 to 1929, when the liberal oligarchy and later the middle-class Radicals ruled over a prosperous nation. The "age of lead" began with the depression of 1929 and has lasted down to the present.

The "age of gold" contained the seeds of later decline, and Ferns holds every sector of Argentine society responsible for today's "age of lead." During the period 1861 to 1916, the landed oligarchy established an open society with a representative system and a democratic spirit. However, this society, though socially mobile, was also intensely hierarchical. As the democratic system — corrupted by electoral fraud—took root, it was in constant conflict with social stratification. Social hierarchy and egalitarian, liberal institutions have always existed side by side in Argentina. This explains the ambivalence of the landed oligarchy toward the democracy they both created and corrupted. In commenting on the oligarchy, Ferns writes: "They do not like and do

**Argentina*. By H. S. Ferns. New York: Praeger (Nations of the Modern World Series), 1969. 265 pp. $7.50.
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not want dictatorship and rigid authoritarianism. But they do not like the consequences of democracy either; nor do they appear willing to learn the techniques of compromise and political management which are necessary to render compatible a hierarchical prestige system of socio-economic relations with an open, flexible, fully participant political system." (p. 159.)

As for the middle-class Radicals, who ruled from 1916 to 1930, they too must be held responsible for today's "malaise." Ostensibly the leaders of the newcomers to Argentine shores, "the Radicals were at best suspicious of the immigrant masses and at worst hostile to them." (p. 141.) The Radicals also had no program or strategy and they failed in directing "popular political energy" to social objectives. Led by Hipólito Yrigoyen, they were unable or unwilling to develop new means for upward social mobility through economic change. Furthermore, they perverted the political system by using the military as a political tool.

In dealing with the Argentine working class, Ferns delivers some eye-opening statements. He says that in 1943, after a decade of renewed oligarchical rule, labor leaders saw in Colonel Juan Domingo Perón "a new kind of politician: one who was prepared to do something more than bribe them personally; who was prepared to bribe the entire labour movement." (p. 173.) He dismisses as "rubbish" Peronist talk about shirtless masses, declaring that prior to the advent of Perón "Argentine workers enjoyed the highest standard of living in Latin America and in terms of food consumed, housing, and educational opportunity were comparable with workers in the United States and western Europe." (p. 173.) During his rise to power, Perón "developed a pay-off strategy of rallying political support" (p. 192) and this strategy persisted into the presidential years. Ferns, whose position is intensely anti-Peronist, believes that the pay-off policy, exercised by a dictator who simply hated to be unpopular, exhausted Argentina's resources.

Having reached the Perón years (1943 to 1955), marked by dictatorship built on an army-labor alliance, we may at this juncture introduce two excellent works on these political forces. For the army, we have Robert A. Potash's *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945,* a detailed and well-written contribution to the field. For labor, we have Samuel L. Baily, *Labor, Nationalism, and Politics in Argentina,* an analytical and perceptive political history of labor from the nineteenth century to 1957.

According to Potash, past studies of the Latin American militaries have been "cliché-ridden," and so he seeks a new approach. His book focuses on the personalities of military leaders, the institutional development of the army, and a broader area of politico-military behavior than the sporadic coups. He also analyzes the relationship between officers and politicians, military influence on gov-

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ernmental policy, and the treatment of the army by both civilian and military regimes. Through the skillful use of books and articles, personal interviews and embassy documents, he fulfills his aims.

Potash provides further insights into the circumstances contributing to the "age of lead," with its frequent coups and military interventions. The expansion of the Argentine military from 1930 to 1945—in numbers, economic power and educational institutions—gave the armed forces a new confidence in their ability to run the nation. This confidence was bolstered by the failure of the political parties, from 1916 on, to respect their apolitical role. The burden of guilt for militarism in Argentina rests heavily, but not exclusively, on the professional politicians. In the years 1916 to 1922, and again from 1928 to 1930, Hipólito Yrigoyen and the Radicals sought to manipulate the military. In the 1930 revolution, the anti-Yrigoyenists turned to the army to oust the Radicals by force. The ensuing military dictatorship of 1930 need not have meant an end to civilian control in Argentina. But beginning in 1932 General Agustín P. Justo and the civilian oligarchy, again expressing their ambivalence to democracy, restored electoral fraud. They also based their regime at least partly on military force.

Once military force was used to perpetuate oligarchical rule, the opposition parties had no recourse but to appeal to the army. Both the right-wing nationalists and the Radicals urged the military to political action. These appeals served to confirm a deeply rooted military prejudice against the professional politicians and convinced many army officers that they alone could save the nation. A principal beneficiary of this outlook in the period 1943 to 1945 was Colonel Perón.

When Potash delves into the motivations of the army officers, he again gives us keen observations. For example, he rightly dismisses Germanic influence in the Argentine army as a key factor in causing militarism. He also warns against generalizing from the proven fact that most army officers come from the middle class—which means only that they come from a large, politically heterogeneous social group. It is simplistic, Potash argues, to stress social origins, for they are but one among many other loyalties: to career, in-laws, civilian friends, fellow officers, superior officers, and military laws and regulations. These competing loyalties, combined with outright political ambitions, give us a picture of motivations of utmost complexity.

In closing, Potash warns against viewing Perón's pro-labor measures as the work of a military apostate. Having served in the interior provinces, most army officers were aware of the poverty of the lower classes. Many had written reports and articles on the deprivation of the peons. Some officers developed a paternalistic attitude toward the poor, which later led them to support Perón's efforts to improve the condition of the lower class.

A discussion of Perón's labor

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policies brings us to Baily's contribution. Although his book begins with the formation of the first labor federation in 1890 and ends with the activities of the Liberating Revolution in 1957, emphasis is placed on the Perón period. In this respect his account, which attempts to understand Peronism on its own terms, provides a good balance for Ferns' stern anti-Peronism.

One of the striking characteristics of Baily's book is its clarity in treating complex developments. He begins in the nineteenth century, when the uprooted immigrant workers in Argentina turned to political action to establish their identity and to protect their interests. With the passage of time, these workers looked to the state rather than the local union to resolve economic and social problems that were really national problems. Popular nationalism became their ideology, and the labor nationalists sought to "create and protect a national consensus around their ideals and programs." (p. 186.)

But there was to be no national consensus in Argentina, and Baily shows that even within the ranks of labor a basic and sharp dichotomy developed between organized skilled immigrant workers and newly urbanized "creole" migrants. Organized workers included liberals and laboristas, who sought political power through the Socialist Party and the Partido Laborista, respectively. The laboristas were liberals who supported Perón in the elections of 1946. Although these two groups differed, both believed that traditional democratic institutions provided the best means to change society. Liberal nationalism was identified with the European immigrant workers. Their goal was the creation of a democratic society in accordance with Argentina's liberal tradition as modified by their leaders.

However, the liberal philosophy became elitist in the face of a vast internal migration in Argentina in the late 1930's. This migration brought the peons streaming into the Buenos Aires area, destroyed their rural ties, and made them quest for a new identity in the urban environment. In the period prior to 1943, the union liberals failed to recognize the importance of these "criollo workers" and little was done to assimilate them into established labor organizations. As Baily writes, "the internal migrants and the organized workers viewed each other with hostility and suspicion." (p. 81.)

Thwarted by the liberals, the "criollo workers" of the interior sought power through Perón. To these uprooted peons, familiar only with the personalism of the backlands, Perón became the "national patron." Most of them were unskilled and had little bargaining power. Political power was, therefore, a more urgent need to them than to the liberals and laboristas.

The story of Argentine labor nationalism is one of failure. The liberals and laboristas were undermined by Perón, who labeled them foreign elements in a nationalist Argentina. The "criollo nationalists," whose hopes for an egalitarian society were encouraged by

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Perón's first administration, were abandoned by him during his second term of office. But "criollo nationalism" lives on, and Baily concludes that if future leaders come to use this force in marshaling popular support, Perón might cease to be the leader and symbol of the Argentine labor movement. With a new leadership and new allegiance to democratic institutions, the workers of Argentina might join with other social groups in ending the "age of lead."

Interest Groups in the USSR*

by Sidney I. Ploss

Until recently most scholars assumed that policymaking in the Soviet Union was entirely in the hands of the top party leadership. If interest groups were acknowledged to exist, they were usually judged to be passive "transmission belts" for the implementation of party policy, with no role in determining that policy. It is now more widely agreed that there is group participation in policy deliberation which has broadened from time to time since Stalin's death. Furthermore, during the past few years Western scholars have shown an increasing readiness to accept the interest group approach as a valid tool for the study of Soviet politics.

Using this mode of analysis, the contributors to *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* examine seven groups at the upper and middle levels of the Soviet social structure: the party *apparatchiki*, the security police, the military, industrial managers, economists, writers and jurists. In each case, the discussion focuses primarily on the operations of the group at the national level during the post-Stalin era.

Although the book does not assume that political interest groups are the principal feature of Soviet politics, or the dominant factors in the political process, it is argued that they are an important and, until now, neglected element of the Soviet political system. At the same time, a dissenting opinion is offered by one of the editors, Franklyn Griffiths, who suggests that data regarded as evidence of interest group activity are better interpreted as reflecting conflicting "tendencies of articulation" through which policies are made for Soviet society.

Unfortunately, lowest marks must go to the essay devoted to the strongest of elite groupings: the party officials. While pointing up various shadings of opinion among the *apparatchiki*, Jerry F. Hough grossly understates the adherence of most of them to neo-Stalinist patterns of thought and behavior. Hough avers that many party functionaries "may be more receptive than other groups to the proposition that stability depends upon the correction of social evils and that the latter in turn requires a reasonably free flow of 'responsible' criticism." (p. 71.) The thin line the party men draw between such

**Interest Groups in Soviet Politics.* Edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 433 pp. $12.50.

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criticism and "carping" (*kritikanstvo*) or "blackening" (*ochernitelstvo*) has been rather obvious from the harsh crackdowns on literary and other dissidents under the post-Khrushchev regime in the USSR.

In his zeal to debunk the truism of stubborn resistance by the *apparatchiki* to genuine social reform, Hough at one point woefully distorts the meaning of a highly indicative speech made by Leningrad party boss Tolstikov at the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966. On the basis of this speech, Hough says that "leaders of the Leningrad party organization . . . have been most vigorous in their support for the development of concrete sociological investigation." (p. 71.) Actually, Tolstikov urged a study of "the social consequences of the scientific-technical revolution" for the purpose of drafting long-range plans for "the all-round social development of factory staffs." The various institutes called upon to assist in realization of this absolutist scheme were notorious for their orthodox political leanings—as pointed out elsewhere in the Skilling-Griffiths volume.

Lashing out at distinguished specialists in the field of comparative government, Hough chides "the scholar who hypothesizes a Central Committee secretariat united in an ideological approach and opposing a more pragmatic, rational state administration." (p. 86.) Surely, the top *apparatchiki* have a vested interest in blurring the lines of administrative jurisdiction so that governmental departments are pitted against one another and disputes must be settled by overseers from the party machine. Over the past few decades such divide-and-conquer tactics were constantly used by the secretarial cliques of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Legal nihilism and the leading role of the party machine are opposite sides of the same coin of Muscovite partocracy.

The following essay, by Frederick C. Barghoorn, challenges the mistaken view of the party men as more or less reasonable fellows. As Barghoorn shows, the officers of the state security service have a great stake in the Soviet status quo and have been the ultimate guardians of party supremacy. One of the best features of this essay is that it underlines the persistent influence of autocratic Russian political tradition. Barghoorn shrewdly notes that the tradition of stern, centralized rule, in which powerful secret political police agencies were relied upon to ferret out treason and subversion, was centuries old in Russia before Lenin's Bolsheviks seized power in 1917. This appreciation of the vast role played by tradition in an advanced post-revolutionary society is deftly combined with an understanding of Leninism as a uniquely important legitimizing force in the conduct of Soviet affairs. Barghoorn usefully includes in his perceptive essay an informative account of his kidnaping and imprisonment by the KGB in 1963.

On the same high level of scholarship and insight is the chapter on the military by Roman Kol-

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kowicz. An astute exponent of political sociology, Kolkowicz gets behind the Kremlin's facade of the military as a fully integrated part of a totalitarian system and reveals the special objectives and values of this important elite grouping. The many strains and disagreements that exist between party and army leaders are clearly revealed through use of the case study method, which still has analytical virtue at a moment of no little misplaced scientism in the study of politics. It would be hard to refute Kolkowicz's well-argued thesis that in Moscow "any political leader who persistently and profoundly threatens some of the military's basic interests invites his own political demise." (p. 166.) Just how this grave situation might change to the benefit of the consumer, the overall efficiency of the country's economic system and the cause of arms limitation is a question the editors might profitably have raised in their own concluding chapters.

John P. Hardt and Theodore Frankel display a masterly grasp of the subject matter in their coverage of the industrial managers. Their close look at the Stalin era discloses that even then there were opportunities both for interest articulation and for the realization of demands. They then show how in the post-Stalin period the managerial group's freedom to express its interests and bring them to bear on the powerholders has increased. As well as indicating the impact of the managerial group on state policy, Hardt and Frankel provide fresh data on the group's size, composition and education. They also imaginatively link the changing role of the professional in meeting broader challenges to the overextended control system of the party nonspecialists.

Original material on the stirring of creative thought in the Stalin era is brought to light by Richard W. Judy, whose study concentrates on Soviet economists who occupy leading positions and who voice opinions on major questions of theory and practice. In this well-researched piece, Judy attempts to do several things. He presents certain attributes of economists that correlate well with their opinions on issues of policy and methodology, reviews leadership-economist relations during the Stalin era and since 1953, and discusses two sample issues on which opinion group activity is evident among economists: the "Liberman" debate and the basis of price formation. We see vividly how some talented experts and judicious government men like Kosygin have fought with backward commentators and economically-illiterate party bosses of the Stalin school for the sake of dragging Soviet economics into the twentieth century. As Judy puts it, "analytical economics is fully compatible with rational humane socialism. . . . It is not compatible, however, with the unfettered exercise of power by a small minority such as the party apparatus." (p. 250.) The author might have devoted a few words to the hot dispute which raged in 1966-1968 over whether to revamp the starkly-centralized system of agricultural planning and introduce a nearly-

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free market for the sale of farm products. That would have been a clear-cut illustration of the interaction among groups of economists and politicians and other groups of scientists and party men which produces coalition politics on the Soviet scene.

Other workmanlike efforts are the chapters on the writers (Ernest J. Simmons) and the jurists (Donald D. Barry and Harold J. Berman). One statement by the last-mentioned scholars needs clarification, namely, that "the party leadership has recognized that its own authority can best be maintained if various groups are given more leeway to pursue independently the general interests of society." (p. 293.) This was certainly true during the last years of Khrushchev's rule, when the writings of the Czech reform economist Ota Sik were translated into Russian and published in Moscow; it is definitely not valid for the more orthodox reign of the Politburo headed by Brezhnev, especially since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The separate overviews presented by the editors at the close of their volume are provocative, if not always enlightening. Griffiths is most aware of the patronage ties between supreme leaders and intermediate actors. He rightly asserts that the signaling of a favorable disposition from the upper levels is required if lower figures are to express themselves and be heard on the really important issues of public policy. On the other hand, Griffiths displays a misunderstanding of party power when he says that "a good deal could be accomplished in the Soviet Union without significant institutional reform. Through intensified use of public and professional discussions, conferences, opinion polls, mass participation in the affairs of public associations and the state apparatus, informal participation could be extended in ways that would continue to circumvent the organs of representation and leave intact the position of the party as the leading force." (p. 376.)

What, after all, keeps the party men in the saddle? Their power position is justified in terms of the communist ideology and would be undermined if an honest wage for workers and farmers took the place of "revolutionary enthusiasm" drummed up by political agitators. Thus, Brezhnev cynically advises his people that "it would be wrong to reduce everything to material incentives as this would impoverish the inner world of Soviet man."[1] And Suslov, incarnation of the ideals of the *apparatchiki,* cautions that "The neglect of moral factors can inflict no less economic and political damage than ignoring of the principles of material incentive."[2] This exploitative mentality would be fully discredited — and the *apparatchiki* dislodged from the seats of power—if the wellsprings of public opinion were tapped in the USSR.

H. Gordon Skilling effectively criticizes his co-editor's abstract concept of diffuse "tendencies of articulation" instead of reference to "groups" and "group alliances."

[1] *Pravda,* March 30, 1968.
[2] *Ibid.,* November 7, 1970.

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But he lacks Griffiths' attunement to the workings of the patronage system, a key phenomenon that more or less unifies the concepts of Soviet politics which are geared to interest group activity and leadership conflict at top level. Nevertheless, Skilling convinces that the inclusion of political interest groups in the picture of Soviet politics renders it richer and more authentic. On the whole, he and Griffiths have succeeded in contributing to our deeper understanding of the Soviet political system.

Communist Economic Systems: Principles and Dynamics*

by Bogdan Mieczkowski

In 1968 Michael Gamarnikov published a topical book on *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe,*[1] a work that was interesting in its narrative and that concentrated on "the specter of revisionism haunting Eastern Europe." J. Wilczynski's *The Economics of Socialism,* which similarly covers Eastern Europe, including the USSR, is more analytical, and in this respect it resembles an earlier study by Stanislaw Wellisz, *The Economies of the Soviet Bloc.*[2] Wilczynski, like Wellisz, examines the principles governing the economic systems of Eastern Europe and covers the different aspects of these systems. Like Gamarnikov, however, he stresses the systems' dynamic character, thus allowing the reader to gain a better understanding of the direction of current changes. This approach is underlined by the subject matter of the last chapter which compares socialism and capitalism, summarizes the advantages and weaknesses of socialism, and analyzes the convergence hypothesis.

Wilczynski's previous study, *The Economics and Politics of East-West Trade,*[3] was well received, and he has contributed to professional journals in eight countries. He utilizes original sources in several East European languages, with a marked, though not exclusive, preference for Polish, Russian, Czech and Yugoslav materials, in that order. In addition, his latest book provides handy reference to writings available in English on individual chapter topics. Consequently, each chapter contains source material for wider research. His previous work on East-West trade has given him a comparative advantage in two of his chapters treating communist foreign trade and international economic cooperation. Other chapters cover the background of modern socialist economics, planning and the market, profit, production and growth, accumulation, consumption, labor, land, pricing, money and banking, fiscal policy and control, and domestic trade. A glossary of socialist economic terms and a guide to relevant periodicals are conveniently included.

**The Economics of Socialism: Principles Governing the Operation of the Centrally Planned Economies in the USSR and Eastern Europe under the New System.* By J. Wilczynski. London: Allen & Unwin, 1970. 233 pp. £2.75.

[1](Detroit: Wayne University Press).
[2](New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).
[3](London: Macmillan, 1969).

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A few criticisms should be mentioned. The author refers to the socially equitable distribution of national income (pp. 22-23) without noting the individually inequitable distribution, heavily skewed to the advantage of "the new class," or as some people in Eastern Europe have termed this political elite, "the owners of the People's Republic." He uncritically accepts and repeats the usual communist assertion that "there is no basic antagonism between the interest of the employer (the State) and the employees (the workers)." (p. 99). All the officially suppressed spontaneous actions of workers in Eastern Europe, from the 1953 Berlin uprising to the Baltic coast Polish workers' revolt of December 1970, belie that assertion—one made on the basis of Marxist faith rather than communist fact. The author himself later lists some possible sources of conflict between workers and management (pp. 102 and 209). While the communist system does not pit private capitalists against the workers, the interests of the state are divergent from those of workers, and enterprise managers and the party are as antagonistic to workers as private capitalists ever have been.

It is also a mistake to assert that workers' councils in Poland have any power (pp. 102, 209), since they were curtailed early in 1959 and later liquidated in fact, though apparently not in law. Discussion of rates of growth takes account of the dip in the early 1960's but omits the problem of general fluctuations in Soviet-type economic systems, leaving this to be noted later in a footnote in the chapter on money and banking (p. 149). The rates of economic growth are given straight from official sources without corrections made by independent Western economists. The chapter on consumption also fails to utilize available calculations of consumption indices made in the West, which are more reliable than the official indices, and in discussing the relative burdens of military expenditures the author should have pointed out that many such expenditures are hidden in communist countries under other budget items.

These are, however, minor criticisms. There are economists who prefer to rely only on official statistics, even though the credibility gap is wider in the East than in the West.

Wilczynski has collected an imposing amount of information, and has presented it concisely and clearly, producing a *vade mecum* of modern communist economics.[4] His book is the second in a new series of Studies in Economics, edited by Charles Carter. The first one, on *Expectation, Enterprise and Profit*, was written by G. L. S. Shackle, a well-known author of several other studies. These two entries augur well for the series and for its contribution to economic knowledge.

[4]Just published is a sequel to *The Economics of Socialism* by the same author, entitled *Socialist Economic Development and Reforms* (New York: Praeger, 1972), a valuable integration of research on the functioning of socialist economies.

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Books Received

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I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Armed Forces of the World: A Reference Handbook. (Third edition.) Edited by Robert C. Sellers. New York: Praeger, 1971. 296 pp. $15.00. This handbook on the military strength of nations is compiled from surveys of governments and from careful literature searches in military and political journals from all over the world. Mr. Sellers, president of a management consultant firm, concedes that the margin of error may be as high as 8 to 10 per cent in some cases and looks for cooperation from users to help him improve the accuracy of the volume's data.

Columbia Essays in International Affairs. Volume VI: The Dean's Papers, 1970. Edited by Andrew W. Cordier. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 232 pp. $10.00. In this latest volume of student essays, nine studies treat a wide variety of topics. Included are "The Establishers: A Comparative Analysis of Adenauer and Nehru," by Bette Knapp; "Nonmilitary Incentives for the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons," by Charles Bethill; "Sweden's View of the Non-Proliferation Treaty," by Gertrud Svala; and "The EEC and the Maghreb," by Glenda Rosenthal.

The International Corporation: A Symposium. Edited by Charles P. Kindleberger. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1970. 415 pp. $5.95 (paper). This valuable collection of fifteen papers is the product of a seminar on the international corporation given in the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the spring of 1969. Papers on the following topics are included: A Theory of Direct Foreign Investment; The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of the International Corporation; Technology, U.S. Investment, and European Economic Growth; The Myth of National Independence; The Multinational Corporation in World Petroleum; U.S. Automotive Investments Abroad; American Banks in Europe; Japan as Host to the International Corporation; Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America; and Future of the Multinational Enterprise.

International Law: The Substance, Processes, Procedures and Institutions for World Peace with Justice. By Charles S. Rhyne. Washington: CLB Publishers, 1971. 656 pp. n.p. Written by a leading authority in the field, this volume is aimed at increasing the knowledge of international law among both laymen and lawyers. It is the author's hope that increased knowledge will pave the way to increased acceptance of, increased respect for and thus increased strength in international law and its legal institutions. He includes a compilation and description of the agencies that create international law.

Nationalism. By K. R. Minogue. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970. 168 pp. $1.45 (paper). Professor Minogue's treatment of nationalism examines its origins as a European phenomenon, laying particular emphasis on the French Revolution

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and the quest for German unification, and the various forms in which it was exported to other areas after its Continental development. Four types of nationalism are described and analyzed: that of once-fragmented countries seeking unity; the macro-nationalism of the pan-movements such as pan-Arabism; the nationalism of Black Muslims, Zionists and other people in search of a home; and fascism or totalitarian nationalism.

The Power to Keep Peace. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield. Berkeley, Calif.: World Without War Council, 1971. 250 pp. $2.95. Proceeding from an analysis of past efforts of UN forces, Dr. Bloomfield proposes an international peacekeeping force capable of isolating and controlling wars arising within and among nations. His proposal is then assessed by Hans Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffmann, Thomas Schelling and Henry Dicks. Reports by U Thant and Dag Hammarskjold and position papers by major American organizations and commissions add to the views on the topic.

Report on Planet Three and Other Speculations. By Arthur C. Clarke. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 250 pp. $6.95. A collection, at once lighthearted and serious, of twenty-three delightful essays on space and the future of science and technology by the co-author, with Stanley Kubrick, of the fascinating film *2001: A Space Odyssey.*

Small States in International Relations. Edited by August Schon and Arne Olaf Brundtland. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971. 250 pp. $15.00. Made up of papers presented at the Seventeenth Nobel Symposium convened by the Norwegian Nobel Institute, this book includes the views of contributors from all parts of the globe and from states both large and small. Among the topics dealt with are the role of small states in easing international tensions, their impact within alliance systems, and their actions in international organizations.

Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. (Fourth edition.) By Inis L. Claude, Jr. New York: Random House, 1971. 514 pp. n.p. In the latest revision of one of the classic texts on international organization, the author again seeks to provide the student with his personal evaluations on such matters as the reciprocal relationship between international organization and international politics, the reasons for the development of international organization in the twentieth century, and the persistence of features and forces within the international system that inhibit the fundamental modification of that system by organizational means.

Trade and Specialization. By Ronald Findlay. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970. 149 pp. $1.65 (paper). A brief, clearly written analysis of international economic specialization and the resultant benefits as seen from both cosmopolitan and nationalistic viewpoints. Among the topics treated are the empirical testing of theories of specialization and the impact of international specialization on welfare economics. One of the Penguin Modern Economics Texts, the book is liberally illustrated with graphs and diagrams.

Trade Strategy for Rich and Poor Nations. Edited by Harry G. Johnson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. 232 pp. $9.50. Four essays on trade and development strategies and problems. The paper by David Wall links the question of tariff preferences for developing countries to the formulation of a broad strategy for maintaining the momentum of trade liberalization in the world as a whole. Hans Liesner examines the implications of a multilateral free trade treaty for the national economic policies of the participating countries, and deals with the nontariff distortion problem and policy harmonization question. M. D. Steuer analyzes an issue that promises to be a matter of major concern in the 1970's: the benefits and costs of direct investment in a

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country by multinational corporations and the influence of trade and other policies on such investment and its economic consequences. The editor, Harry Johnson, provides an introductory essay on the development problem, the success of the First UNCTAD in 1964, the failure of the Second UNCTAD in 1968, and the future of UNCTAD and of development promotion.

United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal. By James M. Boyd. New York: Praeger, 1971. 261 pp. $15.00. The author discusses the United Nations' role in controlling international conflict and its peacekeeping efforts, focusing on three key crises—Suez, the Congo and Cyprus. He compares and contrasts the three operations, considering the grounds for intervention, the problems of force creation and composition, and the conduct of the operation and its accomplishments. On the basis of this appraisal, he makes suggestions to enhance the capabilities and effectiveness of such forces in the future.

Yalta. By Diane Shaver Clemens. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 356 pp. $8.50. Utilizing Soviet, British and American sources and comparing the records, memoirs and proposals of all three sides, the author discusses the origins of the Conference at Yalta, follows the issues resolved through day-to-day negotiations, and presents a daily analysis of the conference. Her conclusion is that Yalta and the decisions taken there reflect the personal interactions of men with different, often shifting outlooks.

II. United States

Agnew, the Unexamined Man: A Political Profile. By Robert Marsh. New York: M. Evans, 1971. 182 pp. $5.95. This account of Spiro Agnew's rise from struggling Baltimore lawyer and zoning board member in the mid-1950's to Governor of Maryland and then Vice President of the United States was written by a public affairs specialist who served on Agnew's staff during the 1966 gubernatorial campaign. He characterizes Agnew as "not unintelligent," loyal and "basically honest," industrious, patriotic, politically lucky, thin-skinned, incapable of self-analysis and philosophical commitment, and, finally, as the inventor of "a new mode of politics—upward mobility through failure."

A History of United States Foreign Policy. (Third edition.) By Julius W. Pratt. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 621 pp. n.p. This classic text on American foreign policy has now been revised to include an additional chapter on the Western Hemisphere and a new chapter on the Indochina war. The author also substitutes a bibliographical essay for the former chapter bibliographies.

How Democratic Is America? Responses to the New Left Challenge. Edited by Robert A. Goldwin. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971. 136 pp. $2.95 (paper). This book is comprised of a lengthy excerpt from the Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and five essays—by Walter Berns, Howard Zinn, Sidney Hook, Harry M. Clor and Allan Bloom — which scrutinize the theoretical foundations of the New Left movement. The essayists examine the movement's articulated philosophy, explore its attack on the established principles of the American political system, and reassess the institutions and values of American society and government.

Radicals or Conservatives? The Contemporary American Right. By James McEvoy III. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971. 167 pp. $4.95. At the core of this assessment of the social and psychological origins of the American Right and its influence and activities from 1950 to 1968 is a detailed study of the

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two attempts to capture the Presidency by Barry Goldwater and George Wallace. Employing extensive demographic and class structure survey data, the author examines the central themes of these two movements—intense nationalism and anti-communism, concern for traditional morality, and advocacy of reduced social welfare programs—and advances the proposition that notable differences distinguish the two political efforts.

Report from Wasteland: America's Military Industrial Complex. By William Proxmire. New York: Praeger, 1970. 248 pp. $6.95. In the summer of 1969 Senator Proxmire, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, conducted hearings on the military budget and national priorities. This book reports on the findings of the subcommittee's investigations; examines the relationships between defense contractors and the Pentagon and between the Pentagon and Congress; discloses "the shameful record of deception, incompetence, and cover-up" of the "military-industrial complex"; and shows how the United States is "wasting at least $10 billion a year on our weapons systems."

The Southern Strategy. By Reg Murphy and Hal Gulliver. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. 273 pp. $7.95. Written by the Editor and Associate Editor of the Atlanta *Constitution,* this book assesses the functioning and aims of the Southern Strategy which began in the early spring of 1968 when Richard Nixon made a political deal with Strom Thurmond and which came to grief, according to the authors, in the 1970 elections, thanks largely to the black voter registration drive.

The Stately Game. By James W. Symington. New York: Macmillan, 1971. 256 pp. $5.95. Congressman Symington, United States Chief of Protocol from 1966 to 1968, explains the role of protocol in the conduct of the affairs of states and statesmen in the contemporary international system and demonstrates that diplomatic niceties are of greater importance than might be generally recognized. The reader is treated to a behind-the-official-facade look at specific examples of diplomacy and diplomats in action.

Strategic Energy Supply and National Security. By Carl Vansant. New York: Praeger, 1971. 135 pp. $15.00. The author, formerly with the United States Atomic Energy Commission, examines energy supplies around the world and evaluates the strategic strength of various nations from this perspective. Inequitable distribution of resources, whether petroleum, coal, nuclear, hydraulic or from other sources, and the differing rates of technological demands for power are assessed as they bear on strategic capabilities. There are also useful appendices dealing with U.S. fuel procurement, deliveries and tanker lifts.

III. Western Europe and Atlantic Community

Disaster at Bari. By Glenn B. Infield. New York: Macmillan, 1971. 301 pp. $6.95. The story of the secret poison gas tragedy at Bari which resulted when the merchantman *S.S. John Harvey* exploded with a cargo of one hundred tons of 100-pound mustard bombs on December 2, 1943, killing over one thousand Allied military personnel and unprotected Italian civilians.

Europe Since Hitler: The Rebirth of Europe. By Walter Laqueur. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972. 543 pp. $2.95 (paper). A comprehensive history of post-war Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic, originally published in 1970. The author describes the events of the Stalinist phase of the Cold War, economic and social trends, the cultural scene, and European politics from 1955 to 1970.

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The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914. By Zara S. Steiner. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970. 262 pp. $10.50. This study of the British Foreign Office at a decisive period in world affairs is primarily an administrative history of how and why a secretarial department, archaic in tone and manner, developed into a major department of state and assumed an integral role in the process of formulating foreign policy.

Geography of Europe: A Regional Analysis. By Vincent H. Malmstrom. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 165 pp. $6.95 ($2.50, paper). An examination of the European continent's six major regions, conducted according to physical, cultural and political criteria. The author organizes his analysis within each region by country, and within each country by physiographic provinces.

Germany. By Ernest K. Bramsted. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 278 pp. $6.95. This interpretive history focuses on the German position in the heart of Europe, a target of invasions and foreign exploitation and a battleground for neighboring armies, which caused "much mental claustrophobia and insecurity . . . before 1870, and . . . aggressive self-assertiveness afterwards." After an introductory discussion of Germany as a divided country today, the author goes back in history to describe medieval and early modern Germany to 1815 and "the Spirit of Weimar, 1775-1832." He divides nineteenth-century Germany into three eras: the early industrial revolution, 1815-1850; Bismarck and the Second Empire, 1850-1890; and the reign of William II, to 1918. His last four chapters are devoted to the "unlucky republic" of 1918-1933; Hitler's Third Reich; literature and politics, 1914-1949; and major foreign policy issues since 1949.

Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Postwar Years. By Alfred Grosser. New York: Praeger, 1971. 378 pp. $12.50. Following a brief survey of German history, the author describes conquered Germany after 1945, the Nuremberg trials, denazification, the policies of the occupying powers, and the impact of the Cold War. The major part of the book is devoted to a discussion of political institutions, elections and party politics, economic and social forces, and moral and intellectual trends in West Germany since 1949. The East German state is treated in one chapter and the "German problem" and foreign policy issues are examined in another.

History of the Italian People. By Giuliano Procacci. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 394 pp. $10.00. While presenting a sweeping account of the past thousand years of Italian history, the author attempts to bring unity to its complexity by stressing such ideas as the role of the intellectual in Italian history and the historical possibilities of revolution for Italy. The Italian version of this work won the Viareggio Prize (1968), one of the most prestigious prizes in Italian letters.

Old World, New Horizons: Britain, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance. By Edward Heath. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. 89 pp. $4.95. British Prime Minister Heath delivered these Godkin Lectures on the philosophy and purpose behind the movement for European unity at Harvard University in March 1967. He was particularly concerned to trace the development of the EEC and "to deduce from its history the direction of its future development" and to examine "Britain's attitude towards the EEC and how Britain's aspirations in Europe fitted into a general concept of Britain's place in the world." The lectures, whose publication was delayed until 1970 because of the delicate nature of negotiations surrounding Britain's application for EEC membership, have been updated.

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IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power, 1934-1944. By Nissan Oren. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 293 pp. n.p. The struggle of Bulgarian communists for control of their country was waged for more than a decade before the establishment of communist rule in Bulgaria in September 1944. This book, which concentrates on the ten years preceding the takeover, contains detailed studies of the leaders active in Soviet exile, noncommunist factions both in and out of the ruling elite, embattled party cadres, peculiarities of the Bulgarian political process, and the country's relations with purge-torn Soviet Russia.

The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis, 1962-1968. By Galia Golan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. 349 pp. $16.50. The author describes the early efforts toward reform from Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech of 1956 to 1962; the crucial developments of 1963—the Twelfth Party Congress, the revolt of the intellectuals, the resulting crisis and decision to de-Stalinize; the subsequent reforms in the economic, social-cultural and political spheres; and the events of 1967, when the liberals came to power as a result of pressures from economists, the cultural elite, Slovaks and youths. A concluding section examines the "Prague Spring" of 1968, the Soviet invasion, and Moscow's concept of "limited sovereignty."

The Czechs Under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance, 1939-1942. By Vojteck Mastny. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. 274 pp. $10.00. Czechoslovakia fell under Hitler's control early and remained under his domination longer than any other nation. Was the stability of German rule a result of the policies of the occupation forces? Professor Mastny, born in Prague, seems to answer in the negative. Instead, he argues that the explanation lies in the failure of the Czechs and their leaders to conduct a resistance effort properly.

Lenin and the Russian Revolution. By Christopher Hill. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1971. 185 pp. $1.45 (paper). First published in 1947 as part of the "Teach Yourself History" series, this book assesses the place of Lenin and the revolution he made in world history. Intended for general readers, it does not pretend to be an exhaustive study of the man, but rather a selective account in which the most significant aspects of Lenin's activity and thought are given detailed treatment.

Russia Enters the 20th Century. Edited by Erwin Oberlander, George Katkov, Nikolaus Poppe and Georg von Rauch. New York: Schocken Books, 1971. 345 pp. $12.00. The editors provide a portrait of pre-1917 Russia in which the October Revolution is not assumed or viewed as an inevitability. Separate chapters treat important events which took place in such fields as religion, philosophy, literature, economics, foreign policy, agrarian reform, education and colonization. The aim is to provide perspective on the proposition that, had World War I not occurred, Russia might have been able to reform without the revolution.

The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the USSR. By John S. Reshetar, Jr. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971. 412 pp. $4.50 (paper). This study of the Soviet political system treats initially of the USSR as a multinational empire, of Soviet political culture and the Russian political tradition, and of the ideological heritage. The author then describes the institutions and functioning of the system: the CPSU, its organization, membership, and the structure of power; the formal organs of government at the center and at republic and local levels; economic decision-making, social welfare services and the politics of cultural affairs; and issues in Soviet foreign policy.

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The Strangled Democracy: Czechoslovakia, 1948-1969. By David Rodnick. Lubbock, Texas: The Caprock Press, 1970. 214 pp. $4.95 (paper). The author spent ten months in Czechoslovakia in 1948 doing research for a book that was not published, and returned in 1969 after the Prague Spring and Soviet invasion of 1968. In his description of Czech communism in action, cultural developments, Czech family life, young people, farmers and workers, the middle classes, and ethnic differences between Czechs and Slovaks, he stresses the theme that, despite twenty years of communism, the cultures of the Czechs and Slovaks have changed very little.

Yugoslavia. By Stevan K. Pavlowitch. New York: Praeger, 1971. 416 pp. $11.00. The underlying theme of this most recent addition to the Nations of the Modern World series is Yugoslavia's pursuit of unity. The author reviews the quest for unity prior to the end of World War I and the efforts of the royal family to achieve national unity after the creation of an independent Yugoslavia. Against this background he assesses the Tito experiment in ideological unity following the communist victory in 1945 and the present situation in which ethnic and national antipathies seem to grow stronger even as the population, in some respects, draws closer together. The impression left with the reader is that the threads which bind the state together are still weak.

V. Middle East and Africa

Desalting Technology for Middle Eastern Agriculture: An Economic Case. By Jerome J. Fried and Milton C. Edlund. New York: Praeger, 1971. 115 pp. $12.50. The Middle East is as short of fresh water as it seems to be long on oil. Desalting water in an effort to remedy the scarcity has been considered to be prohibitively expensive. An economist and a physicist now challenge this view and offer a plan for desalinization plants using low-cost fuel, which abounds in the region.

The Economic History of Iran: 1800-1914. Edited by Charles Issawi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. 405 pp. $17.50. In 1966 Professor Issawi published *The Economic History of the Middle East: 1800-1914.* This book is a companion volume, as the earlier publication did not include Iran. While in recent years Iran has developed rapidly, the modern pace is in sharp contrast to that of the period under discussion. The social structure, geography, resources and administrative organization of the country are evaluated. So, too, is the stultifying effect on Iran of the Anglo-Russian rivalry.

A History of O.P.E.C. By Fuad Rouhani. New York: Praeger, 1971. 283 pp. $17.50. Many observers today believe that the once dominant position of the oil company in international petroleum has been lost in favor of oil-producing-country domination in the contemporary world marketplace. To the degree that the pendulum has swung, the trend can be attributed in large measure to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Ambassador Rouhani, the first Secretary-General of OPEC, evaluates its achievements in bringing about the more favorable position of the member countries. Concentrating on recent agreements, particularly that of February 1971 at Tehran, he concludes that the organization's strength and effectiveness will continue to grow.

Iran Faces the Seventies. Edited by Ehsan Yar-Shater. New York: Praeger, 1971. 399 pp. $12.50. A collection of essays, this book treats several aspects of Iran's recent progress and forecasts that developing nation's short-term future prospects. The contributors include leading Middle East scholars writing in their special areas of expertise. Among them, Ann K. S. Lambton analyzes land reform and agricultural cooperatives, Charles Issawi examines Iran's economic performance, and J. C. Hurewitz places the country in international perspective.

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Israel and the Holy Places of Christendom. By Walter Zander. New York: Praeger, 1971. 248 pp. $8.50. The city of Jerusalem has a special significance for each of the three major religions which were cradled in the Middle East. Insofar as Christianity is concerned, two major issues have influenced its attitudes and actions in the Holy Land. First, the area has for generations been governed by non-Christians; second, Christendom has been divided. Walter Zander deals with both issues as they have developed since the June War of 1967 and the consequent Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and the West Bank. Included is a discussion of the various schemes for the governing of Jerusalem, involving the United Nations, joint religious trusteeship and Arab-Israeli condominium.

Madagascar. By Nigel Heseltine. New York: Praeger, 1971. 334 pp. $11.00. After a consideration of Madagascar's geographic and societal backgrounds, the author surveys the island's history since 1800, with greatest emphasis on the post-1960 period of independence, when Madagascar became the Malagasay Republic. He also examines the economy and the future prospects for political development.

Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts by Amilcar Cabral. Translated and edited by Richard Handyside. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969. 174 pp. $4.95. A summary of the principles of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde as contained in the writings and utterances of Amilcar Cabral, a guerrilla leader in Portuguese Guinea.

Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East, Volume II: The Arab States. By George M. Haddad. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1971. 587 pp. $12.50. Professor Haddad's first volume, dealing with the non-Arab states of the northern tier—Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan—was published in 1965. The present volume, one of two planned to include the study of fifty-nine revolutions and coups d'état in eight Arab countries, concentrates on Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Not only does it survey revolutions and the personalities involved, and assess the various leaders' successes and failures, it also attempts to highlight patterns of military takeovers and to analyze the characteristics and results of military rule.

Turkey: An Introductory Geography. By J. C. Dewdney. New York: Praeger, 1971. 214 pp. $7.50. While there have been numerous geographies of the Middle East, this is the first volume in English which treats Turkish geography as a separate subject. Dividing his work into four parts, Professor Dewdney examines the physical, human, economic and regional geographic aspects of a country constituting an important bridge between East and West.

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

Arms, Yen & Power: The Japanese Dilemma. By John K. Emmerson. New York: Dunellen, 1971. 420 pp. $15.00. A thorough examination of Japan's foreign policy and international position, written by the U.S. Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo from 1962 to 1967, who retired from the Foreign Service in 1968 and is now Senior Research Fellow at The Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He scrutinizes the U.S.-Japanese alliance, the American nuclear umbrella and military base problems, the role and strength of Japan's self-defense forces, Okinawa reversion, Tokyo's relations with China, the USSR, Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia, the political and technological issues in the nuclear option, and the future of U.S.-Japanese relations.

China and Ourselves: Explorations and Revisions by a New Generation. Edited by Bruce Douglass and Ross Terrill. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970. 259 pp. $7.50.

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Ten essays on modern China by young scholars from Australia, the Philippines, Japan, Canada and the United States who, according to Edgar Snow's preface, say that "the People's Republic is . . . the only China they have known; in accepting it as the great reality they have no guilt feelings about a 'lost' China they never knew." Two essays deal with the meaning of the Cultural Revolution, and others treat such topics as China and the unfinished revolutions of Asia, Taiwan as an issue in Washington-Peking relations, the distinctive features of China's modernization, the relationship between Christian social thought and the practice of Chinese communism, and the significance of Chinese socialism in the light of the European socialist tradition.

The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation. By Stephen P. Cohen. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 216 pp. $7.50. The author, a member of the Political Science Department of the University of Illinois, explores the objectives and techniques of the British in creating the Indian Army, an institution serving their colonial purposes yet able to survive the stresses of nationalism, the partition of the subcontinent and independence. Tracing the army from its inception through Empire and the world wars to its present form, he examines its contribution to nation-building and development theory.

Isolation and Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the European Crises, 1935-1939. By E. M. Andrews. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970. 236 pp. $7.95. Beginning with a description of the early support for the League of Nations offered by Britain and Australia, Dr. Andrews details Australian reactions to the aggressions that led to World War II. Crises and conflicts in Ethiopia, Spain, Czechoslovakia and Poland are discussed, and emphasis is placed on the impact Munich's appeasement had on Australian foreign policy. In the concluding chapter implications are drawn from the prewar period for comparison with Australia's present support for the United States in Viet Nam.

Radical Politics in West Bengal. By Marcus F. Franda. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1971. 287 pp. $12.50. In view of the successful secession of East Bengal (Bangla Desh) from Pakistan, this study of communism in West Bengal is particularly timely. The author provides valuable information on the origins, aims and behavior of communist factions in West Bengal and the impact of these communist movements on state and national politics in India. Though Bengali communism has been "intimately related to the decline of Bengal in this century and to the Bengali search for a new regional identity and regional political power," the growing involvement of the Soviet Union and Communist China in the politics of the region inevitably will magnify the international implications of local struggles for power. Details of the radicalization of this Indian state make a useful contribution to the slender library of works on communism in South Asia.

Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China. Edited by Chün-tu Hsüeh. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 580 pp. $4.95 (paper). In this series of twenty articles eminent China scholars appraise the highest leadership of the three revolutions of modern China: the Taiping Rebellion, the Republican Revolution, and the communist movement. The general purpose of the volume is to show how strategic elites committed to China's domestic modernization and enhanced international status have supplanted leadership groups wedded to traditional values and institutions.

Uncertain India: A Political Profile of Two Decades of Freedom. By Pran Chopra. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1968. 403 pp. $2.95 (paper). The

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editor of *The Statesman* (New Delhi) reports with guarded optimism and considerable pride on the manner in which Indian statesmen handled the many economic, political, religious and linguistic problems that confronted his country from 1947 to 1967. He places special emphasis on the performance of the economy under Jawaharlal Nehru's brand of socialism, the evolution of India's political system and especially of democratic socialism, and the domestic and international pressures on the conduct of India's foreign policy of nonalignment.

VII. Latin America

Catholicism and Political Development in Latin America. By Frederick C. Turner. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971. 272 pp. $8.75. In this study of the changing role of the Catholic Church in Latin America and its part in political development, the author analyzes the varied relationships between the Church and the process of social and political change. Viewing the Church as both a social institution and an evolving body of doctrine, he pays particular attention to divergent attitudes among Church progressives, traditionalists and revolutionaries. An effort is also made to relate the Church's experience to theories of political development and religious sociology.

The Church as a Political Factor in Latin America. By David E. Mutchler. New York: Praeger, 1971. 320 pp. $18.50. This work documents the fragmentation of Church organization in Colombia and Chile during the last decade. The author maintains that ties with U.S. and West European policy interests contributed to the decline of the Church's influence in Latin American politics.

Contemporary Inter-American Relations: A Reader in Theory and Issues. Edited by Yale H. Ferguson. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall 1972. 543 pp. $9.25. A wide-ranging collection of articles, many by key figures and policy-makers, dealing with significant intra- and extra-Western Hemisphere relationships as well as those between the United States and Latin America. In Part I, the essays highlight concepts and theories that lend perspective to the readings. Discussions are included on such topics as the external factors in Latin American politics; the decline of the OAS; the role of international labor organizations; nonintervention; and the relevance of the Latin American milieu to the foreign policy of Commonwealth Caribbean states. Part II, concerned with the patterns and problems of contemporary inter-American relations, includes several treatments of the Dominican crisis of 1965. The last sections explore the problems and prospects for modernization.

Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. By Hugh Thomas. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 1696 pp. $20.00. A massive history of Cuba from the English capture of Havana through the years of Spanish and U.S. domination, the Spanish-American war, the young republic, 1909-1932, the revolution of 1933, the Batista era, the Castro revolution, the missile crisis, and the current period of Cuban-U.S. hostility. Among the many valuable contributions of this book is the author's close attention throughout to the island's greatest crop, sugar, and its crucial impact on Cuban society.

For the Liberation of Brazil. By Carlos Marighela. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971. 190 pp. $1.45 (paper). A collection of writings by a long-time member of the orthodox Communist Party in Brazil who rebelled against its bureaucratization in 1967 and turned his efforts toward creating a genuinely revolutionary Brazilian movement until he was killed by the police in November 1969.

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Monographs and Reports Received

Arab Nationalism and a Wider World. Edited by Sylvia G. Haim. New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1971. 52 pp. $1.25.

Cambodia & the Vietnam War. Edited by Hal Kosut. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1971. 222 pp. $3.95.

Christianity in Israel. Edited by A. Roy Eckardt. New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1971. 51 pp. n.p.

A Comparative Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy: Notes on Theorizing. By Edward L. Morse. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 36, November 1971. 42 pp. $2.50.

The Dollar Crisis and Europe. By Louis Camu. Paris: The Atlantic Institute, The Atlantic Papers, No. 3, November 1971. 68 pp. $1.70.

The Impact of Developments in the Asian Pacific on South Asia & the Indian Ocean Basin, 1972-1984. By James McGarry and Daniel Tretiak. Falls Church, Va.: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Center for Advanced Studies and Analyses, ASA Monograph No. 7, September 1971. 41 pp. $2.25.

New Directions in Economic Research. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., Fifty-first Annual Report, November 1971. 177 pp. n.p.

1971 Yearbook on Latin American Communist Affairs. Edited by William E. Ratliff. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1971. 194 pp. $4.50.

The Security Council in a Universal United Nations. By Arthur Lall. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Occasional Paper No. 11, November 1971. 42 pp. $1.00.

Telecommunications: One World-Mind. By Don Fabun. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Glencoe Press, 1971. 38 pp. $1.25.

3 Assassinations: The Deaths of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King. Edited by Janet M. Knight. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1971. 266 pp. $4.45.

The United States and the European Community: Policies for a Changing World Economy. A Statement by the Research and Policy Committee, CED. New York: Committee for Economic Development, November 1971. 75 pp. $1.50.

U.S. Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970's: A New Approach to New Realities. A Policy Report by an NPA Advisory Committee, with papers by C. Fred Bergsten, Robert M. Dunn, Jr., Frances M. Geiger, Theodore Geiger, Robert E. Hunter and Harald B. Malmgren. Washington: National Planning Association, Planning Pamphlet No. 130, November 1971. 211 pp. $2.50.

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Politique Etrangère

N° 5/6-1971
NUMERO SPECIAL

INTERETS ET POLITIQUES DE LA FRANCE ET DES ETATS-UNIS AU MOYEN-ORIENT ET EN AFRIQUE DU NORD

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